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INTRODUCTION
We are pleased to be joined by Law Review members Joshua Harms,
Natalie Reid, Edna Enriquez, Evanie Parr, Michael Parrott, and Gregory
Swanson, and the rest of the Seattle University Law Review, who
performed the research required to update this Survey. Many sections of
this Survey were improved through editing and revisions, clarifying the
discussions and analysis of cases. This marks the sixth publication of the
Survey that was originally authored by Justice Robert F. Utter,
Washington State Supreme Court (retired) in 1985, with updates published
in 1988, 1998, 2005, and 2013.
This Survey is intended to serve as a resource which Washington
lawyers, judges, law enforcement officers, and others can turn to as an
authoritative starting point for researching Washington search and seizure
law. In order to be useful as a research tool, this Survey requires periodic
updates to address new cases interpreting the Washington constitution and
the U.S. Constitution and to reflect the current state of the law. Many of
these cases involve the Washington State Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the Washington constitution. Also, as the U.S. Supreme Court has
continued to examine Fourth Amendment search and seizure
jurisprudence, its decisions and reflections on Washington law are
discussed.
Often the rules and approaches in interpreting the Washington
constitution differ in certain areas from the analysis used by the U.S.
Supreme Court in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Where that
occurs, this Survey has identified the independent approach adopted by the
Washington State Supreme Court.
Article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution is a counterpart to
the Fourth Amendment. That section provides that “no person shall be
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of
law.” The Washington State Supreme Court historically applied the
analytical framework outlined in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 61–62,
720 P.2d 808 (1986), in its case-by-case determination of the scope of
protection afforded under article I, section 7, and in situations where
greater individual protection exists under the Washington constitution than
under the Fourth Amendment.
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Gunwall adopted the following six neutral interpretive factors: (1)
the textual language of the state constitution; (2) the significant differences
in the texts of parallel provisions of the federal and state constitutions; (3)
the state constitutional and common law history; (4) the preexisting state
law; (5) the differences in structure between the federal and state
constitutions; and (6) matters of particular state interest or local
concern. Id.
This analytical framework adopted in Gunwall provides the structure
and foundation from which Washington courts continue to define the
scope of article I, section 7. Recognizing the structural approach to state
constitutional interpretation, however, continues to provide a reasoned
method for resolving issues of state constitutional law.
This Survey contains updated case comments and statutory
references that are current through December 2018, and focuses primarily
on search and seizure law in the criminal context; it omits discussion of
many procedural issues, including those arising under court rules that
implement constitutional protections. In addition, all references to Wayne
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment,
have been updated to the October 2018 update of the fifth edition.

CHAPTER 1
Triggering Article I, Section 7 and the Fourth Amendment:
Defining Searches and Seizures
This chapter addresses three questions: (1) what is a search; (2)
what is a seizure; and (3) who has standing to challenge a search or
seizure? These questions represent the threshold inquiry in any search or
seizure problem. Unless a search or seizure has occurred within the
meaning of the federal or state constitution, constitutional protections are
not triggered. This chapter first discusses when a search has occurred,
from entries into the home to the taking of blood samples. The chapter
then discusses when a seizure has occurred, be it an arrest, an
investigatory stop, or the detainment of property. The chapter concludes
with a discussion of who may raise claims concerning article I, section 7
or the Fourth Amendment.
1.0 DEFINING “SEARCH” PRE-KATZ:
“CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AREAS”
Prior to 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court found Fourth Amendment
protections in “constitutionally protected areas.” Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 59, 87 S. Ct. 1873, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040 (1967); Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438–39, 83 S. Ct. 1381, 10 L. Ed. 2d 462
(1963). The Fourth Amendment’s guarantees applied only to those
searches that intruded into one of the “protected areas” enumerated
within the Fourth Amendment: “persons” (including the bodies and
clothing of individuals); “houses” (including apartments, hotel rooms,
garages, business offices, stores, and warehouses); “papers” (such as
letters); and “effects” (such as automobiles). See generally 1 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.1, at 562–76 (5th ed. 2012).
This conception of the Fourth Amendment changed in 1967 when
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 88
S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). In Katz, the Court found that the
Fourth Amendment protects “people, not places.” Id. at 350–52, 88 S.
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Ct. 507. That is, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . [b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” Id. at 351,
88 S. Ct. 507. The Court thus defined a search as that which invades an
individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 360, 88 S. Ct.
507 (Harlan, J., concurring). The following sections examine the
application of this “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis as well
as the continued vitality of the “constitutionally protected area.” See 1
LaFave, supra, § 2.1, at 562–96.
1.1 DEFINING “SEARCH” POST-KATZ: THE “REASONABLE EXPECTATION
OF PRIVACY”
The concurring opinion in Katz, which has since been accepted as
the Katz test, explained that the Fourth Amendment extends search and
seizure protections to all situations in which a defendant has a
“reasonable expectation of privacy.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
360, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see
1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.1, at 562–96 (5th ed. 2012).
A reasonable expectation of privacy is measured by a twofold analysis.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S. Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring). First, a
person must have “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy.” Id. For example, a person has no expectation of privacy where
illegal business is openly conducted. State v. Clark, 129 Wn.2d 211, 226,
916 P.2d 384 (1996); State v. Hastings, 119 Wn.2d 229, 232, 830 P.2d
658 (1992). Second, the individual’s expectation must be “one that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Katz, 389 U.S. at 361,
88 S. Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 31, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001); State v. Carter,
151 Wn.2d 118, 127, 85 P.3d 887 (2004); State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d
173, 189, 867 P.2d 593 (1994). This “legitimate” expectation of privacy
“must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by
reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.” Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143–44 n.12, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387
(1978).
Similarly, article I, section 7 extends search and seizure protections
to one’s “private affairs” and home. Const. art I, § 7. The focus is on
“those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should
be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant.” State
v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689, 695, 92 P.3d 202 (2004) (quoting State v.
Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151 (1984)). In the remainder of
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this section, we discuss the protection of a person’s “private affairs”
under article I, section 7 and the reasonable expectation of privacy under
the Fourth Amendment, as both have been applied to the use of sensoryenhancing devices and techniques such as canine sniffs, aerial
surveillance, GPS trackers, and recording devices.
1.1(a) Article I, Section 7 Analysis of Sensory-Enhancing Devices
and Techniques
In applying article I, section 7, courts engage in a case-by-case
analysis concerning the use of sensory-enhancing techniques in the
course of police investigations. For example, whether a canine sniff
constitutes a search remains an unanswered question in Washington.
State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 181, 196 P.3d 658 (2008). Specifically,
Washington courts have rejected a blanket rule that canine sniffs are not
searches, focusing instead on the intrusiveness of the sniff and the
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. Boyce, 44 Wn.
App. 724, 730, 723 P.2d 28 (1986); see also State v. Hartzell, 156 Wn.
App. 918, 929–30, 237 P.3d 928 (2010) (dog sniff of exterior of car door
is not a search); State v. Stanphill, 53 Wn. App. 623, 631, 769 P.2d 861
(1989) (dog sniff of package at post office is not a search).
Furthermore, under article I, section 7, “[a]erial surveillance is not
a search where the contraband is identifiable with the unaided eye, from
a lawful vantage point, and from a nonintrusive altitude.” State v. Wilson,
97 Wn. App. 578, 581, 988 P.2d 463 (1999); State v. Cord, 103 Wn.2d
361, 365, 693 P.2d 81 (1985) (aerial surveillance of defendant’s property
at an altitude of 3,400 feet without the aid of visual enhancement devices
does not constitute a search); Myrick, 102 Wn.2d at 514, 688 P.2d 151
(observation of defendant’s marijuana plants at an altitude of 1,500 feet
with the unaided eye is not a search); 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 2.3, at 724–803 (5th ed. 2012). Regarding GPS devices, a
search occurs when the device is installed on an individual’s vehicle.
State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 264, 76 P.3d 217 (2003).
It is not a violation of article I, section 7 to record a conversation
when a party consents. Clark, 129 Wn.2d at 221; State v. Pulido, 68 Wn.
App. 59, 63, 841 P.2d 1251 (1992). However, it is unlawful to record
any “[p]rivate communication transmitted by telephone, telegraph, radio,
or other device between two or more individuals . . . without first
obtaining the consent of all the participants in the communication.”
RCW 9.73.030(1)(a) (emphasis added). An individual has “consented”
to the recording of electronic communications, however, if the individual
has knowledge that the communications will be recorded. State v.
Townsend, 147 Wn.2d 666, 676, 57 P.3d 255 (2002) (defendant was
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deemed to have consented to the recording of the communications
because he constructively knew that his attempts to arrange sexual
encounters with a minor over an Internet instant messaging service were
automatically recorded by the receiving computer); see also State v.
Smith, 189 Wn.2d 655, 666, 405 P.3d 997 (2017) (defendant, as the user
of his own cell phone and who is thereby considered generally familiar
with its functions, is deemed to have consented to voice mail recordings
that he inadvertently and unknowingly makes); In re Marriage of Farr,
87 Wn. App. 177, 184, 940 P.2d 679 (1997) (because an answering
machine’s only purpose is to record messages, a defendant who
knowingly left messages on the answering machine has implicitly
consented to the recording and has no reasonable expectation of privacy
as to the recording). But see State v. Hinton, 179 Wn.2d 862, 876, 319
P.3d 9 (2014) (defendant retained a privacy interest in text messages sent
to and received by a third party’s phone when he was unaware that the
recipient reading and responding to the messages was someone other
than the intended recipient). Lastly, although an individual does not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a conversation with a police
officer recorded on a dashboard camera during a traffic stop, RCW
9.73.090 nevertheless requires that the officer inform the individual, on
camera, that the conversation is being recorded. Lewis v. State, Dep’t of
Licensing, 157 Wn.2d 446, 473, 139 P.3d 1078 (2006).
1.1(b) Fourth Amendment Analysis of Sensory-Enhancing
Devices and Techniques
Under the Fourth Amendment, a canine sniff does not normally
constitute a “search” because “any interest in possessing contraband
cannot be deemed ‘legitimate,’ and thus, governmental conduct that only
reveals the possession of contraband ‘compromises no legitimate privacy
interest.’” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L.
Ed. 2d 842 (2005) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123,
104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984)); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S.
1, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013). For a discussion of the use
of canine sniffs and probable cause, see Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237,
133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61 (2013). See also infra § 2.4(b).
Also, under the Fourth Amendment, aerial surveillance is not
precluded merely because precautions are taken against ground
surveillance. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213, 106 S. Ct. 1809,
90 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1986) (aerial surveillance of marijuana growing in a
fenced backyard does not implicate Fourth Amendment because officer’s
observations were merely from a public vantage point); see also Florida
v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450, 109 S. Ct. 693, 102 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1989)
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(surveillance of a residential backyard by a helicopter in a manner that
does not interfere with the defendant’s normal use of their property is
not a search). However, if highly sophisticated equipment is used in
conducting the aerial surveillance, the Fourth Amendment may be
implicated. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238, 106 S.
Ct. 1819, 90 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1986).
There is also no legitimate expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment when one party consents to the recording of a conversation.
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 726, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 82 L. Ed. 2d
530 (1984); see 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (“It shall not be unlawful . . . for a
person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one
of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
interception.”) (emphasis added). Therefore, a defendant who utilized a
telephone answering service whereby both he and the caller were aware
that a third party was taking messages had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the recorded message, and thus, no search occurred when the
records were subsequently subpoenaed. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
740, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979). Further, under the Fourth
Amendment, individuals maintain a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the records of their physical movements recorded and maintained through
their cell phone’s wireless carrier service. Carpenter v. United States, 138
S. Ct. 2206, 2217, 201 L. Ed. 2d 507 (2018).
In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the rule in Katz as adding
to, not substituting for, the common law trespassory test that predated
Katz. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409, 132 S. Ct. 945, 181 L.
Ed. 2d 911 (2012). In Jones, the police attached a GPS device to the
defendant’s vehicle without a warrant and tracked his movements for
twenty-eight days. Id. at 403, 132 S. Ct. 945. Without addressing the
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court found that an
improper “search” occurred because, in attaching the GPS device to the
vehicle, the police had committed a common law trespass. Id. at 410, 132
S. Ct. 945. This physical trespass, combined with an attempt to find
something or obtain information, constituted a search. Id. at 407 n.5, 132
S. Ct. 945. Accordingly, behavior possibly constituting a search is
analyzed under either the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test
or, when applicable, the common law trespass test resurrected in Jones.
1.2 DEFINING “SEARCH” POST-KATZ: “CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED AREAS”
Although the concept of “constitutionally protected areas” does not
“serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem,”
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Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 n.9, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d
576 (1967), the concept retains considerable clout. The U.S. Supreme
Court has referred to “constitutionally protected areas” since Katz and
has given special deference to the areas specifically enumerated within
the Fourth Amendment. Because they are specifically enumerated in
both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, houses and homes
can be understood as such constitutionally protected areas.
1.3 SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF POST-KATZ ANALYSIS
1.3(a) Residential Premises
Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution states that no
person shall have “his home invaded.” Const. art. I, § 7. The Washington
State Supreme Court has held that article I, section 7 is more protective
of the home than is the Fourth Amendment. State v. Groom, 133 Wn.2d
679, 685, 947 P.2d 240 (1997).
Similarly, the Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . shall not be violated.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV. The core of the Fourth Amendment is “the right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
government intrusion.” Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511,
81 S. Ct. 679, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1961); see also Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 34, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001) (“[I]n the case
of the search of the interior of homes—the prototypical and hence most
commonly litigated area of protected privacy—there is a ready criterion,
with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal expectation of
privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable.”)
(emphasis added). Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment prohibits police
from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s
home, absent exigent circumstances, to effect a routine felony arrest.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d
639 (1980). In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and
seizures of persons, courts have drawn the Fourth Amendment line at the
entrance to the house. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511, 81 S. Ct. 679.
A search of a home can occur even when government officers do
not personally enter the home. State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 186, 867
P.2d 593 (1994) (“The constitutional line of privacy that encircles the
home is more than just a barrier to physical penetration.”). Specifically,
a search can occur when the “[g]overnment uses a device that is not in
general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously
have been unknowable without physical intrusion.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at
40, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (search occurred when thermal imaging device
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monitored a home from a public street). Similarly, a search occurs when
the government monitors an electronic device to determine whether a
particular article or person is within an individual’s home at a particular
time. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 82
L. Ed. 2d 530 (1984); see also Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158, 158, 84
S. Ct. 1186, 12 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1964) (Clark, J., concurring) (the Fourth
Amendment is implicated when a microphone used by police officers
“penetrate[s]” the petitioner’s premises in a manner sufficient to
constitute trespass).
In Washington, the use of infrared surveillance of a home
constitutes a search under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth
Amendment. Young, 123 Wn.2d at 186, 867 P.2d 593. In contrast, using
a flashlight to look through a window at night is no more invasive than
using natural eyesight to look through a window in daylight, and it is
therefore not a search. State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 400, 909 P.2d
280 (1996).
The privacy interest in a home is not confined to houses, but it
extends to other types of residences. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376
U.S. 483, 490, 84 S. Ct. 889, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856 (1964) (hotel rooms);
State v. Murray, 84 Wn.2d 527, 534, 527 P.2d 1303 (1974) (apartments);
State v. Davis, 86 Wn. App. 414, 419, 937 P.2d 1110 (1997) (motel
rooms); State v. Ramirez, 49 Wn. App. 814, 818, 746 P.2d 344 (1987)
(hotel rooms). However, there is a reduced expectation of privacy in
motor vehicles that are readily mobile but can also be used for sleeping.
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 389, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 L. Ed. 2d
406 (1985) (mobile motor home); see infra § 1.3(e). Additionally, there
is a reduced privacy interest in those spaces where several persons or
families occupy the premises in common, such as sharing common
living quarters, where the defendant can demonstrate sole and exclusive
control of the area searched. State v. Alexander, 41 Wn. App. 152, 155–
56, 704 P.2d 618 (1985).
Despite the heightened protection of the home, objects and
activities that are exposed to the “plain view” of outsiders are not
protected because no intention to keep them private has been exhibited.
State v. Clark, 129 Wn.2d 211, 229–30, 916 P.2d 384 (1996).
Accordingly, a person may forfeit his or her privacy interest in an
activity or object in the home by failing to protect the activity or
object from observation by persons outside the home. State v.
Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 408, 47 P.3d 127 (2002). For example, a
privacy expectation in an individual’s home is not reasonable when the
individual positions himself in front of a window with the lights on and
drapes open. State v. Drumhiller, 36 Wn. App. 592, 595, 675 P.2d 631
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(1984). In contrast, drawing the curtains demonstrates a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and the fact that an individual failed to
completely shut the curtains does not diminish the reasonableness of that
expectation. State v. Jordan, 29 Wn. App. 924, 927, 631 P.2d 989
(1981). Under this “open view” doctrine, no search has occurred when
an officer is lawfully present at a vantage point and able to detect
something by utilization of one or more of his or her senses. State v.
Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304, 313, 4 P.3d 130 (2000).
A person may waive his or her right to privacy by willingly
admitting a visitor; for example, waiver may occur where a person
admits an undercover police officer into the premises to conduct an
illegal transaction. See State v. Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836, 848, 904 P.2d
290 (1995) (defendant waived any right to privacy by willingly admitting
plainclothes officer into a motel room to conduct a drug transaction); see
also State v. Dalton, 43 Wn. App. 279, 284–85, 716 P.2d 940 (1986)
(student invited officer into college dormitory to conduct an illegal drug
transaction; warrantless entry upheld as nonintrusive because police
were invited in and took nothing except what would have been taken by
a willing purchaser). A person does not, however, relinquish the privacy
interest in the home by opening the door in response to a police officer’s
knock. State v. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89 (1985). For
a discussion of the distinction between the plain view doctrine and the
open view doctrine, see infra § 5.5.
Courts in some jurisdictions have held that common hallways of
multiple-dwelling buildings that are accessible to the public are not
protected areas. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1252–
53 (3d Cir. 1992); 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.3(b), at
739–48 (5th ed. 2012). For example, even if a building is secure and not
accessible to the public, some courts have found no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the common hallways. See, e.g., United States
v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1993) (apartment dweller
of “high security” apartment building has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the common areas of the building—search is valid even
though officer trespassed). See generally 1 LaFave, supra, § 2.3(b), at
739–48. However, certain uses may grant residents a greater expectation
of privacy in building common areas. See State v. Houvener, 145 Wn.
App. 408, 419–22, 186 P.3d 370 (2008) (residents in university
dormitory had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas
of their floor given their intimate academic and social experiences and
“common interest” in the maintenance of their privacy). In addition, the
Fourth Amendment is triggered when a housing inspector enters to
conduct an administrative search. See Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523,
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534, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967); City of Seattle v. McCready,
124 Wn.2d 300, 309, 877 P.2d 686 (1994). Administrative searches are
discussed infra § 2.9(a).
1.3(b) The Curtilage and Adjoining Lands
The “curtilage” of residential premises consists of “all buildings in
close proximity to a dwelling, which are continually used for carrying on
domestic employment; or such place as is necessary and convenient to a
dwelling, and is habitually used for family purposes.” United States v.
Potts, 297 F.2d 68, 69 (6th Cir. 1961). The curtilage has been considered
“part of [the] home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes,” and thus
receives Fourth Amendment protections. Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 180, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1984).
The U.S. Supreme Court has identified four factors that should be
reviewed in determining the extent of a residence’s curtilage:
the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home,
whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the
home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the
steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation
by people passing by.
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 94 L. Ed.
2d 326 (1987). The Dunn Court expressly declined to adopt a
“bright-line” rule that the curtilage extends “no farther than the
nearest fence surrounding a fenced house.” Id. at 301 n.4, 107 S. Ct.
1134. Rather, a court is to use the factors identified above as a tool
in determining whether the area in question is so intimately tied to
the home as to fall within “the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth
Amendment protection.” Id. at 301, 107 S. Ct. 1134; see, e.g., United
States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 2010) (small, enclosed
yard adjacent to a home in a residential neighborhood is “clearly
marked” area “to which the activity of home life extends,” and therefore
within the curtilage); United States v. Davis, 530 F.3d 1069, 1079–80
(9th Cir. 2008) (workshop not within the curtilage when nearly 200 feet
from the house, not shielded from view, set apart from house by a fence,
and from which no domestic activity was observed); State v.
Niedergang, 43 Wn. App. 656, 662, 719 P.2d 576 (1986) (car parked
in cul-de-sac where any member of the public could park is not within
curtilage).
The curtilage also includes lands adjacent to a dwelling in which
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. Wattenburg v. United States,
388 F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1968) (reasonable expectation of privacy
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extends to backyard of lodge); see also Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178, 104 S.
Ct. 1735, (individual may have legitimate expectation of privacy in
“area immediately surrounding the home”); 1 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 2.3(f), at 780–92 (5th ed. 2012).
Under Washington law, there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in areas of a home’s curtilage impliedly open to the public. State
v. Smith, 118 Wn. App. 480, 484–85, 93 P.3d 877 (2003). An open
curtilage is an area “apparently open to the public, such as the
driveway, the walkway, or any access route leading to the residence.”
State v. Dodson, 110 Wn. App. 112, 123, 39 P.3d 324 (2002). A police
officer with legitimate business, when acting in the same manner as a
reasonably respectful citizen, may lawfully enter these open curtilage
areas. State v. Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304, 312, 4 P.3d 130 (2000); see also
State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 392, 909 P.2d 280 (1996) (officer
entitled to walk onto a porch, which was the usual access route to the
house); State v. Solberg, 122 Wn.2d 688, 698–99, 861 P.2d 460 (1993)
(unenclosed front porch held to be a public place, not a constitutionally
protected area); State v. Gave, 77 Wn. App. 333, 337, 890 P.2d 1088
(1995) (driveway, walkway, or access routes leading to residence or to
porch of residence are all areas of “curtilage” impliedly open to the
public); State v. Graffius, 74 Wn. App. 23, 24, 871 P.2d 1115 (1994)
(driveway commonly used for guests and members of the public not
protected). Upon entering these areas in the same manner as a
reasonably respectful citizen, Ross, 141 Wn.2d at 312, 4 P.3d 130, the
officer is free to use his or her senses, State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d
793, 807, 92 P.3d 228 (2004).
When a police officer enters a property through an impliedly open
curtilage area and discovers evidence, a court will consider a
combination of factors to analyze the admissibility of evidence,
including whether the officer (1) spied into the residence; (2) acted
secretly; (3) acted after dark; (4) used the normal, most direct access
route; (5) tried to contact the resident; (6) created an artificial vantage
point; or (7) made the discovery accidentally. State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d
332, 345, 815 P.2d 761 (1991) (citing State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898,
905, 632 P.2d 44 (1981)); see Thompson, 151 Wn.2d at 807, 92 P.3d 228
(quoting Seagull, 95 Wn.2d at 901, 632 P.2d 44 (“The mere observation
of that which is there to be seen does not necessarily constitute a
search.”)); Ross, 141 Wn.2d at 312, 4 P.3d 130 (reasonably respectful
citizen rule); State v. Boethin, 126 Wn. App. 695, 700, 109 P.3d 461
(2005) (evidence suppressed when, in traversing from the stairs to the
garage and putting their noses close to the garage door, officers deviated
substantially from what a reasonably respectful citizen would have
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done); State v. Jesson, 142 Wn. App. 852, 859, 177 P.3d 139 (2008)
(“While the ‘No Trespassing’ signs alone are not sufficient to remove
implied consent to the access of the property via the driveway, the closed
gate, the primitive road, the secluded location of the home in addition to
the posted signs are sufficient.”); State v. Mierz, 72 Wn. App. 783, 791,
866 P.2d 65 (1994), aff’d, 127 Wn.2d 460, 901 P.2d 286 (1995)
(warrantless intrusion into a backyard, which was enclosed by a sixfoot fence and padlocked gate, violated the Fourth Amendment).
1.3(c) “Open Fields”
The expectation of privacy in structures located and viewed from
outside the curtilage, but on private property, is the same as the
expectation of privacy in those structures viewed from public places.
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 94 L. Ed. 2d
326 (1987). Therefore, police officers standing in an open field could
look into a barn even if the defendant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the barn. Id.; see also 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 2.4(a)–(b), at 804–32 (5th ed. 2012). Under this “open fields” doctrine,
an expectation of privacy in open fields is unreasonable. Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 179, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1984)
(“[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities
that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference
or surveillance.”).
Moreover, a person in possession of land falling within the purview
of the open fields doctrine cannot create a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the area by taking steps to conceal activities such as posting
“no trespassing” signs or erecting fences around the secluded areas. Id.
at 182–83, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (issue was whether the “government’s
intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the
Fourth Amendment”); State v. Dodson, 110 Wn. App. 112, 123, 39 P.3d
324 (2002) (presence of “no trespassing” signs is not dispositive of the
homeowner’s reasonable expectation of privacy). In addition, the fact
that police commit a common law trespass while observing an object or
activity in an open field does not render the intrusion a search under the
federal constitution. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183, 104 S. Ct. 1735. Thus, an
intrusion may be onto the land itself as well as by aerial surveillance, and
yet it may still not be considered a search. See id.
Under article I, section 7, the relevant inquiry is not whether the
observed object was in a protected place or whether the defendant had a
legitimate and subjective expectation of privacy in the observed location,
but rather whether “the State unreasonably intruded into the defendant’s
‘private affairs.’” State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 510, 688 P.2d 151
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(1984); State v. Wilson, 97 Wn. App. 578, 581, 988 P.2d 463 (1999). The
nature of the property may be a factor in determining what constitutes
“private affairs,” but the fact that the location of the search is an open
field is not conclusive. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d at 513, 688 P.2d 151.
1.3(d) Business and Commercial Premises
The Fourth Amendment privacy protections extend to most business
and commercial premises. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,
235, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 90 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1986); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc.,
436 U.S. 307, 311, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978) (OSHA
inspector’s entry into the nonpublic working areas of electrical and
plumbing business constituted a search). Some Washington courts have
interpreted article I, section 7 to be coextensive with the Fourth
Amendment in this context. See Seymour v. Wash. State Dep’t of Health,
Dental Quality Assur. Comm’n, 152 Wn. App. 156, 160, 216 P.3d 1039
(2009); Centimark Corp. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 129 Wn. App. 368,
375, 119 P.3d 865 (2005). The expectation of privacy in commercial
properties, however, is less than in the home. New York v. Burger, 482
U.S. 691, 699, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 96 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1987); Centimark Corp.,
129 Wn. App. at 376, 119 P.3d 865 (“[A]n expectation of privacy in
commercial premises is different, and less significant, than a ‘similar
expectation in an individual's home.’”).
Similarly, the warrantless entry into the public lobby of a motel or
restaurant for the purpose of serving an administrative subpoena is
permitted although the “administrative subpoena itself [does] not
authorize either entry or inspection of [the] premises.” Donovan v. Lone
Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 413–14, 104 S. Ct. 769, 78 L. Ed. 2d 567
(1984) (an employer may not insist on a warrant as a condition precedent
to a valid administrative subpoena unless government inspectors seek
nonconsensual entry into “areas not open to the public”).
Given the lesser expectation of privacy, unlike searches of private
homes, warrantless administrative searches of commercial property may
be authorized by the Legislature without violating the Fourth
Amendment. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702, 107 S. Ct. 2636. The Fourth
Amendment could be violated, however, if the Legislature, in
authorizing these warrantless administrative searches, failed to make
rules governing the inspection procedure. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594, 599, 101 S. Ct. 2534, 69 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1981).
Courts often consider certain factors in determining whether
warrantless administrative searches are allowed. One factor considered
is whether a business, such as the liquor or firearms business, has
historically been extensively regulated. See, e.g., Burger, 482 U.S. at
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707, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (automobile junkyards have historically been
“closely regulated”). Due to such long histories of government oversight
in these industries, these businesses do not enjoy a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Barlow’s, 436 U.S. at 313, 98 S. Ct. 1816
(distinguishing the liquor and firearms industries from ordinary
businesses on the basis of “a long tradition of close government
supervision”).
Whether a place is a personal residence or a business may also
affect whether it constitutes curtilage or an open field. Dow Chem. Co.,
476 U.S. at 239, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (aerial photographs from navigable
airspace of open areas of an industrial plant complex with numerous
structures spread over 2,000 acres not a search because area not
“curtilage”).
Courts have generally upheld police investigative entries into bus
terminals, pool halls, bars, restaurants, and general stores such as
furniture stores and variety stores. 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 2.4(b), at 816–32 (5th ed. 2012). But the “‘implied invitation
for customers to come in’ . . . extends only to those times when the
premises are . . . ‘open to the public’; the mere fact that certain premises
are open to the public at certain times does not justify entry by the police
on other occasions.” Id.
Although an individual enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his or her commercial premises, the warrant requirements for
administrative searches of commercial premises may differ from those
for searches in general. See infra § 6.4(b); see also 1 LaFave, supra, §
2.4(b), at 816–32.
1.3(e) Automobiles and Other Motor Vehicles
Under article I, section 7, the protection against governmental
intrusion into one’s “private affairs” includes automobiles and their
contents. State v. Parker, 139 Wn.2d 486, 494, 987 P.2d 73 (1999).
Passengers in a vehicle also have a constitutionally protected privacy
interest that does not diminish merely by virtue of entering a vehicle. Id.
at 496, 987 P.2d 73. This privacy interest is independent of the driver’s
privacy interest. Id. Thus, even when a driver is under arrest, “where
officers do not have articulable suspicion that an individual is armed or
dangerous and have nothing to independently connect such person to
illegal activity,” a search of a passenger in an automobile is invalid. Id.
at 498, 987 P.2d 73.
Similarly, under the Fourth Amendment, automobiles constitute
“effects.” United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53
L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977), overruled on other grounds by California v.
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Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991). As a
result, constitutional protections against unreasonable searches apply to
automobiles and other motor vehicles. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106,
112, 106 S. Ct. 960, 89 L. Ed. 2d 81 (1986) (“A citizen does not
surrender all the protections of the Fourth Amendment by entering an
automobile.”); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390, 105 S. Ct. 2066,
85 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1985). Passengers and drivers in automobiles,
however, have a reduced expectation of privacy. Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U.S. 295, 303, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1999); see also
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424, 124 S. Ct. 885, 157 L. Ed. 2d 843
(2004).
Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, this
reduced expectation of privacy derives from both the pervasive schemes
of regulation and the ready mobility unique to vehicles. See Carney, 471
U.S. at 392, 105 S. Ct. 2066. As a result, even when a vehicle is used as a
residence, its owner has a lesser expectation of privacy when that vehicle
is readily mobile and licensed to operate on public streets. Id. at 393, 105
S. Ct. 2066 (mobile home in public lot was treated as a vehicle); cf. State
v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 449, 909 P.2d 293 (1996) (lessened privacy
interest for sleeper compartment of a tractor-trailer rig). Additionally,
courts have held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in things
that are located on a vehicle’s exterior in plain view of passersby. State v.
McKinney, 148 Wn.2d 20, 32, 60 P.3d 46 (2002) (computerized check of
defendant’s license plate and driving record did not constitute a search
under article I, section 7); see also United States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494
F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2007) (no search under Fourth Amendment). But
see Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1671, 201 L. Ed. 2d 9 (2018)
(automobile exception under the Fourth Amendment does not permit
officers to remove a vehicle cover and search vehicle located within the
home’s curtilage).
1.3(f) Personal Characteristics
The Fourth Amendment provides no protection for what “a person
knowingly exposes to the public.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
351, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). Personal characteristics
such as facial features and voice tone are continually exposed to the
public and therefore not protected under the Fourth Amendment. United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14, 93 S. Ct. 764, 35 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1973)
(“No person can have a reasonable expectation that others will not know
the sound of his voice any more than he can reasonably expect that his
face will be a mystery to the world.”). Like speech, handwriting is also
often exposed to the public. Accordingly, an individual has no more
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privacy in his handwriting than in the sound of his voice. United States
v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21, 93 S. Ct. 774, 35 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1973). Article
I, section 7 has been interpreted using this same analysis. Bedford v.
Sugarman, 112 Wn.2d 500, 512, 772 P.2d 486 (1989) (no privacy with
regard to one’s personality, appearance, and behavior, which would
normally be exposed in public).
In contrast to the lack of a general privacy interests in facial
characteristics, voice exemplars, and handwriting, the taking of blood,
urine, or DNA samples is considered a search within the meaning of both
the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7. Ferguson v. Charleston,
532 U.S. 67, 76, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 149 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2001) (urine
samples); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S. Ct. 1826,
16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (blood samples); State v. Surge, 122 Wn. App.
448, 454, 94 P.3d 345 (2004), aff’d, 160 Wn.2d 65, 156 P.3d 208 (2007)
(DNA samples); State v. Baldwin, 109 Wn. App. 516, 523, 37 P.3d 1220
(2001) (breath and blood sample); Robinson v. City of Seattle, 102 Wn.
App. 795, 818–19, 10 P.3d 452 (2000) (urine samples).
In Washington, mandatory blood testing, although considered a
search, may still not violate article I, section 7 or the Fourth Amendment
when testing an individual with a diminished privacy interest. See Surge,
160 Wn.2d at 74, 156 P.3d 208 (convicted felons); In re Juveniles A, B,
C, D, E, 121 Wn.2d 80, 93–94, 847 P.2d 455 (1993) (sexual offenders);
State v. Meacham, 93 Wn.2d 735, 739, 612 P.2d 795 (1980) (putative
fathers). These searches may be justified under the special needs
doctrine. See infra § 6.1.
An individual may also unknowingly consent to a seizure of his or
her bodily fluids. For example, under RCW 46.20.308, any person who
operates a vehicle is deemed to have consented to a blood alcohol test.
See Baldwin, 109 Wn. App. at 525 (upholding constitutionality of
implied consent statute). Further, a person retains no privacy interest in
his saliva when he licks an envelope and places it in the mail. State v.
Athan, 160 Wn.2d 354, 367, 158 P.3d 27 (2007).
1.3(g) Personal Effects and Papers
The Fourth Amendment expressly protects the right of privacy in
“papers . . . and effects.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Although it is not
explicitly stated, article I, section 7 protects personal effects in so far as
they constitute “private affairs.” Const. art. I, § 7. With regard to a
person’s banking and home telephone records, garbage, and motel
registry information, article I, section 7’s protection is broader than the
protection provided by the Fourth Amendment.
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Under the Washington Constitution, a person’s banking records
constitute “private affairs” that are protected from warrantless searches.
State v. Miles, 160 Wn.2d 236, 244, 156 P.3d 864 (2007). However, there
may be no expectation of privacy to an individual’s bank records or
business transactions when a person exposes evidence of those
transactions to a third party, such as an insurance company. State v.
Farmer, 80 Wn. App. 795, 801, 911 P.2d 1030 (1996). Under the Fourth
Amendment, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a person’s
bank records, checks, deposit slips, and other records relating to bank
accounts because, according to the Court, such records “contain only
information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their
employees in the ordinary course of business.” United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435, 442, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 71 (1976).
Under the U.S. Constitution, individuals using their home
telephones have no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the phone
numbers dialed. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46, 99 S. Ct.
2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979). In State v. Gunwall, however, the
Washington Supreme Court declined to follow Smith v. Maryland,
finding that article I, section 7 was violated when the police used a pen
register—a device that records or decodes electronic impulses
transmitted on a home telephone line, see RCW 9.73.260(1)(d)—without
lawful authority to make a record of the local and long distance telephone
numbers dialed on the customer’s telephone. State v. Gunwall, 106
Wn.2d 54, 68–69, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
Likewise, although the U.S. Constitution does not protect an
expectation of privacy in one’s trash after it has been left outside to be
picked up, California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43, 108 S. Ct. 1625,
100 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1988), the Washington Constitution does, State v.
Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571, 578, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990). This expectation of
privacy, however, can be lost depending on the circumstances. For
example, one court has found that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in garbage bags left in front of a neighboring abandoned house.
State v. Hepton, 113 Wn. App. 673, 679, 54 P.3d 233 (2002). Another
court has found no reasonable expectation of privacy in stolen goods
hidden in a community garbage receptacle. State v. Rodriguez, 65 Wn.
App. 409, 418, 828 P.2d 636 (1992). Another court, however, has found
that a person’s privacy right in his or her garbage “must be evaluated in
terms of the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy and the
reasonableness of the governmental intrusion . . . this privacy right is not
limited by the location of the garbage or the act of placing the garbage
in the can.” State v. Sweeney, 125 Wn. App. 881, 887, 107 P.3d 110
(2005).
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Article I, section 7 protects information that may provide intimate
details about a person’s activities or associations contained in a motel
registry, including information as to where an individual is located
within the motel, as a “private affair” that the police may not search
without an individualized suspicion. State v. Jorden, 160 Wn.2d 121,
130, 156 P.3d 893 (2007). Under the Fourth Amendment, however,
courts have found that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
motel guest registration records. United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d
1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000).
With regard to information contained on personal computers, the
Ninth Circuit has held that an individual has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in a personal computer. United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d
1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). This privacy interest diminishes, however,
when a person installs and uses file-sharing software, thereby exposing
his or her computer to other people. United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d
1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit has also found that the use
of pen registers for computers—which identified the “to” and “from”
addresses for e-mail messages, the IP addresses of websites visited, and
the total data transmitted—did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510, 511 (9th Cir. 2008).
Analogizing to both physical mail and the telephone information
obtained in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577, by means
of a pen register, the court found dispositive the fact that the police only
obtained addressing information and not the contents of the messages.
Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510.
Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, a search
does not occur when the police search property that was voluntarily
abandoned. State v. Reynolds, 144 Wn.2d 282, 287–88, 27 P.3d 200
(2001) (no expectation of privacy in the contents of a jacket that was
abandoned during an arrest). Whether property has been abandoned
depends on an individual’s actions and intent, which can be inferred from
the circumstances. State v. Dugas, 109 Wn. App. 592, 595, 36 P.3d 577
(2001) (no abandonment when defendant asked police if he could take
off his jacket because he felt hot and then placed the jacket on the hood
of his car); see also State v. Kealey, 80 Wn. App. 162, 173, 907 P.2d 319
(1995) (lost or mislaid property is not considered abandoned). In
Washington, abandonment does not occur when the property is located
in an area that retains privacy protections, even if the individual denies
ownership of the property. State v. Evans, 159 Wn.2d 402, 413, 150 P.3d
105 (2007) (briefcase found in defendant’s car that defendant denied
owning was not abandoned property when located in an area where
defendant has a privacy interest).
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Lastly, both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 protect a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of first-class mail and
sealed packages. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114, 104 S. Ct.
1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984); State v. Hinton, 179 Wn.2d 862, 873, 319
P.3d 9 (2014). However, senders of mail have no reasonable expectation
of privacy prohibiting a canine sniff of the package or protecting their
names and addresses on the exterior of a package. State v. Stanphill, 53
Wn. App. 623, 627, 769 P.2d 861 (1989) (release of information at request
of police regarding arrival of package did not unreasonably intrude into
private affairs).
1.4 DEFINING SEIZURES OF PERSONS
The definition of a seizure is comparatively the same under both
article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment. A seizure occurs when an
officer, by physical force or by show of authority, restrains an
individual’s freedom of movement. United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 553, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980). More
specifically, a seizure occurs when a police officer’s behavior would
communicate to a reasonable, innocent person that he or she is not free
to ignore the officer’s presence and walk away. Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S.
626, 629, 123 S. Ct. 1843, 155 L. Ed. 2d 814 (2003); United States v.
Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242
(2002); United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir.
2009); see also State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 574, 62 P.3d 489
(2003) (“Under article I, section 7, a person is seized only when, by
means of physical force or a show of authority his or her freedom of
movement is restrained and a reasonable person would not have believed
he or she is (1) free to leave, given all the circumstances, or (2) free to
otherwise decline an officer's request and terminate the encounter.”)
(internal citations omitted).
If the individual’s movement was already restricted by
something independent from police behavior—for example, the
individual was a passenger on a bus and wanted to remain on the bus,
or the individual was at work and thus obligated to the employer—the
appropriate test is whether the individual felt free to terminate the
encounter and ignore the officer’s questions. Florida v. Bostick, 501
U.S. 429, 436, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991); see also I.N.S.
v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1984)
(finding no seizure of the workplace or of the individual workers when
INS agents moved systematically through the factory inquiring about the
workers’ citizenship while other INS agents were stationed at the exits).
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Whether a seizure occurs depends on both the police officer’s
conduct as well as the setting in which that conduct occurs. Michigan v.
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565
(1988). Under federal law, an individual is not seized until he or she
submits to an officer’s show of authority. California v. Hodari D., 499
U.S. 621, 629, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991). Rejecting
Hodari and its subjective test, the Washington Supreme Court has held
that the standard under article I, section 7 is a “purely objective” one.
State v. Young, 135 Wn.2d 498, 501, 957 P.2d 681 (1998). Police
behavior that could amount to a show of authority constituting a seizure
includes “the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance
with the officer’s request might be compelled.” Id. at 512, 957 P.2d 681
(quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554–55, 100 S. Ct. 1870).
Accordingly, a person cannot avoid seizure by failing to yield to an
officer’s show of authority. State v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 388, 219
P.3d 651 (2009) (citing Young, 135 Wn.2d 498, 957 P.2d 681).
An arrest occurs when a police officer “manifests an intent to take
a person into custody and actually seizes or detains such person.” Id. at
387, 219 P.3d 651. Not every seizure, however, is considered an arrest.
Brief, investigative detentions, often called Terry stops, do not constitute
arrests, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d
889 (1968), because they are limited in scope and duration. State v.
Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747, 64 P.3d 594 (2003) (citing State v. Williams,
102 Wn.2d 733, 740, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984)). For an in-depth discussion
of Terry stops, see infra § 4.5. For a discussion of the level of proof
needed to make seizures of the person, see infra §§ 2.1 (arrest) and 2.9(b)
(Terry stop).
When a person is detained in his or her own home both article I,
section 7 and the Fourth Amendment may be triggered. Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981);
State v. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89 (1985). Absent
exigent circumstances, the police are prohibited from arresting
individuals in their homes without authority of law, usually an arrest
warrant. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed.
2d 639 (1980); State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 402, 166 P.3d 698
(2007); Holeman, 103 Wn.2d at 429, 693 P.2d 89; see also supra §
1.3(a). “After the police obtain a valid warrant they have lawful authority
for a limited intrusion to enter a residence, execute the arrest, and then
promptly leave.” Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d at 402, 166 P.3d 698. In executing
a valid search warrant at a home, it is also reasonable for an officer to
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“briefly detain occupants of that residence, to insure officer safety
and an orderly completion of the search.” State v. King, 89 Wn. App.
612, 618–19, 949 P.2d 856 (1998). Further, because there is a lesser
expectation of privacy, the police may arrest someone without a
warrant when the person voluntarily exits the home to speak to
officers on an unenclosed front porch. State v. Solberg, 122 Wn.2d
688, 696, 861 P.2d 460 (1993); see also infra § 4.2.
1.4(a) Consensual Encounters
Not every encounter with a police officer amounts to a seizure.
Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 185–
86, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2004). A consensual encounter
with an officer does not trigger the Fourth Amendment, even when
the individual has been approached by an officer and is aware of the
officer’s identity as an officer. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S.
194, 200–01, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2002) (citing
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d
229 (1983)); see also State v. Belanger, 36 Wn. App. 818, 820, 677
P.2d 781 (1984).
There is no clear definition of a consensual social contact; it lies
somewhere between a cordial greeting and a detention for investigative
purposes. State v. Harrington, 167 Wn.2d 656, 664, 222 P.3d 92 (2009).
A common example of behavior constituting a consensual encounter
rather than a seizure is when an officer asks for someone’s identification.
See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185–86, 124 S. Ct. 2451; see also State v. O’Neill,
148 Wn.2d 564, 577, 62 P.3d 489 (2003); State v. Hansen, 99 Wn. App.
575, 578, 994 P.2d 855 (2000). A request for identification may
constitute a seizure, however, when it follows a “considerable display of
authority.” State v. Carney, 142 Wn. App. 197, 202, 174 P.3d 142
(2007).
Under article I, section 7, a social contact can evolve into a seizure.
Harrington, 167 Wn.2d at 665–66, 222 P.3d 92. For example, in
Harrington, the Washington State Supreme Court found that although
the interaction between the officer and defendant may have begun as a
social contact on the street, it evolved into a seizure when another police
officer arrived, and the first officer asked the defendant to remove his
hands from his pockets and subsequently frisked him. Id. at 669, 222
P.3d 92. Although the officers’ actions, when viewed individually, may
not have amounted to a seizure, the actions did constitute a seizure when
viewed cumulatively. Id. at 668, 222 P.3d 92; see also United States v.
Washington, 490 F.3d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 2007) (initial consensual
encounter escalated into a seizure when, late at night, uniformed officers
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questioned defendant, without informing him of his right to leave, and
directed defendant to move to a location where the officers were in
between defendant and his car); cf. State v. Smith, 154 Wn. App. 695,
700–02, 226 P.3d 195 (2010) (defendant’s interactions with the police
did not evolve into a seizure when police requested, but did not order,
defendant to exit hotel room, asked for identification, and asked for
consent to search defendant’s openly displayed wallet).
1.4(b) Seizures of Persons in Vehicles
A seizure of an automobile driver occurs as soon as an officer in a
police car activates her emergency lights and addresses the driver. State
v. Gantt, 163 Wn. App. 133, 141, 257 P.3d 682 (2011); State v.
DeArman, 54 Wn. App. 621, 624, 774 P.2d 1247 (1989) (police seized
the defendant when they pulled behind the vehicle and activated their
emergency lights). A vehicle that voluntarily stops in response to
emergency lights and police actions directed at a third party, however, is
not seized. United States v. Al Nasser, 555 F.3d 722, 731 (9th Cir. 2009).
The analysis differs somewhat with regard to individuals in parked
vehicles because, once a vehicle is parked, its “occupants” (no longer
“passenger” or “driver”) are ostensibly pedestrians. State v. O’Neill, 148
Wn.2d 564, 579, 62 P.3d 489 (2003); see also State v. Johnson 156
Wn. App. 82, 92, 231 P.3d 225 (2010) (no seizure when officer parked
behind parked car and asked for, but did not demand, defendant’s
identification). Such an encounter, however, can still ripen into a
seizure when the police take additional actions. See State v. Beito, 147
Wn. App. 504, 510, 195 P.3d 1023 (2008) (seizure of passenger
occurred when officer stood outside of passenger door, blocking
passenger from exiting, told driver she was not allowed to leave, and
repeatedly asked passenger for identification).
Under article I, section 7, absent a reasonable basis for the inquiry,
a request for identification from a passenger of a vehicle for investigatory
purposes constitutes a seizure. State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689, 697,
92 P.3d 202 (2004) (distinguishing the court’s treatment of
passengers versus pedestrians on the heightened privacy expectations in
a vehicle). At least one Washington court, however, has narrowed this
rule to only those circumstances in which a police officer has stopped a
moving car with cause to detain and question the driver but not
necessarily the passengers. State v. Mote, 129 Wn. App. 276, 291, 120
P.3d 596 (2005).
Under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, a seizure
also occurs when officers stop automobiles without suspicion pursuant
to a systematic “spot check” or roadblock, though the courts’ evaluation
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of constitutionality of these seizures has varied. When examining the
constitutionality of these seizures, the courts consider the government
interest and nature of stop itself. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,
41, 121 S. Ct. 447, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2000) (holding drug checkpoints
intended primarily to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing
unconstitutional); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449–
50, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (holding drunk driving
checkpoint constitutional given the “magnitude of the problem” and the
State’s interests); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555–
56, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (1976) (holding permanent
checkpoint near the border to interdict illegal aliens constitutional); City
of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 457–60, 755 P.2d 775 (1988)
(holding Seattle’s holiday sobriety checkpoint program unconstitutional
under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment). “Spot check”
or “checkpoint” seizures are often justified under the “special needs”
doctrine and examined under a reasonableness standard. See infra § 6.3.
1.5 DEFINING SEIZURES OF PROPERTY
The Fourth Amendment protects both a person’s possessory interest
in his or her “effects” and his or her privacy interest. United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1983). “A
‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference
with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984);
State v. Jackson, 82 Wn. App. 594, 603, 918 P.2d 945 (1996). Put
differently, an object is seized when government agents exercise
“dominion and control” over the object. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120, 104
S. Ct. 1652; Jackson, 82 Wn. App. at 603–04, 918 P.2d 945. Thus,
impounding a room or securing a home constitutes a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. State v. Ng, 104 Wn.2d 763, 770, 713 P.2d 63
(1985) (citing State v. Bean, 89 Wn.2d 467, 472, 572 P.2d 1102 (1978)).
At least one Washington court has found that transferring property within
a home from one room to another could constitute a seizure. State v.
Cotten, 75 Wn. App. 669, 682, 879 P.2d 971 (1994) (agents asserted
dominion and control over a shotgun, even though that control was
temporary, by taking shotgun from the bedroom, unloading it, and
carrying it into another room).
In some circumstances, interference with an individual’s
possessory interests may also implicate an individual’s liberty interests.
For example, in Place, the seizure of luggage at an airport was
determined to “effectively restrain the person since he is subjected to the
possible disruption of his travel plans in order to remain with his luggage
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or to arrange for its return.” 462 U.S. at 708, 103 S. Ct. 2637; see also 4
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.8(e), at 1006–27 (5th ed.
2012).
1.6 STANDING TO RAISE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CLAIMS
In Washington, standing to challenge police action under article I,
section 7 may take one of two forms: automatic standing or asserting a
violation of a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the object or
place searched or seized. State v. Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836, 841, 904 P.2d
290 (1995) (citing United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 86–87, 100
S. Ct. 2547, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1980)); see also State v. Williams, 142
Wn.2d 17, 23–24, 11 P.3d 714 (2000); State v. Libero, 168 Wn. App.
612, 277 P.3d 708 (2012); State v. Kypreos, 110 Wn. App. 612, 39
P.3d 371 (2002) (discussing history of automatic standing doctrine).
The first form of standing is automatic standing. Article I, section
7 of the Washington Constitution confers automatic standing upon
anyone charged with a possessory crime regardless of whether the
defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy. State v. Evans, 159
Wn.2d 402, 407, 150 P.3d 105 (2007) (citing State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d
170, 179, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980) (plurality opinion) (upholding the use of
automatic standing based on the state constitution)). Put another way, “a
defendant who has been charged with an offense that has possession as
an element has automatic standing to challenge the search that led to the
discovery of the substance the defendant is charged with possessing.”
State v. Chelly, 94 Wn. App. 254, 258, 970 P.2d 376 (1999); State v.
Johnston, 38 Wn. App. 793, 801, 690 P.2d 591 (1984).
In order to claim automatic standing, the defendant must show that
(1) possession is an “essential” element of the offense for which the
defendant is charged and (2) the defendant was in possession of the seized
property at the time of the contested search. State v. Jones, 146 Wn.2d 328,
332, 45 P.3d 1062 (2002). The “fruits of the search” must directly relate
to the search the defendant is challenging. State v. Williams, 142 Wn.2d
17, 23, 11 P.3d 714 (2000). But see State v. Libero, 168 Wn. App. 612,
619, 277 P.3d 708 (2012) (“Automatic standing does not permit a
defendant to collaterally attack a search on the basis that it violated
another’s rights.”).
The second form of standing analysis under article I, section 7
mirrors the standing analysis under the Fourth Amendment, see State v.
Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836, 841, 904 P.2d 290 (1995) (citing Salvucci, 448
U.S. at 86–87, 100 S. Ct. 2547), and more often applies to persons
charged with non-possessory crimes, State v. Francisco, 107 Wn. App.
247, 249, 26 P.3d 1008 (2001). Under the Fourth Amendment, the
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concept of standing has been merged with the substantive law of the
Fourth Amendment’s privacy analysis. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
138–40, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978). Accordingly,
in order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a
defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an
expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his
expectation is reasonable; i.e., one that has “a source outside of
the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real
or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized
and permitted by society.
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 87–88, 119 S. Ct. 469, 142 L. Ed.
2d 373 (1998) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12, 99 S. Ct. 421);
see also Williams, 142 Wn.2d at 23, 11 P.3d 714; State v. Link, 136
Wn. App. 685, 692, 150 P.3d 610 (2007); Francisco, 107 Wn. App.
at 252, 26 P.3d 1008.
By merging the standing issue with the privacy analysis, the federal
courts abandoned the concept of automatic standing. Salvucci, 448 U.S.
at 92–93, 100 S. Ct. 2547. Hence, although the Fourth Amendment no
longer applies to searches of stolen goods, it does apply to searches of
legally possessed items discovered in the search of stolen goods, because
an “illegal search only violates the rights of those who have ‘a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the invaded place.’” Id. (quoting Rakas, 439
U.S. at 143, 99 S. Ct. 421) (holding that unlawful possession of stolen
goods stored in the apartment of another does not confer on thieves a
reasonable expectation of privacy as to the interior of the apartment). A
person who resides in an apartment with the permission of the lessee and
who has a key to the apartment may therefore assert a privacy interest in
the interior of the apartment. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 141–42, 99 S. Ct. 421
(citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed.
2d 697 (1960)). In many instances, an individual may be able to show
both forms of standing because, generally, an individual “who owns or
lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a
legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of [his or her] right to
exclude.” Id. at 143 n.12, 99 S. Ct. 421. However, passengers in vehicles
and houseguests have been found to have diminished privacy interests
despite their immediate possession or control over the place searched.
See id. at 148–50; State v. Boot, 81 Wn. App. 546, 551, 915 P.2d 592
(1996).
A mere passenger in a motor vehicle may not assert a personal
privacy interest in the interior of the vehicle but may challenge his or her
own seizure. Id. at 148–50, 99 S. Ct. 421; United States v. Pulliam, 405
F.3d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 2005) (asserting a passenger’s authorized
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presence in the vehicle was not determinative of a legitimate expectation
of privacy); State v. Byrd, 110 Wn. App. 259, 264, 39 P.3d 1010 (2002)
(“[A] passenger in a vehicle stopped by police officers can contest the
lawfulness of the stop.”). An unauthorized driver, however, may have
standing to challenge a search of the vehicle if she has received
permission to use the car. United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1199
(9th Cir. 2006) (defendant has standing to challenge search of rental car
when he can prove permission from the authorized renter).
With regard to a person’s presence in someone else’s home, an
overnight guest has standing to challenge a search of the
home. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96–97, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 109 L.
Ed. 2d 85 (1990). A defendant who was legitimately, but only casually,
on the premises, however, does not necessarily demonstrate a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the home. State v. Boot, 81 Wn. App. 546, 551,
915 P.2d 592 (1996). Four relevant but non-exhaustive factors for
analyzing whether a social guest had standing are “(1) the defendant’s
relationship with the homeowner or tenant; (2) the context and duration
of the visit during which the search took place; (3) the frequency and
duration of the defendant’s previous visits to the home; and (4) whether
the defendant kept personal effects in the home.” State v. Link, 136 Wn.
App. 685, 693, 150 P.3d 610 (2007).

CHAPTER 2
Standards of Proof
2.0 THE NATURE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
This chapter summarizes the standards for probable cause for
searches and seizures conducted with or without a warrant. Sections 2.1
and 2.2 discuss the nature of the standard, while sections 2.3 through 2.8
discuss specific types of information considered in the probable cause
determination. Finally, section 2.9 summarizes the types of searches and
seizures for which probable cause is either not required or a lesser standard
is applied.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. Under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, “[n]o
person shall be disturbed . . . without authority of law.” Const. art I, § 7.
As under the Fourth Amendment, this “authority of law” is fulfilled by a
warrant issued upon probable cause that is established by sworn affidavit.
State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 465, 158 P.3d 595 (2007); see also
State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 108, 59 P.3d 58 (2002). The probable
cause analysis is thus substantively the same under article I, section 7 and
the Fourth Amendment. State v. Grande, 164 Wn.2d 135, 141, 187 P.3d
248 (2008).
The probable cause requirement is a fact-based determination
representing a compromise between society’s competing interests in
enforcing the law and protecting the individual’s right to privacy. State v.
Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 182, 196 P.3d 658 (2008) (citing Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)). Probable
cause requires reasonable grounds to believe that a defendant is guilty of
a crime. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S. Ct. 795, 157 L.
Ed. 2d 769 (2003). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 3.2 (5th ed. 2012) (discussing the general nature of probable cause). The
police officer must be aware of reasonably trustworthy information that
would cause a reasonable officer to believe that a crime has been
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committed. State v. Potter, 156 Wn.2d 835, 840, 132 P.3d 1089 (2006);
State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 70, 93 P.3d 872 (2004); State v. Reeb, 63
Wn. App. 678, 681–82, 821 P.2d 84 (1992) (information need only be
reasonably trustworthy, not absolutely accurate). The belief must be
specific to the person to be searched or seized. Grande, 164 Wn.2d at 144,
187 P.3d 248 (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62
L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979)).
Probable cause is required for most searches and seizures regardless
of whether a search warrant is required, see Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 479–80, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963), or an arrest
is made, State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107, 112, 874 P.2d 160 (1994).
Where a valid search or seizure occurs without a warrant, police may
initially determine whether probable cause exists, but the grounds for the
search or seizure must be strong enough to obtain a warrant. Wong Sun,
371 U.S. at 480, 83 S. Ct. 407. A neutral and detached magistrate must
make the probable cause determination for a warrant to issue. Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948). In
addition, a suspect arrested without a warrant may not be detained for an
extended period of time without a judicial determination of probable
cause. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 124–25, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 L. Ed.
2d 54 (1975). See generally 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.1.
When federal officers are working with and assisting state officials,
they must comply with the Washington Constitution. State v. Johnson, 75
Wn. App. 692, 700, 879 P.2d 984 (1994). Conversely, when federal
officers obtain evidence pursuant to federal law and independent of state
officials, the evidence may be used in a state criminal proceeding even if
the procedure involved would have violated the Washington Constitution.
State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 591, 940 P.2d 54, (1997); In re
Teddington, 116 Wn.2d 761, 772–73, 808 P.2d 156 (1991). Courts have
reasoned that the Washington Constitution cannot control the independent
conduct of federal agents. State v. Bradley, 105 Wn.2d 898, 902–03, 719
P.2d 546 (1986). Accordingly, where a federal warrant is served, the
federal standard for probable cause applies even though the evidence
would be used in state courts. See Johnson, 75 Wn. App. at 699, 879 P.2d
984.
Though the probable cause requirement is a fact-based
determination, it may be satisfied even when police officers make a
reasonable mistake of fact. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d at 117, 59 P.3d 58
(incorrect date of informant’s observations in affidavit did not affect the
finding of probable cause); In re Yim, 139 Wn.2d 581, 597, 989 P.2d 512
(1999) (failure to assert in affidavit that defendant lacked a license to sell
explosives was not critical when magistrate could reasonably infer that
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defendant was probably engaged in the unlicensed manufacture and sale
of explosives); State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 900, 908, 632 P.2d 44
(1981) (warrant valid even though officer misidentified tomato plant as
marijuana). Likewise, negligent or innocent mistakes are insufficient to
void a finding of probable cause. State v. Gore, 143 Wn.2d 288, 296, 21
P.3d 262 (2001), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hughes, 154
Wn.2d 118, 110 P.3d 192 (2005); Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 479, 158 P.3d
595; In re Yim, 139 Wn.2d at 597, 989 P.2d 512. Probable cause can exist
even where an incongruity is legal rather than factual: probable cause may
still exist at the time of arrest even if the statute under which an individual
is being arrested is later declared unconstitutional. State v. Afana, 169
Wn.2d 169, 183, 233 P.3d 879 (2010); State v. Potter, 129 Wn. App. 494,
497, 119 P.3d 877 (2005).
The probable cause requirement may not, however, be satisfied when
the police make an “inexcusable mistake of law” (in other words, they
incorrectly believe that certain conduct is unlawful), State v. Melrose, 2
Wn. App. 824, 828, 470 P.2d 552 (1970), or when probable cause is based
on a law “so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of
reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws.” Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1979).
Additionally, if the defendant can show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the affidavit on which probable cause was based contained
“intentional material omissions or material omissions made with reckless
disregard for the truth,” then the omitted evidence must be considered in
the probable cause finding. Gore, 143 Wn.2d at 297, 21 P.3d 262. The
defendant, however, must make a substantial showing as to both
materiality and intentionality for the omission. State v. Garrison, 118
Wn.2d 870, 872–73, 827 P.2d 1388 (1992) (per curiam) (mere showing of
the omission of material that is critical to a finding of probable cause is
not a sufficient preliminary showing that the omission was a reckless
disregard for the truth). See generally Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
155–56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978).
2.1 PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD: ARREST VERSUS SEARCH
Generally, probable cause requires the same sufficiency of evidence
regardless of whether it concerns a search or an arrest. State v. Grande,
164 Wn.2d 135, 142, 187 P.3d 248 (2008) (citing 2 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 3.1(b) (4th ed. 2004)). In practice, however, the
standards are not necessarily identical: probable cause for a search does
not always constitute probable cause for an arrest, and probable cause for
an arrest does not necessarily justify a search. See State v. Dalton, 73 Wn.
App. 132, 140, 868 P.2d 873 (1994) (“[P]robable cause to believe a man
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has committed a crime on the street does not necessarily give rise to
probable cause to search his home.”) (citing Commonwealth v. Kline, 234
Pa. Super. 12, 17, 335 A.2d 361 (1975)).
For a search, the officer must have probable cause to believe that the
items to be seized are connected with criminal activity and will be found
in the place to be searched. State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 145–47, 151,
977 P.2d 582 (1999); State v. McReynolds, 104 Wn. App. 560, 570, 17
P.3d 608 (2000) (inscribed crow bar alone provided insufficient nexus
between alleged crimes and the defendant’s residence). Broad
generalizations of criminal activity alone, by themselves, may not be
sufficient. Thein, 138 Wn.2d at 147, 977 P.2d 582 (rejecting generalization
that drug dealers keep drugs at home); State v. Jackson, 111 Wn. App.
660, 688, 46 P.3d 257 (2002) (rejecting generalization that criminals
commonly return to the scene of their crime); State v. Nordlund, 113 Wn.
App. 171, 182–84, 53 P.3d 520 (2002) (generalized statements about the
computer habits of sex offenders insufficient to justify search of
defendant’s personal computer); State v. McGovern, 111 Wn. App. 495,
499–501, 45 P.3d 624 (2002) (magistrate could infer that evidence of drug
dealing would be found in defendant’s home based on generalization that
drug dealers keep drugs at their home plus additional facts suggesting that
“this drug dealer probably keeps drugs at his or her residence”); see also
United States v. Rodgers, 656 F.3d 1023, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A]n
assumption that most sixteen-year-old passengers have identification does
not lead to probable cause to search every car carrying a teenager absent
some individualized suspicion . . . .”). The item sought need not be at the
place to be searched at the time the warrant is issued, but the magistrate
must have reasonable grounds to believe it will be there at the time of the
search. State v. Maddox, 116 Wn. App. 796, 804, 67 P.3d 1135 (2003)
(magistrate could reasonably infer that drugs or evidence of drug dealing
were in the defendant’s home based on evidence that the defendant was
dealing drugs from his home); State v. Perez, 92 Wn. App. 1, 7–9, 963
P.2d 881 (1998) (sufficient facts supported inference of large-scale drug
dealing to support search of alleged safe house).
For an arrest, probable cause exists when the arresting officer has
information that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
suspect has committed a crime. State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 70, 93 P.3d
872 (2004); State v. Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711, 724, 927 P.2d 227 (1996);
State v. Cerrillo, 122 Wn. App. 341, 350–51, 93 P.3d 960 (2004). Probable
cause to arrest is a nontechnical standard based on the facts and
circumstances known to the officer at the time of arrest. State v. Baxter,
68 Wn.2d 416, 420, 413 P.2d 638 (1966); State v. Lewellyn, 78 Wn. App.
788, 797–98, 895 P.2d 418 (1995), aff’d, 130 Wn.2d 215, 922 P.2d 811
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(1996) (officer’s observations, defendant’s driving, and field sobriety tests
supported probable cause for DWI arrest); State v. Garcia, 63 Wn. App.
868, 870–75, 824 P.2d 1220 (1992) (hotel maid’s observations of folded
papers in a drawer, diesel fuel smell, and telephone calls at all hours were
not sufficient by themselves, but when combined with the police
information of the suspect’s car on a drug trafficking tip sheet, did
constitute sufficient probable cause); State v. Griffith, 61 Wn. App. 35,
39–40, 808 P.2d 1171 (1991) (police had probable cause to arrest the
defendant on a DWI charge when the defendant drove erratically, hit a
roadway construction sign, did not stop in response to police emergency
flashers, and proceeded to a home); State v. Fore, 56 Wn. App. 339, 343–
44, 783 P.2d 626 (1989) (probable cause existed based on officer’s
observation of drug transactions in area with reported narcotics activity
and performed in a manner similar to undercover buys made by the
officer); see also State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 824–825, 147 P.3d
1201 (2006) (probable cause existed for blood draw of suspect to compare
with DNA samples from hospital rape-kit performed on victim), overruled
on other grounds by State v. W.R., Jr., 181 Wn.2d 757, 336 P.3d 1134
(2014); State v. Mance, 82 Wn. App. 539, 541–42, 918 P.2d 527 (1996)
(information obtained after defendant was arrested could not be used to
establish probable cause for the arrest). Facts that arise after a warrant is
issued are immaterial unless they were reasonably inferable when the
warrant was issued. State v. Goble, 88 Wn. App. 503, 508, 945 P.2d 263
(1997). Finally, where a seizure does not amount to an arrest, varied
standards may apply. See infra § 2.9.
2.2 PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD: CHARACTERISTICS
2.2(a) Objective Test
Under both the federal and state constitutions, the probable cause
standard is an objective one. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S. Ct. 223,
13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964); State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 70, 93 P.3d 872
(2004). The officer’s subjective belief is not determinative. State v. Huff,
64 Wn. App. 641, 645, 826 P.2d 698 (1992). Accordingly, an officer’s
good faith is not enough to justify a search absent probable cause, and
likewise, an officer’s belief that probable cause was not present is also not
determinative. Id.; see also State v. Gaddy, 114 Wn. App. 702, 706, 60
P.3d 116 (2002) (officer’s good faith reliance on an agency “hot sheet”
would not validate an arrest if the “hot sheet” was not based upon probable
cause), aff’d on other grounds, 152 Wn.2d 64, 93 P.3d 872; State v.
Rodriguez-Torres, 77 Wn. App. 687, 693, 893 P.2d 650 (1995) (officer’s
subjective belief that probable cause did not exist was not dispositive);
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Huff, 64 Wn. App. at 645–46, 826 P.2d 698 (officer’s subjective belief that
an offense has been committed does not cure a lack of probable cause).
Additionally, the probable cause standard is determined with
reference to a reasonable person with the expertise and experience of the
officer in question. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897–98, 95
S. Ct. 2585, 45 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1975) (border patrol officers are entitled to
draw inferences in light of their prior experience with aliens and
smugglers). As a result, an officer’s particular training and expertise is
highly important. State v. Cole, 128 Wn.2d 262, 289, 906 P.2d 925 (1995)
(acknowledging officer’s drug enforcement experience and ability to
identify marijuana smell), abrogated on other grounds by In re Det. of
Petersen, 145 Wn.2d 789, 42 P.3d 952 (2002); Rodriguez-Torres, 77 Wn.
App. at 693–94, 893 P.2d 650 (probable cause existed when an officer
with specialized training in narcotics enforcement observed exchange of
money for hidden, cupped object in an area known for narcotics, and defendant fled upon notice of officer’s presence). The officer’s basis of
knowledge, specific training, and experience must be included in the
affidavit so that the magistrate may make an independent determination of
probable cause and establish more than the officer’s personal belief. State
v. Jacobs, 121 Wn. App. 669, 678, 89 P.3d 232 (2004), reversed on other
grounds, 154 Wn.2d 596, 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (noting that an affidavit’s
failure to indicate an officer’s experience and education is not fatal to the
resulting warrant’s validity if other facts establish probable cause),
superseded by statute as stated in State v. Conover, 183 Wn.2d 706, 355
P.3d 1093 (2015); State v. Johnson, 79 Wn. App. 776, 780, 904 P.2d 1188
(1995). Similarly, a dog’s training and experience is important for
establishing probable cause predicated on a canine sniff alert. See Florida
v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 247, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61 (2013).
2.2(b) Quantum of Evidence Required
Probable cause is a quantum of evidence “less than . . . would
justify . . . conviction,” yet “more than bare suspicion.” Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949). Although
a single fact in isolation may not be sufficient, probable cause may exist
when that fact is read together with other facts stated in the affidavit. State
v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 110, 59 P.3d 58 (2002); State v. Tarter, 111 Wn.
App. 336, 341, 44 P.3d 889 (2002).
Accordingly, to make an arrest, the officer need only have reasonable
grounds for suspicion and evidence of circumstances sufficiently strong
enough to justify a cautious and disinterested person in believing that the
suspect is guilty. State v. Scott, 93 Wn.2d 7, 10–11, 604 P.2d 943 (1980)
(officers possessing description of car used in robbery and license number
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of similar car used in robbery involving similar modus operandi had
probable cause to arrest persons who were driving a similar vehicle toward
the address where the car’s license number was traced). The exact
quantum of evidence required is unclear and may depend in part on the
nature of the intrusion and the seriousness of the offense. See generally 2
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(e) (5th ed. 2012).
2.2(c) Individualized Suspicion
Probable cause to arrest an individual exists only if police have
reasonable grounds to believe that the particular individual has committed
the crime. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d
238 (1979); State v. Grande 164 Wn.2d 135, 145, 187 P.3d 248 (2008).
Accordingly, Washington courts have required individualized suspicion as
to each occupant of a vehicle; the passenger cannot be arrested based
solely on individualized suspicion as to the driver. Grande, 164 Wn.2d at
146–47, 187 P.3d 248. Under the Fourth Amendment, however, a police
officer may reasonably infer a “common enterprise” among passengers in
a vehicle. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371–73, 124 S. Ct. 795, 157
L. Ed. 2d 769 (2003).
Individualized suspicion may also be described as a sufficient nexus
between the suspects to be searched and the criminal activity. State v.
Carter, 79 Wn. App. 154, 158, 901 P.2d 335 (1995). This was not the case
in Carter, where a police informant observed residents and non-residents
of a building buying, selling, and using illegal drugs, but the informant
was unable to identify any of the individuals by name. Id. at 156, 901 P.2d
335. Based upon the informant’s observations, the police obtained a
warrant to search “all ‘persons at the residence at the time the warrant i[s]
being served as well as persons arriving at and leaving the residence at the
time the warrant is being executed for controlled substances and papers of
identification.’” Id. Upon execution of the warrant, the police found the
defendant asleep on a mattress in the living room and discovered rock
cocaine in his pants pocket. Id. at 157, 901 P.2d 335. The court held that
the warrant did not justify a search of the defendant’s person because the
observations of the informant did not support the conclusion that only
illegal conduct occurred within the apartment and that any person present
was likely to be involved with criminal activity “in such a way as to have
evidence of the criminal activity on his person.” Id. at 161, 901 P.2d 335
(quoting Stokes v. State, 604 So.2d 836, 838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
However, the court carefully noted that it was not deciding whether
warrants with “all persons present” language would be valid under
different circumstances. Id. Washington courts also require individualized
suspicion before the police search motel registries for outstanding
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warrants. See State v. Jorden, 160 Wn.2d 121, 130, 156 P.3d 893 (2007);
In re Nichols, 171 Wn.2d 370, 377, 256 P.3d 1131 (2011).
Individualized suspicion may not be required when the police are
conducting a valid vehicle roadblock or spot check. See infra § 5.18.
Further, individualized suspicion may also not be required for some
administrative searches. See generally infra § 6.4(b)–(c).
2.3 INFORMATION CONSIDERED: IN GENERAL
A court reviewing a probable cause determination considers only the
information that was available to the magistrate at the time that the warrant
was issued to the officer. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
481–82, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963); State v. Murray, 110 Wn.2d
706, 709–10, 757 P.2d 487 (1988). Probable cause must be based on facts
and not on mere conclusions. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 113, 84 S.
Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964), abrogated on other grounds by Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983); State v.
Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 145–47, 977 P.2d 582 (1999). In addition, probable
cause must exist at the actual time of arrest or search, and it cannot be
stale. See State v. Lyons, 174 Wn.2d 354, 368, 275 P.3d 314 (2012) (no
timely probable cause when affidavit failed to state when the informant
observed a marijuana grow operation); State v. Maddox, 152 Wn.2d 499,
505–06, 98 P.3d 1199 (2004) (delay in executing a warrant “may render
the magistrate’s probable cause determination stale,” while the test for
staleness is based on the facts and circumstances identified in the
affidavit).
Affidavits for search warrants must be evaluated in a commonsense,
non-hypertechnical manner. In re Yim, 139 Wn.2d 581, 597, 989 P.2d 512
(1999); State v. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d 962, 965, 639 P.2d 743 (1982); see infra
§ 3.3(c). “The support for issuance of a search warrant is sufficient if, on
reading the affidavits, an ordinary person would understand that a
violation existed and was continuing at the time of the application.”
Fisher, 96 Wn.2d at 965, 639 P.2d 743 (quoting State v. Clay, 7 Wn. App.
631, 637, 501 P.2d 603 (1972)). Upon review, all doubts are resolved in
favor of the warrant’s validity. Maddox, 152 Wn.2d at 509, 98 P.3d 1199;
State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 195, 867 P.2d 593 (1994); State v. Olson,
73 Wn. App. 348, 354, 869 P.2d 110 (1994).
Information need not be admissible at trial in order to support
probable cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172–74, 69 S. Ct.
1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949); Bokor v. Dep’t of Licensing, 74 Wn. App.
523, 526, 874 P.2d 168 (1994). For example, marital privilege does not
prevent a spouse’s statements from being used to establish probable cause.
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State v. Bonaparte, 34 Wn. App. 285, 289, 660 P.2d 334 (1983). See
generally infra § 7.3.
Even if a search may have occurred illegally, “a search warrant [will]
not [be] rendered totally invalid if the affidavit contains sufficient facts to
establish probable cause independent of the illegally obtained
information.” State v. Coates, 107 Wn.2d 882, 887, 735 P.2d 64 (1987).
In Coates, police obtained a search warrant based partially on facts in
violation of the defendant’s right to remain silent. Id. However, the court
upheld the search warrant because other facts in the affidavit supported a
finding of probable cause. Id. at 888–89, 735 P.2d 64.
2.3(a) Hearsay
Hearsay from an informant can establish probable cause for a warrant
as long as there is evidence that provides reason to believe that the
informant is reliable and has an adequate basis of knowledge. Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969),
abrogated on other grounds by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct.
2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 113–14,
84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964), abrogated on other grounds by
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317; State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432,
437–38, 688 P.2d 136 (1984) (“If the informant’s information is hearsay,
the basis of knowledge prong can be satisfied if there is sufficient
information so that the hearsay establishes a basis of knowledge.”). As a
result, a magistrate may rely on a police officer’s affidavit or other
testimony that relays hearsay information based on a fellow officer’s
personal knowledge. State v. Lodge, 42 Wn. App. 380, 386, 711 P.2d 1078
(1985). The affidavit may also relate hearsay from informants as long as
there is a basis for crediting it. State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 209–10, 720
P.2d 838 (1986); State v. Lund, 70 Wn. App. 437, 449–50 n.9, 853 P.2d
1379 (1993); see infra § 2.5. Multiple levels of hearsay may also be
considered if the requirements are met for each person in the chain of
information. See Huft, 106 Wn.2d at 209–10, 720 P.2d 838 (concerned
citizen information not sufficient without basis of informant’s
knowledge); State v. Vanzant, 14 Wn. App. 679, 683, 544 P.2d 786 (1975)
(information passed to second detective by detective with personal
knowledge of informant’s reliability sufficient to establish probable cause
for arrest). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(d)
(5th ed. 2012).
2.3(b) Prior Arrests, Prior Convictions, and Reputation
A magistrate or police officer making a probable cause determination
may consider prior convictions that have probative value to the specific

1314

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:1277

probable cause inquiry. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 111 n.51, 59 P.3d
58 (2002); State v. Clark, 143 Wn.2d 731, 749, 24 P.3d 1006 (2001)
(defendant’s prior conviction was “helpful in establishing probable cause”
when the conviction was of the same general nature as the crime under
investigation); State v. Sterling, 43 Wn. App. 846, 851, 719 P.2d 1357
(1986) (occupant’s two prior convictions for narcotics can be a factor in
determining probable cause). A prior criminal record—even of the same
type of criminal conduct—does not alone justify a warrantless search.
State v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437, 446, 617 P.2d 429 (1980); State v. Duncan,
81 Wn. App. 70, 78, 912 P.2d 1090 (1996); see Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,
97, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 3.2(d) (5th ed. 2012). While prior acts may establish
probable cause when the modus operandi is similar and distinctive, see 2
LaFave, supra, § 3.2(d), a general assertion of criminal reputation is
insufficient, Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21
L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969), abrogated on other grounds by Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). However, the U.S.
Supreme Court has noted that an officer’s knowledge of a suspect’s
reputation is a “practical consideration of everyday life” upon which an
officer (or a magistrate) may rely in determining the reliability of an
informant. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 29
L. Ed. 2d 723 (1971) (plurality opinion). Specific facts leading to a
conclusion that a suspect has a bad reputation may also be considered. Id.;
see 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.2(d).
2.3(c) Increased Electrical Consumption
Standing alone, an increase in electrical use does not constitute sufficient probable cause to issue a search warrant. State v. Olson, 73 Wn.
App. 348, 356, 869 P.2d 110 (1994); State v. Sterling, 43 Wn. App. 846,
851, 719 P.2d 1357 (1986); State v. McPherson, 40 Wn. App. 298, 301,
698 P.2d 563 (1985). Further, evidence of increased power consumption,
absent other information, is an innocuous fact and cannot corroborate an
anonymous tip of suspected criminal activity. State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d
173, 196, 867 P.2d 593 (1994); see also State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 211,
720 P.2d 838 (1986) (“[T]here are too many plausible reasons for
increased electrical use to allow a search warrant to be issued based on
increased consumption.”). When the increase in power consumption is
combined with other factors, however, the increase may be considered in
determining whether probable cause exists. State v. Cole, 128 Wn.2d 262,
291, 906 P.2d 925 (1995), overruled on other grounds by In re Det. of
Petersen, 145 Wn.2d 789, 801, 42 P.3d 952 (2002) (increase in electrical
consumption is a proper factor in determining probable cause when
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combined with other suspicious factors); Sterling, 43 Wn. App. at 851–52,
719 P.2d 1357 (400 to 500 percent increase in power usage combined with
suspicious facts supported probable cause for search warrant). For
example, Washington courts have considered evidence of power usage
three to four times greater than the previous occupant’s, in combination
with the absence of accumulated snow on the roof when neighboring
buildings had 20 to 30 inches, in determining that probable cause was not
established. State v. Rakosky, 79 Wn. App. 229, 239–40, 901 P.2d 364
(1995).
An individual has a protected privacy interest in power usage records
such that a disclosure of this information is prohibited unless there is
written notice to the utility company that the person is suspected of
criminal activity. RCW 42.56.335 (formerly RCW 42.17.314, prohibiting
the inspection or copying of a person’s utility records by law enforcement
unless the utility is provided a written statement that indicates the person
is suspected of committing a crime and there is a reasonable belief that the
records could determine or help determine whether the suspicion is true).
See generally Cole, 128 Wn.2d at 290, 906 P.2d 925 (a search warrant
satisfies the requirements of former RCW 42.17.314); In re Maxfield, 133
Wn.2d 332, 341–42, 945 P.2d 196 (1997) (no reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity because electrical service was new and records showed
high electrical consumption pottery kilns were to be used at location);
State v. Maxwell, 114 Wn.2d 761, 767–69, 791 P.2d 223 (1990)
(telephonic request for utility record not admissible because verbal request
was in violation of former RCW 42.17.314); In re Rosier, 105 Wn.2d 606,
613–16, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986) (recognizing the need to balance the
public’s interest in disclosure of information leading to arrests and the
individual and societal interest in preventing “fishing expeditions” by the
government), superseded by statute as stated in Doe ex rel. Roe v.
Washington State Patrol, 185 Wn.2d 363, 374 P.3d 63 (2016).
2.3(d) Polygraph Results
The results of a polygraph test may be considered in a magistrate’s
probable cause determination, even though such results are inadmissible
at trial unless stringent conditions are satisfied. State v. Clark, 143 Wn.2d
731, 749–50, 24 P.3d 1006 (2001). Although the qualifications of the FBI
agent who administered the polygraph test in Clark were not set forth in
the affidavit, the court noted that information from a reliable informant has
corroborative value even if the informant’s basis of knowledge is not
specified. Id. at 750, 24 P.3d 1006 (citing State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706,
712, 630 P.2d 427 (1981)). In Clark, the FBI agent’s basis of knowledge
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was “the administration of the polygraph test and his clinical and common
sense observation of Clark’s performance.” Id.
2.3(e) Taking of Blood Samples
Probable cause exists to justify the seizure of a person’s blood sample
if the police believe that a person’s blood sample will provide evidence of
criminal activity and the facts and circumstances known to the officers
justify their belief that the person is intoxicated and has committed a
crime for which intoxication is an element. State v. Curran, 116 Wn.2d
174, 184, 804 P.2d 558 (1991), abrogated on other grounds by State v.
Berlin, 133 Wn.2d 541, 947 P.2d 700 (1997); see also State v. Schulze,
116 Wn.2d 154, 161, 804 P.2d 566 (1991) (no right to counsel prior to
undergoing a mandatory blood draw); State v. Komoto, 40 Wn. App.
200, 208, 697 P.2d 1025 (1985) (police may enter the home of a suspected drunk driver if police “have probable cause to believe that the
suspect was under the influence, that he has committed a felony of
which being under the influence of alcohol is an element, and that he is
presently at home”).
2.4 LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS’ FIRST-HAND OBSERVATIONS
Because the existence of probable cause is dependent on a fact-based
inquiry, it is impossible to define when an officer’s observations are
sufficient to constitute probable cause. However, the following common
factual situations provide some general guidance.
2.4(a) Particular Crimes: Stolen Property
Suspicious conduct suggesting that property is stolen does not always
establish probable cause. For example, when officers saw two men park a
car in an alley, load it with cartons, drive away, and later return and repeat
their conduct, the officers did not have probable cause to believe that the
cartons contained stolen property. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 99,
103, 80 S. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1959).
The alternative outcome occurred in a case where officers stopped a
vehicle after learning that its owner had an outstanding warrant for a traffic
violation. State v. Glasper, 84 Wn.2d 17, 18, 523 P.2d 937 (1974). The
police then saw an unpadded, unsecured television in the open trunk. Id.
A passenger in the car claimed ownership of the set but was unable to
identify the brand. Id. The court held that the police had reasonable cause
to believe that the television was stolen. Id. at 21, 523 P.2d 937. Similarly,
items wrapped in a blanket on a street and thrown into bushes when police
approached were indicative of stolen property when police had previous
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experience with similar situations. State v. Barber, 118 Wn.2d 335, 337–
38, 340, 823 P.2d 1068 (1992). However, in another case, the existence of
an expensive briefcase in a car that had not been reported stolen was not
sufficient to establish probable cause for a vehicle search. State v. Ozuna,
80 Wn. App. 684, 688–89, 911 P.2d 395 (1996). See generally 2 Wayne
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.6(a) (5th ed. 2012).
2.4(b) Particular Crimes: Illegal Substances
The odor of an illegal substance may establish probable cause as long
as the odor is detected by someone trained and experienced in detecting
illegal substances. State v. Jacobs, 121 Wn. App. 669, 678, 89 P.3d 232
(2004), rev’d on other grounds, 154 Wn.2d 596, 115 P.3d 281 (2005);
State v. Olson, 73 Wn. App. 348, 356, 869 P.2d 110 (1994) (trained
officer’s detection of marijuana odor); State v. Vonhof, 51 Wn. App. 33,
41–42, 751 P.2d 1221 (1988) (odor combined with experience in smelling
the illegal substance constituted probable cause). The affidavit in support
of a warrant must set forth the officer’s training and experience in
identifying the odor. See State v. Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711, 724–25, 927
P.2d 227 (1996); State v. Remboldt, 64 Wn. App. 505, 510, 827 P.2d 282
(1992); State v. Solberg, 66 Wn. App. 66, 79, 831 P.2d 754 (1992), rev’d
on other grounds, 122 Wn.2d 688, 861 P.2d 460 (1993) (officer had
experience in identifying marijuana grow operations); State v. Fore, 56
Wn. App. 339, 343–44, 783 P.2d 626 (1989) (officer training relevant to
surveillance of drug transactions in park). However, even if the officer’s
experience and education are not in the affidavit, the omission is not fatal
to the search warrant’s validity if other facts in the affidavit demonstrate
probable cause. Jacobs, 121 Wn. App. at 678, 89 P.3d 232.
Absolute certainty as to the identity of a substance is not required.
Graham, 130 Wn.2d at 725, 927 P.2d 227 (quoting Fore, 56 Wn. App. at
345, 783 P.2d 626). Moreover, odor may be used in concert with other
suspicious activities to establish probable cause. See State v. Huff, 64 Wn.
App. 641, 647–48, 826 P.2d 698 (1992) (odor of methamphetamine
combined with furtive gestures and lying to police during car stop created
probable cause). Documentation purporting to authorize a defendant’s use
of marijuana will not negate an officer’s probable cause. State v. Fry, 168
Wn.2d 1, 6, 228 P.3d 1 (2010). The authorization creates only a potential
affirmative defense that would excuse the criminal act. Id. at 7–8, 228
P.3d 1. However, the officer’s experience with and training on the
characteristics of those who cultivate illegal substances, without more, are
not enough to establish probable cause. Olson, 73 Wn. App. at 357, 869
P.2d 110 (officer’s experience that those who cultivate marijuana usually
hide records and materials in a safe house under their control did not
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satisfy probable cause for search warrant of the safe house premises); State
v. Perez, 92 Wn. App. 1, 7–8, 963 P.2d 881 (1998) (sufficient facts
supported inference of large-scale drug dealing to support search of
alleged safe house); see State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 150, 977 P.2d 582
(1999) (magistrate could not infer that evidence might be found in the
defendant’s home based solely on generalization that drug dealers likely
keep drugs at their home); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
3.6(b) (5th ed. 2012).
In the case of a drug enforcement dog sniff, an alert establishes
probable cause if the dog’s training and reliability are known to the
officers and set forth in the affidavit for a warrant. State v. Jackson, 82
Wn. App. 594, 606–07, 918 P.2d 945 (1996) (alert by police dog after
temporary seizure of Federal Express package constituted probable cause);
State v. Flores-Moreno, 72 Wn. App. 733, 740–41, 866 P.2d 648 (1994)
(probable cause established from observations of drug deal combined with
positive canine sniff); State v. Stanphill, 53 Wn. App. 623, 632, 769 P.2d
861 (1989) (corroborating canine sniff overcame any deficiency in the
reliability of an informant). The U.S. Supreme Court has found that
“evidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a certification or training
program can itself provide sufficient reason to trust [the dog’s] alert[]”
such that a court can initially presume that the alert provides probable
cause to search. Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61
(2013). In Harris, however, the Court used the “totality of the
circumstances” test established in Illinois v. Gates to determine that
probable cause was not invalidated by the absence of records establishing
the dog’s track record in locating substances in the field. Id. at 1055, 185
L. Ed. 2d. 61. The Washington State Supreme Court, however, has
declined to follow the test set out in Illinois v. Gates, and therefore the
applicability of the totality of the circumstances test under article I, section
7 to probable cause based on a canine sniff alert remains unclear. State v.
Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); see Florida v. Jardines,
133 S. Ct. 1409, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013).
2.4(c) Association: Persons and Places
Because of the individualized suspicion requirement, mere
association with a person whom police have grounds to arrest does not
constitute probable cause for arrest. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,
587, 68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L. Ed. 210 (1948) (search of a car passenger
unjustified when the driver was arrested for possession of counterfeit
ration coupons). Mere proximity to others suspected of criminal activity
does not in itself establish probable cause for a search of the associate.
State v. Crane, 105 Wn. App. 301, 312, 19 P.3d 1100 (2001), overruled
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on other grounds by State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 62 P.3d 489 (2003);
State v. Dorsey, 40 Wn. App. 459, 466, 698 P.2d 1109 (1985) (probable
cause based on association with others engaged in criminal activity
requires an additional circumstance that reasonably implies knowledge of
or participation in that activity). An officer must establish an
individualized finding of probable cause to make a lawful arrest. State v.
Grande, 164 Wn.2d 135, 140, 187 P.3d 248 (2008). In Grande, the court
held that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest and search a car
passenger based solely on the smell of marijuana emanating from the car.
Id. at 146, 187 P.3d 248. Additionally, race or color alone, including
“racial incongruity” (“a person of any race being allegedly ‘out of place’
in a particular geographic area”) can never constitute probable cause of
criminal activity. State v. Barber, 118 Wn.2d 335, 346, 823 P.2d 1068
(1992); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885–87,
95 S. Ct. 2574, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1975).
Neither is an individual’s presence in a high-crime area sufficient, by
itself, to establish probable cause. See Crane, 105 Wn. App. at 312, 19
P.3d 1100; see also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61
L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979). Suspicion of dangerousness must relate to the person
searched, not to the area in which he is found. State v. Smith, 102 Wn.2d
449, 452–53, 688 P.2d 146 (1984) (general practice of frisking individuals
in particularly dangerous area of the city is not justified by probable
cause). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.6(g)
(5th ed. 2012).
2.4(d) Furtive Gestures and Flight
A suspect’s furtive gestures or flight, without more, cannot establish
probable cause; however, they may be a factor in determining whether
probable cause exists. State v. Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711, 725–26, 927 P.2d
227 (1996) (finding probable cause when the defendant quickly concealed
an object in his pants pockets, ignored the officers’ request to stop, looked
nervous, and sweated profusely on a cold night); State v. Baxter, 68 Wn.2d
416, 421–22, 413 P.2d 638 (1966) (“flight is an element of probable
cause”); State v. Huff, 64 Wn. App. 641, 647, 826 P.2d 698 (1992) (furtive
movements and lying to police about identity support probable cause);
State v. Hobart, 24 Wn. App. 240, 243, 600 P.2d 660 (1979), rev’d on
other grounds, 94 Wn.2d 437, 617 P.2d 429 (1980) (defendant grabbed
his pocket and turned away from an officer after the officer asked if the
defendant had cocaine in his pocket); see also Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40, 66–67, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917 (1968) (probable cause
existed when strangers tiptoed from apartment and fled from police
officer); State v. Larson, 93 Wn.2d 638, 645, 611 P.2d 771 (1980)
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(suspect’s leaving at the time a police cruiser arrives does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that it is reasonable to suspect the person of
committing a crime). Probable cause, however, is not negated merely
because it is possible to imagine an innocent explanation for observed
activities. Graham, 130 Wn.2d at 725, 927 P.2d 227 (quoting State v. Fore,
56 Wn. App. 339, 344, 783 P.2d 626 (1989)) (noting that absolute certainty
as to the identity of a suspicious substance is not required).
2.4(e) Response to Questioning
A suspect’s response to police questioning can establish probable
cause when combined with other circumstances. State v. Glover, 116
Wn.2d 509, 514, 806 P.2d 760 (1991) (officer’s disbelief of defendant’s
statement that he lived at housing complex, combined with suspicious
gestures, constituted probable cause for criminal trespass); State v. Huff,
64 Wn. App. 641, 647, 826 P.2d 698 (1992) (lying to police about identity
coupled with furtive gestures and identification of illegal substance odor
established probable cause); see also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891,
897, 95 S. Ct. 2585, 45 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1975) (border patrol may consider
nature of responses to questioning to help establish probable cause).
A suspect’s failure or refusal to answer an officer’s questions,
however, may not be taken into account. State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 106,
640 P.2d 1061 (1982) superseded by statute as stated in State v. Graham,
130 Wn.2d 711, 927 P.2d 227 (1996); see Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,
53 n.3, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979). See generally 2 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.6(f) (5th ed. 2012). Similarly, a suspect’s
silence after Miranda warnings have been given may not be considered in
determining probable cause. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617–18, 96 S.
Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976). Nor may the suspect’s failure to
challenge the officer’s actions be considered. United States v. Di Re, 332
U.S. 581, 594, 68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L. Ed. 210 (1948) (officers could not infer
probable cause from suspect’s failure to protest arrest or to proclaim
innocence).
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Fourth
Amendment cannot compel a suspect to answer questions, a state may
criminalize a suspect’s refusal to identify herself if the request for
identification is reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the
investigative stop. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nevada, Humboldt
Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 187–89, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2004);
see State v. Turner, 103 Wn. App. 515, 525–26, 13 P.3d 234 (2000)
(holding the defendant’s refusal to provide his name combined with the
defendant’s lunging at the officer were sufficient to support an arrest for
obstruction of a law enforcement officer); State v. Contreras, 92 Wn. App.
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307, 316, 966 P.2d 915 (1998) (recognizing the defendant’s right to refuse
to answer questions, but including the defendant’s giving a false name as
one reason that supported a charge for obstruction of justice). See
generally RCW 9A.76.020(1) (Washington’s obstruction of justice
statute).
2.5 INFORMATION FROM AN INFORMANT: IN GENERAL
Different sets of rules govern information received from an
informant depending on whether the informant is a criminal informant, a
citizen informant, a police informant, or an anonymous informant. This
section discusses general rules that apply to all informants; section 2.6
focuses on citizen informants; section 2.7 covers the rules for when the
informant is a fellow police officer; and section 2.8 deals with anonymous
informants.
Traditionally, under the Fourth Amendment, information from an
informant could establish probable cause only when the information
available to the police satisfied the two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test, which
requires that an informant’s basis of knowledge and reliability be
established. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415–16, 89 S. Ct. 584,
21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S. Ct.
1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964); see 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 3.3(a) (5th ed. 2012). While the Supreme Court has since
rejected Aguilar-Spinelli in favor of a less stringent totality of the
circumstances approach for determining when an informant’s tip may
establish probable cause, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231–32,
103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), the Washington State
Supreme Court has held that article I, section 7 requires adherence to
the Aguilar-Spinelli test. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 111–12, 59 P.3d
58 (2002) (citing State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 440, 688 P.2d 136
(1984)).
A Washington trial court may not use the Gates “totality of the
circumstances” test. State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 71 n.2, 93 P.3d 872
(2004); Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 443, 688 P.2d 136; see 2 LaFave, supra, §
3.3(a). As a result, under article I, section 7, a strong showing as to an
informant’s basis of knowledge cannot overcome a deficiency in the
informant’s credibility and vice versa. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 441, 688
P.2d 136. But probable cause may still be established despite such a
deficiency if the police can support this missing prong by sufficiently
corroborating the informant’s tip. Id. at 445, 688 P.2d 136.
Under the “basis of knowledge” prong, the facts must enable the
person making the probable cause determination, such as a magistrate, to
decide whether the informant had a basis for the allegation of criminal
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conduct. Id. at 444, 688 P.2d 136 (basis of knowledge not satisfied when
informant could not establish how he knew the defendant was a drug
dealer). Under the “veracity” prong, the facts must enable the magistrate
to determine either the informant’s inherent credibility or reliability on the
particular occasion. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415–16, 89 S. Ct. 584. An
informant’s tip may provide police with grounds to stop a person only if
there are some indicia of reliability. State v. Smith, 102 Wn.2d 449, 455,
688 P.2d 146 (1984) (officers’ reliance on street kids to lead them to
suspect is not permissible when the officers questioned the reliability
of children). If either the basis of knowledge or veracity prong is
deficient, the police may cure the deficiency by corroborating the
informant’s tip through an independent investigation. Vickers, 148
Wn.2d at 112, 59 P.3d 58.
2.5(a) Satisfying the “Basis of Knowledge” Prong by
Personal Knowledge
The best way to satisfy the “basis of knowledge” prong is to show
that the informant based his or her information on personal knowledge.
See, e.g., Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed.
2d 723 (1964); State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 112, 59 P.3d 58 (2002);
State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 437, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); State v. Bauer,
98 Wn. App. 870, 875, 991 P.2d 668 (2000). For example, an informant’s
statement that he had observed a marijuana grow operation in the
defendant’s residence will satisfy the basis of knowledge prong. State v.
Wolken, 103 Wn.2d 823, 827, 700 P.2d 319 (1985). The affidavit need
only show that the informant had personal knowledge of the facts asserted.
Vickers, 148 Wn.2d at 113, 59 P.3d 58 (affidavit did not need to establish
that informant had actually seen the weapons or ammunition used in a
robbery, but did need to establish that the informant had personal
knowledge of the facts asserted in the affidavit regarding the defendants’
conversations about committing an armed robbery). Personal knowledge
of only innocuous facts about the defendant, however, is insufficient. State
v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 196, 867 P.2d 593 (1994) (phone number,
address, and abnormally high electrical consumption considered
innocuous facts); State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 211, 720 P.2d 838 (1986).
Lastly, the basis of an informant’s knowledge may be established by
hearsay. See Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 437, 688 P.2d 136; State v. Casto, 39
Wn. App. 229, 233, 692 P.2d 890 (1984).
Under article I, section 7, a deficiency in the basis of knowledge
prong may be remedied by “independent police investigatory work that
corroborates the tip to such an extent that it supports the missing
elements.” Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 438, 688 P.2d 136; see also State v.
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Kennedy, 72 Wn. App. 244, 249–50, 864 P.2d 410 (1993); State v. Adame,
39 Wn. App. 574, 576–77, 694 P.2d 676 (1985). The corroborated
information, like an informant’s first-hand knowledge, must itself suggest
criminal activity; “[m]erely verifying ‘innocuous details,’ commonly
known facts or easily predictable events should not suffice to remedy [the]
deficiency.” Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 438, 688 P.2d 136; State v. Maddox,
116 Wn. App. 796, 803, 67 P.3d 1135 (2003), aff’d, 152 Wn.2d 499, 98
P.3d 1199 (2004) (corroboration of alleged drug dealing sufficient when
police searched informant before a controlled buy, observed his entrance
and exit, and then re-searched the informant after the controlled buy); State
v. Maxwell, 114 Wn.2d 761, 769–70, 791 P.2d 223 (1990) (frequent
visitors, tin foil on windows, and suspicious conversation not sufficient
evidence of illegal activity).
Lastly, even if a deficiency in the information renders it insufficient
to establish probable cause, it may be used to corroborate other cognizable
information. State v. Lund, 70 Wn. App. 437, 450 n.10, 853 P.2d 1379
(1993) (anonymous police informant’s tip of possible drug activity in
prison not enough to establish probable cause, but could be considered in
corroborating another police informant’s similar information and for
independent police investigation of tip); State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 712,
630 P.2d 427 (1981) (statements by a reliable informant may establish
probable cause when used to corroborate information provided by an
informant whose reliability has not yet been established). See generally 2
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3(f) (5th ed. 2012).
2.5(b) Satisfying the “Veracity” Prong by Past Performance
The veracity prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test is a measure of an
informant’s truthfulness. State v. Chamberlin, 161 Wn.2d 30, 41, 162 P.3d
389 (2007). This prong is met when the affidavit supporting the search
warrant shows the informant’s credibility or contains sufficient facts from
which a magistrate can independently determine the veracity of the
informant. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 112, 59 P.3d 58 (2002); State
v. Garcia, 140 Wn. App. 609, 619, 166 P.3d 848 (2007) (quoting State v.
McCord, 125 Wn. App. 888, 893, 106 P.3d 832 (2005)); State v. Maddox,
116 Wn. App. 796, 803, 67 P.3d 1135, aff’d, 152 Wn.2d 499, 98 P.3d 1199
(2004) (informant’s “track record” of two successful controlled buys
sufficient to support an inference of veracity).
An informant’s reliability may be established if the informant has
previously provided information that was proven to be reliable, thereby
establishing a “track record” of reliability. State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d
432, 437, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); State v. Shaver, 116 Wn. App. 375, 380–
81, 65 P.3d 688 (2003) (confidential informant had provided reliable
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information to the officer in the past); State v. Lopez, 70 Wn. App. 259,
264, 856 P.2d 390 (1993) (informant’s successful assistance in prior
controlled buys established a track record of reliability); see 2 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3(b) (5th ed. 2012). In the absence of
circumstances demonstrating unreliability, an officer need not have
personal knowledge of the informant’s track record, but may rely on
information from fellow officers. State v. Vanzant, 14 Wn. App. 679, 681–
82, 544 P.2d 786 (1975); see infra § 2.7(b). Further, similar to an
informant’s basis of knowledge, an informant’s credibility may be verified
by independent police investigation. See State v. Emery, 161 Wn. App.
172, 202, 253 P.3d 413 (2011) (informant’s veracity confirmed by police
investigation); Shaver, 116 Wn. App. at 380–81, 65 P.3d 688 (confidential
informant’s credibility corroborated by officer’s ongoing investigation of
drug activity at a residence for many years prior to informant’s tip and
officer’s observations that residence was frequented by known drug users).
2.5(c) Satisfying the “Veracity” Prong with Admissions Against
Interest and Motive
The veracity prong may also be established when the informant has
a clear motive for being truthful, such as receiving a benefit in return for
good information. State v. Bean, 89 Wn.2d 467, 469–71, 572 P.2d 1102
(1978) (offer of a favorable sentence recommendation gave informant a
strong motive to provide accurate information); State v. Estorga, 60 Wn.
App. 298, 305, 803 P.2d 813 (1991) (offer to drop charges in exchange for
accurate information established strong motive to be truthful); State v.
Smith, 39 Wn. App. 642, 647–48, 694 P.2d 660 (1984) (offer of reduction
in charge from felony to misdemeanor gave informant strong motive to be
truthful). An informant’s statement against penal interest, or recitation of
another person’s statement against interest, particularly when supported
by other indicia of reliability, may also demonstrate a motive for being
truthful and thereby establish credibility. State v. Chamberlin, 161 Wn.2d
30, 42, 162 P.3d 389 (2007) (informant’s confession of driving under the
influence of narcotics, supported by his willingness to be a named
informant, established reliability); State v. Merkt, 124 Wn. App. 607,
613−14, 102 P.3d 828 (2004); State v. Shaver, 116 Wn. App. 375, 380–
81, 65 P.3d 688 (2003) (confidential informant relayed comments against
penal interest made by suspected drug dealer).
2.6 CITIZEN INFORMANTS: VICTIM/WITNESS INFORMANTS IN GENERAL
The Aguilar-Spinelli test also applies to the use of information from
a citizen informant. State v. Wible, 113 Wn. App. 18, 22, 51 P.3d 830
(2002); State v. Tarter, 111 Wn. App. 336, 340, 44 P.3d 899 (2002)
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(Aguilar-Spinelli test applied where informants were named citizens).
Again, multiple levels of hearsay are acceptable as long as each instance
in the chain meets the two-prong test. See, e.g., State v. Vanzant, 14 Wn.
App. 679, 683, 544 P.2d 786 (1975) (information passed to second
detective by detective with personal knowledge of informant’s reliability
sufficient to establish probable cause for arrest). See generally 2 Wayne
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.4 (5th ed. 2012). Lastly, a
demonstration of reliability may not be required if a citizen provides
noncriminal, nonaccusatory information that strongly suggests that the
informant is relating personal observations. State v. Nordlund, 113 Wn.
App. 171, 181, 53 P.3d 520 (2002); State v. Stone, 56 Wn. App. 153, 156,
782 P.2d 1093 (1989).
2.6(a) Satisfying the “Basis of Knowledge” Prong
The basis for the citizen informant’s knowledge must be established.
See State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 211, 720 P.2d 838 (1986). The basis of
the knowledge prong is satisfied by information showing that the
informant has personally seen the facts asserted and is passing on firsthand
information. State v. Smith, 110 Wn.2d 658, 663, 756 P.2d 722 (1988);
State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d. 432, 437, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); State v.
Wible, 113 Wn. App. 18, 23, 51 P.3d 830 (2002). However, the basis of
the informant’s knowledge must be demonstrated if the informant was not
the eyewitness, or when the information requires some expertise, such as
the identification of the odor of marijuana. State v. Boyer, 124 Wn. App.
593, 606, 102 P.3d 833 (2004) (affidavit failed to establish citizen
informant’s expertise in identifying cocaine); see 2 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 3.4(b) (5th ed. 2012).
2.6(b) Satisfying the “Veracity” Prong by Partial Corroboration of
Informant’s Tip and by Self-Verifying Detail
Washington courts require a showing of reliability for citizen
informants. State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 72–73, 93 P.3d 872 (2004);
State v. Ibarra, 61 Wn. App. 695, 698–99, 812 P.2d 114 (1991) (noting
the different types of informants). Accordingly, the police must present
the issuing magistrate with sufficient facts to determine the informant’s
inherent credibility or reliability unless the police corroborate the
informant’s tip. State v. Bauer, 98 Wn. App. 870, 876–77, 991 P.2d 668
(2000) (credibility established when informant was a concerned citizen,
had been a Washington citizen for more than nine years, was a registered
voter, and feared retaliation); State v. Duncan, 81 Wn. App. 70, 76, 912
P.2d 1090 (1996); State v. Huff, 33 Wn. App. 304, 307–08, 654 P.2d 1211
(1982).
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With an identified citizen informant, however, the burden for
establishing credibility is generally lower, and the court will presume the
citizen informant’s reliability. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d at 72–73, 93 P.3d 872;
State v. McReynolds, 104 Wn. App. 560, 572–73, 17 P.3d 608 (2001)
(citizen informant was readily identifiable from affidavit and provided
information in “entirely unsuspicious circumstances”); Ibarra, 61 Wn.
App. at 699, 812 P.2d 114; State v. Franklin, 49 Wn. App. 106, 109, 741
P.2d 83 (1987) (noting that the standard is relaxed but the information
must support an inference of truthfulness and must establish a basis of
knowledge). This is because a citizen informant is unlikely to have an
established “track record” of providing information to the police, such that
the citizen informant’s veracity may be otherwise difficult to establish.
Ibarra, 61 Wn. App. at 699, 812 P.2d 114. Naming an informant is not
alone a sufficient ground on which to credit an informant, but it is
considered in the determination of whether the informant is actually a
citizen informant. State v. McCord, 125 Wn. App. 888, 893, 106 P.3d 832
(2005) (citing Duncan, 81 Wn. App. at 78, 912 P.2d 1090); see also State
v. Atchley, 142 Wn. App. 147, 162, 173 P.3d 323 (2007) (credibility of
citizen informant established when the informant provided his or her name
and contact information, received no compensation for the tip, and a
background check made no indication of untrustworthiness). The standard
is generally not relaxed, however, when the citizen informant remains
unidentified to the magistrate. State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 211, 720 P.2d
838 (1986); State v. Garcia, 140 Wn. App. 609, 619, 166 P.3d 848 (2007);
Ibarra, 61 Wn. App. at 699, 812 P.2d 114. Lastly, an informant is
presumed reliable if the circumstances that establish personal knowledge
are sufficiently detailed. State v. Gaddy, 114 Wn. App. 702, 707, 60 P.3d
116 (2002), aff’d on other grounds, 152 Wn.2d 64, 93 P.3d 872 (2004);
State v. Wible, 113 Wn. App. 18, 24, 51 P.3d 830 (2002) (no independent
corroboration required); State v. Tarter, 111 Wn. App. 336, 340, 44 P.3d
899 (2002) (State’s burden is “relaxed” with regard to the veracity of
citizen informants).
2.6(c) Sufficiency of Information Supplied
Factors that have been considered in determining whether sufficient
information has been provided by a victim informant or witness informant
include (1) the particularity of the description of the offender or the
vehicle; (2) the size of the area in which the perpetrator might be found;
(3) the number of persons in the area; (4) the direction of flight; (5) the
activity or condition of the person arrested; and (6) the person’s knowledge
that his or her vehicle has been involved in other similar criminal activity.
See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.4(c) (5th ed. 2012).
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When a citizen can identify a suspect by photograph, the information
is sufficient to establish probable cause. See Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377, 384, 88 S. Ct. 967, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247 (1968). Witness
descriptions of the attire, vehicle, and physical build of the suspect may
also provide probable cause when used in combination. State v. Palmer,
73 Wn.2d 462, 464–65, 438 P.2d 876 (1968) (probable cause for arrest
was established when 45 minutes after robbery the victim identified an
automobile by make, year, color, and dirty white top, and described
suspect by hair color and attire); State v. Kohler, 70 Wn.2d 599, 605, 424
P.2d 656 (1967) (probable cause established when two witnesses provided
descriptions of vehicle, clothing, and build of suspects, and when
probability was slight that two similar cars would be traveling within the
limited area of Seattle at 12:30 a.m.); State v. Baker, 68 Wn.2d 517, 520,
413 P.2d 965 (1966) (probable cause established when robbery victims
identified make, color, and license plate number of suspect vehicle).
2.7 POLICE AS INFORMANTS
2.7(a) Satisfying the “Veracity” and “Basis of Knowledge” Prongs
As with citizen informants’ veracity under federal law, the veracity
of police informants’ statements may be presumed. See United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 110, 85 S. Ct. 741, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1965); State
v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 71–73, 93 P.3d 872 (2004). Generally, there must
be a showing that the officer had a basis for his or her knowledge. Gaddy,
152 Wn.2d at 72, 93 P.3d 872. Conclusory allegations will suffice in
limited, complex situations, when explaining the grounds for the belief
may be difficult. Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 223–24, 85 S. Ct.
1365, 14 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1965) (in tax evasion case, affidavit need not
explain every basis of the allegation).
2.7(b) Multiple Hearsay
An arresting officer need not have personal knowledge of the facts
establishing probable cause, but may rely on another officer’s assessment.
Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306
(1971) (“fellow officer rule”); Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d at 70–71, 93 P.3d 872
(officer may rely on information from a police bulletin or “hot sheet” if
the issuing agency has probable cause). However, probable cause must
actually exist for the arrest to be valid. Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 568–69, 91
S. Ct. 1031; Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d at 70–71, 93 P.3d 872; see 2 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.5(b) (5th ed. 2012). An arresting officer’s
good faith reliance is irrelevant. State v. Gaddy, 114 Wn. App. 702, 706,
60 P.3d 116 (2002), aff’d, 152 Wn.2d 64, 93 P.3d 872 (2004).
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Although determining probable cause on the basis of collective
information in an agency is generally permissible, the chain of
communication must be shown. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 12 Wn. App.
309, 310, 529 P.2d 873 (1974). See generally 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.5(c).
Whether the State must prove the reliability of the agency’s records may
depend on whether the court considers the agency to be a citizen
informant. See Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d at 71–74, 93 P.3d 872 (treating
Department of Licensing as a citizen informant and finding Department’s
information presumptively reliable regarding defendant’s driving record);
State v. Sandholm, 96 Wn. App. 846, 848, 980 P.2d 1292 (1999) (no
evidence provided to show reliability of information from WACIC radio).
2.8 INFORMATION FROM ANONYMOUS OR UNKNOWN INFORMANTS:
SATISFYING THE “VERACITY” PRONG
Generally, an anonymous informant’s tip fails to meet the AguilarSpinelli requirements of basis of knowledge and veracity unless the tip is
corroborated. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413, 89 S. Ct. 584,
21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S. Ct.
1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964); State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 195, 867
P.2d 593 (1994). Even a named but unknown informant is not entitled to
a presumption of reliability. See State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 48, 621 P.2d
1272 (1980) (reliability of named but unknown telephone informant not
significantly different from anonymous telephone informant). If the
informant is a citizen informant and wishes to remain anonymous, “the
affidavit must contain ‘background facts to support a reasonable inference
that the information is credible and without motive to falsify.’” State v.
Atchley, 142 Wn. App. 147, 162, 173 P.3d 323 (2007) (quoting State v.
Cole, 128 Wn.2d 262, 287 88, 906 P.2d 925 (1995)); State v. Ibarra, 61
Wn. App. 695, 700, 812 P.2d 114 (1991).
If, however, a police investigation corroborates the informant’s
information and constitutes more than mere public or innocuous facts, the
Aguilar-Spinelli test will be satisfied. Young, 123 Wn.2d at 195, 867 P.2d
593; State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 438, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); State v.
Kennedy, 72 Wn. App. 244, 249, 864 P.2d 410 (1993). The fact that the
anonymous informant accurately describes a vehicle is insufficient. State
v. Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940, 943–44, 530 P.2d 243 (1975) (citing Whiteley
v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971)).
2.9 SPECIAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES REQUIRING
LESSER OR GREATER LEVELS OF PROOF
Although a majority of searches will fall under the general rubric
discussed above, three types of searches are either conducted on less than

2019]

Chapter 2: Standards of Proof

1329

probable cause or, in contrast, require additional constitutional safeguards.
Administrative searches, discussed in section 2.9(a), and Terry
investigatory stops, covered in section 2.9(b), are permissible under
relaxed standards. Searches that intrude into an individual’s body require
a greater level of proof and are discussed in section 2.9(c).
2.9(a) Administrative Searches
The protections of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 of
the Washington Constitution extend to administrative and regulatory
searches. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528–34, 87 S. Ct. 1727,
18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967); Rental Owners Ass’n v. Thurston Cnty., 85 Wn.
App. 171, 183, 931 P.2d 208 (1997). Therefore, such searches must either
be conducted pursuant to a warrant or fall within one of the narrowly
drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. See Camara, 387 U.S. at
534, 87 S. Ct. 1727. To obtain an administrative warrant to search
commercial or residential premises, law enforcement officers must either
offer specific proof of a violation, or show that “reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied
with respect to a particular [establishment].” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc.,
436 U.S. 307, 320–21, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978) (brackets
in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 538, 87 S. Ct.
1727). Administrative searches excepted from the warrant requirement
must be reasonable in light of the individual’s expectation of privacy and
the asserted government interest. Murphy v. State, 115 Wn. App. 297,
307–08, 62 P.3d 533 (2003). For a discussion of administrative searches
in general, see infra § 6.4.
When officers seek a warrant based on a general administrative
program, they must set forth sufficient details of the program to enable the
magistrate to determine whether the program is reasonable. City of Seattle
v. Leach, 29 Wn. App. 81, 85, 627 P.2d 159 (1981). Inventory searches
are one type of search based on a general administrative program that can
be justified without probable cause. State v. White, 135 Wn.2d 761, 766,
958 P.2d 982 (1998) (inventory searches pursuant to standard police
procedures are “reasonable”).
2.9(b) Terry Stops and Frisks
Police may stop an individual for investigation with less than
probable cause if they have reasonable and articulable facts that point
toward criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20
L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689, 698 99, 92 P.3d
202 (2004) (police may request identification from a passenger for
investigatory purposes with an articulable suspicion of criminal activity
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by the passenger); State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 8, 726 P.2d 445 (1986).
However, the stop must not exceed the scope and purpose of a Terry
stop—the stop must be reasonably limited in scope to “whatever
reasonable suspicions legally justified the stop in the first place.” State v.
Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 293–94, 290 P.3d 983 (2012) (citing State v.
Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 350, 979 P.2d 833 (1999)). If the officer has
reasonable grounds to believe the person is armed and currently
dangerous, he or she may perform a limited frisk of the suspect for
weapons. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S. Ct. 1868; State v. Hudson, 124
Wn.2d 107, 112, 874 P.2d 160 (1994). For a complete discussion of Terry
stops and frisks, see generally infra Chapter 4.
2.9(c) Intrusions into the Body
Under article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, taking a blood
sample is a search and seizure that must be supported by probable cause.
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616, 109 S. Ct. 1402,
103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989); State v. Garcia-Salgado, 170 Wn.2d 176, 184,
240 P.3d 153 (2010). If probable cause exists, neither an adversarial
hearing nor notice to defense counsel is required before a search warrant
to obtain a blood sample may be issued. State v. Kalakosky, 121 Wn.2d
525, 534 36, 852 P.2d 1064 (1993). However, due to the invasive nature
of intrusions into the body, the U.S. Supreme Court has iterated three
additional requirements beyond the probable cause requirement. In order
for the search to be lawful, there must be (1) a “clear indication” that the
desired evidence will be found if the search is performed, (2) the method
of searching must be reasonable, and (3) the search must be performed in
a reasonable manner. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769–70, 86
S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (finding that the “interests in human
dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects” require a
heightened standard). However, buccal swabs of arrestees for DNA
identification is a reasonable search that can be considered part of a routine
booking procedure under the Fourth Amendment. Maryland v. King, 569
U.S. 435, 465, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 186 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2013).
More intrusive procedures may be permitted in special
environments. For example, in prisons and jails, strip searches and cavity
searches may be done without a warrant. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
560, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979) (finding full body cavity
searches of prison inmates following contact visits not categorically
unreasonable); State v. Harris, 66 Wn. App. 636, 642, 833 P.2d 402 (1992)
(finding exigent circumstances justified strip search of juvenile before
placement in holding cell when police had prior experience with gang
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members taping razor blades to their skin). For a full discussion of forced
intrusions into the body, see infra § 3.12(b).

CHAPTER 3
Search Warrants
3.0 INTRODUCTION
Article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution states “No
person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded,
without authority of law.” As such, it requires that a search warrant be
supported by probable cause to be valid. State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177,
182 83, 196 P.3d 658 (2008); State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 140, 977
P.2d 582 (1999) (citing State v. Cole, 128 Wn.2d 262, 286, 906 P.2d 925
(1995)). This is consistent with the Fourth Amendment which also
provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
These provisions were enacted as a response to the evils of general
warrants and writs of assistance. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
626 27, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886). General warrants and writs
had provided law enforcement officers virtually unlimited discretion to
search whomever, wherever, and whenever they chose. With the Fourth
Amendment, the Framers sought to curb the abuses of unconstrained
searches. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760 61, 89 S. Ct. 2034,
23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969). Despite these efforts, there are a number of
situations in which searches and seizures may be made without warrants.
See infra Chapter 5.
This chapter focuses on a valid search warrant and its execution
under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. This
chapter addresses general requirements for a valid warrant, the description
of the place to be searched and the items to be seized, the scope and
intensity of the search, the “knock and announce” requirement, detentions
of persons on the premises, and challenges to an affidavit. The standards
discussed below may also apply to arrest warrants as well as to search
warrants. Issues pertaining specifically to arrests are discussed in
Chapter 4.
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3.1 TYPES OF ITEMS THAT MAY BE SEARCHED AND SEIZED
A warrant may be issued to search for and seize any evidence of a
crime; contraband, the fruits of crime, or things otherwise criminally
possessed; weapons or other things by means of which a crime has been
committed or reasonably appears about to be committed; or a person for
whose arrest there is probable cause, or who is unlawfully restrained. CrR
2.3(b); CrRLJ 2.3(b).
Warrants can be issued to recover evidence of a crime as long as
probable cause exists to “establish a reasonable inference that the
defendant is involved in criminal activity and that evidence the criminal
activity can be found at the place to be searched.” State v. Fry, 168 Wn.2d
1, 4 6, 228 P.3d 1 (2010) (procuring warrant to search a suspected
marijuana grow operation) (citing State v. Maddox 152 Wn.2d 499, 505,
98 P.3d 1199 (2004)); State v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 811, 167 P.3d 1156
(2007) (issuing warrants to search for a possible methamphetamine lab and
evidence of child pornography).
The State may seek a warrant to search and seize items that constitute
“mere evidence” of a crime, i.e., items that have evidentiary value only.
See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307, 87 S. Ct. 1642, L. Ed. 2d 782
(1967); State v. Bullock, 71 Wn.2d 886, 890 91, 431 P.2d 195 (1967)
(adopting Warden and admitting a letter found with marijuana in an
apartment search). To obtain a warrant for “mere evidence,” the State must
show probable cause to believe that the evidence will aid in apprehending
or convicting a suspect. See CrR 2.3(b)–(c); Bullock, 71 Wn.2d at 890 91,
431 P.2d 195.
Lastly, a search warrant may be issued for evidence containing
incriminating statements without violating the Fifth Amendment because
the Fifth Amendment provides protection only where the act of producing
evidence is, itself, testimonial. In re Teddington, 116 Wn.2d 761, 776, 808
P.2d 156 (1991) (citing Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 96 S. Ct.
2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976)) (finding that a letter written voluntarily by
the defendant to his friend did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights).
3.2 WHO MAY ISSUE WARRANTS: REQUIREMENT OF A NEUTRAL AND
DETACHED MAGISTRATE
Warrants provide protection against abuse because the determination
of probable cause is made by a neutral and detached magistrate rather than
by a police officer. See State v. Hill, 17 Wn. App. 678, 683, 564 P.2d 841
(1977). The requirement provides protection from “overzealous police
officers” because “the judicial officer will more objectively balance the
interests of privacy against the interests of criminal investigations than will
the investigating police officer, who might distort the independent

2019]

Chapter 3: Search Warrants

1335

judgment of probable cause required by the Fourth Amendment.” State v.
Smith, 16 Wn. App. 425, 427, 558 P.2d 265 (1976).
3.2(a) Qualifications of a “Magistrate”
Washington State has limited those empowered to issue warrants to
judges in the state supreme court, court of appeals, superior court, and
district court, as well as “all municipal officers authorized to exercise the
powers and perform the duties of district judges.” RCW 2.20.020. The
magistrate need not be an attorney or a judge so long as he or she is
“neutral and detached” and “capable of determining whether probable
cause exists for the requested arrest or search.” State v. Porter, 88 Wn.2d
512, 515, 563 P.2d 829 (1977). Case law has specifically included court
commissioners. State v. Gross, 78 Wn. App. 58, 62, 895 P.2d 861 (1995)
(citing Porter, 88 Wn.2d at 514, 563 P.2d 829). However, this power does
not extend to court clerks. State v. Walker, 101 Wn. App. 1, 7 8, 999 P.2d
1296 (2000) (finding that a court clerk, acting alone, was not empowered
to issue a bench warrant); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 4.2(c), at 620 24 (5th ed. 2012) (“Although the Court found that a
layman-clerk could assess probable cause for rather simple ordinance
violations, it does not inevitably follow that such a person is likewise
capable of making the much more sophisticated judgments required for
the issuance of search warrant . . . .”).
Even when the person issuing the warrant is a magistrate in title, he
or she must make an independent probable cause determination and may
not act as a “rubber stamp for the police.” Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108,
111, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964); State v. Lyons, 174 Wn.2d
354, 360, 275 P.3d 314 (2012).
3.2(b) Neutrality
The magistrate issuing the warrant must be neutral. This requires that
the warrant be issued by a judge who is divorced from law enforcement
investigation and activities. State v. Neslund, 103 Wn.2d 79, 88, 690 P.2d
1153 (1984). If a magistrate cannot be neutral, then he or she is
disqualified from issuing a warrant in that case. For instance, magistrates
are per se disqualified from issuing a warrant in a case if they act as a
prosecutor in that same case. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
450, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971), overruled on other grounds
by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112
(1990). Similarly, the magistrate’s involvement in the execution of a
warrant may constitute a violation of the neutrality requirement. Id. at 450,
91 S. Ct. 2022. For example, an administrative “warrant” signed by the
parole officer conducting the search is invalid. Hocker v. Woody, 95
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Wn.2d 822, 825 26, 631 P.2d 372 (1981) (holding that a search of a third
party’s residence was unlawful because the warrant was not signed by a
neutral and detached magistrate).
A pro-tempore judge that is also a part-time prosecutor is not
automatically disqualified if he or she has not been involved in the
prosecution of that particular case and there is no evidence of bias. State
v. Hill, 17 Wn. App. 678, 683, 564 P.2d 841 (1977). Similarly, there is no
per se disqualification for a judge who issued a search warrant in a case
that was before him on special inquiry. State v. Neslund, 103 Wn.2d 88,
88, 690 P.2d 1153 (1984). In Neslund, the court did not per se disqualify
the judge from issuing warrants because the warrants were not issued in
subsequent court proceedings “arising” from the inquiry. Id. at 82 83, 690
P.2d 1153; see RCW 10.27.180. Search warrants have been upheld when
the issuing judicial officer knew from an affidavit that he might be a
witness against the defendant. State v. Smith, 16 Wn. App. 425, 427 28,
558 P.2d 265 (1976); 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.2(b), at 617–20.
Even when an individual is not per se disqualified from issuing a
warrant, that individual’s conduct under the facts of a particular case may
cause him or her to lose their status as a neutral magistrate. Neslund, 103
Wn.2d at 88, 690 P.2d 1153. For instance, in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York,
a judge’s conduct was found to have improperly merged with the police
investigation when he accompanied police during the search of an adult
bookstore owned by the defendant, reviewed material for obscenity, and
added it to a previous signed search warrant. 442 U.S. 319, 326–27, 99 S.
Ct. 2319, 60 L. Ed. 2d 920 (1979).
Lastly, a magistrate is no longer neutral when he or she receives a
fee for each search warrant issued. Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245,
250, 97 S. Ct. 546, 50 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1977) (having a pecuniary interest in
issuing warrants compared with denying them renders a magistrate neither
neutral nor detached); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 4.2(b), at 617–20 (5th ed. 2012).
3.2(c) Presentation of Evidence to a Second Magistrate
Washington courts have not yet squarely addressed the question of
whether or under what circumstances a prosecuting authority may, in an
attempt to obtain a search warrant, present the same evidence to a second
magistrate after one denial. However, commentators appear to agree that
a magistrate’s initial probable cause determination is not a final order and
that the principle of collateral estoppel does not preclude the government
from presenting the same evidence to a second judicial officer, so long as
the government notifies the second officer that the application was
previously denied. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.2(e),
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at 631 33 (5th ed. 2012); see also United States v. Rettig, 589 F.2d 418,
422 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding the second warrant valid but expressing
disapproval that the second judge had not been informed of the prior
attempt).
The presentation of the same evidence to a second magistrate is not
tantamount to forum shopping unless the government visits numerous
magistrates before convincing one to issue the disputed warrant. United
States v. Czuprynski, 8 F.3d 1113, 1115 (6th Cir. 1993), on reh’g en banc,
46 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 1995), supplemented, 65 F.3d 169 (6th Cir. 1995)
(condemning prosecutor who took the case to two district court judges
before taking it to a magistrate who he knew had hard feelings for the
defendant).
3.2(d) Burden of Proof
Unless a magistrate is disqualified under the per se rule of Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971),
overruled on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S.
Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990), the defendant bears the burden of
proving a magistrate’s lack of neutrality. See State v. Hill, 17 Wn. App.
678, 683, 564 P.2d 841 (1977).
3.3 CONTENT OF THE WARRANT
As a search warrant is issued only if the court determines there is
probable cause, the person seeking the warrant must present supporting
evidence “in the form of affidavits, a document as provided in RCW
9A.72.085 or any law amendatory thereto, or sworn testimony establishing
the grounds for issuing the warrant and may be provided to the court by
any reliable means.” CrR 2.3(c); see also CrRLJ 2.3(c).
3.3(a) A Supporting Affidavit
An affidavit must contain the underlying facts and circumstances
upon which the court can determine whether probable cause exists. See
State v. Patterson, 83 Wn.2d 49, 52, 515 P.2d 496 (1973). An affidavit
establishes probable cause to support a search warrant if the affidavit sets
forth facts sufficient to allow a reasonable person to conclude both that the
defendant is involved in criminal activity and that evidence of the crime
can be found at the place to be searched. See State v. Maddox, 152 Wn.2d
499, 509, 98 P.3d. 1199 (2004); In re Yim, 139 Wn.2d 581, 594 95, 989
P.2d 512 (1999); see also State v. Fry, 168 Wn.2d 1, 6, 228 P.3d 1 (2010)
(finding probable cause when the officer smelled marijuana wafting from
the house, even when the defendant produced a marijuana permit).
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Evidence from a prior warrantless search conducted under an exception to
general search and seizure rules may be used by the issuing magistrate in
determining probable cause. A magistrate may also rely on hearsay
statements from a police officer’s affidavits. State v. Chenoweth, 160
Wn.2d 454, 465, 158 P.3d 595 (2007); see CrR 2.3(c). See generally 2
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.5(b), at 335–51 (5th ed. 2012).
3.3(b) Oath or Affirmation Requirement; Pseudonym Affiants
The person presenting the supporting affidavit must swear to the
information contained in the affidavit. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see CrR
2.3(c). Any sworn testimony must be recorded and shall be transcribed if
it is ordered by the court, or if a party wishes to challenge the validity of a
warrant. CrR 2.3(c); CrRLJ 2.3(c).
The Washington State Supreme Court has, however, upheld a
warrant when the affidavit was not sworn but was signed in the presence
of the magistrate. State v. Douglas, 71 Wn.2d 303, 309 10, 428 P.2d 535
(1967). A signed affidavit is not a constitutional requirement for the
issuance of a search warrant. State v. Mannhalt, 33 Wn. App. 696, 699,
658 P.2d 15 (1983). If, however, the court finds there is probable cause,
the person seeking the warrant shall obtain the court’s signature and
display it on the warrant identifying and describing the property or person
to be searched. CrR 2.3(c); CrRLJ 2.3(c).
Washington courts have yet to rule on whether an incorrect name or
pseudonym on the affidavit makes it defective. Likewise, the U.S.
Supreme Court has not addressed this issue directly. 2 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 4.3(f), at 663 64 (5th ed. 2012). However, when a
warrant has been challenged in federal courts on constitutional grounds,
incorrect names were found to make a warrant defective. Id.; see also, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Pugh v. Pate, 401 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1968); King v.
United States, 282 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960).
Nonetheless, a handful of federal circuits have found a warrant still
effective despite an incorrect name or pseudonym. See generally 2
LaFave, supra, § 4.3(f), at 663 65 & n.71. See, e.g., United States v.
Causey, 9 F.3d 1341 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding the affidavit effective when
“the issuing judge has an opportunity to question the affiant, the judge is
in fact not deceived, and there is sufficient probable cause notwithstanding
the false information”).
3.3(c) Insufficient Information, Omissions, and Staleness
A warrant is most commonly defective for one of three reasons: (1)
there is insufficient information to establish probable cause; (2) material
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information was omitted during the warrant process; or (3) the information
in the affidavits is stale.
First, an affidavit is factually insufficient when it contains nothing
more than a mere declaration of suspicion or personal belief that evidence
of a crime will be found on the premises to be searched. Maddox, 152
Wn.2d at 505, 98 P.3d. 1199; see State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 196 P.3d
658 (2008) (holding that empty baggies and prior criminal history are
insufficient to support probable cause). For example, generalizations about
the behavior of drug dealers concerning where they keep controlled
substances are insufficient. See State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 147, 977
P.2d 582 (1999); see also Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5, 47 S.
Ct. 250, 71 L. Ed. 505 (1927). At the same time, affidavits for search
warrants must be tested in a commonsense manner, not a hyper-technical
one. State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 265, 76 P.3d 217 (2003).
The court must determine if the warrant is valid by “consider[ing]
only the information that was brought to the attention of the issuing judge
or magistrate at the time the warrant was requested.” State v. GarciaSalgado, 170 Wn.2d 176, 187, 240 P.3d 153 (2010). Thus, if the warrant
is invalid due to insufficient information, it cannot be made valid later by
adding further information, even if that information was known at the time
of issuance but not presented to the magistrate. See Whiteley v. Warden,
401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971) (holding
that permitting the record to be expanded with information known to the
police, but not disclosed to the magistrate, would “render the warrant
requirements of the Fourth Amendment meaningless”).
Second, under article I, section 7, if there is an omission in the
affidavit, the warrant is valid so long as the omission is neither intentional
nor made with a reckless disregard for the truth and the warrant is facially
valid, i.e., there is sufficient information to find probable cause. See
Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 478, 158 P.3d 595.
To invalidate a search warrant based on a misrepresentation in the
supporting affidavit, the court must find not only that the allegedly
improper statement was material to finding probable cause but also that
statement was knowingly and intentionally made in disregard of the truth.
State v. Olson, 74 Wn. App. 126, 872 P.2d 64 (1994). Thus, innocent or
negligent mistakes do not satisfy the burden stated above. Id. The defense
must allege intentional lies or intentional reckless disregard for the truth
and make a substantial preliminary showing to be entitled to a hearing
respecting alleged misrepresentations. Id. For instance, an incorrect date
on an affidavit is immaterial. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 109, 59 P.3d
58 (2002).
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For example, in In re Yim, the court found the warrant valid even
though the affidavit failed to expressly state that the defendant did not have
an explosives license, a necessary element of the crime. 139 Wn.2d 581,
595 96, 989 P.2d 512 (1999). In State v. Chenoweth, the court found that
the warrant was valid even though the prosecutor had failed to do a
complete search of the informant’s criminal history. 160 Wn.2d at 458 62,
158 P.3d 595. Had she run a search, she would have turned up a large
criminal history, including crimes implicating veracity. Id. However, the
court found that the prosecutor, “who prosecutes more than 200 cases a
year, did not intentionally hide any information from the magistrate and
did not act in bad faith in failing to gather relevant information,” and she
was therefore not reckless. Id. at 481, 158 P.3d 595.
Third, the information establishing probable cause must not be stale
at the time it is presented to the judge. State v. Lyons, 174 Wn.2d 354, 275
P.3d 314 (2012) (finding the warrant stale when there was no date on the
affidavit detailing when the informant had witnessed the grow operation).
The information is not stale so long as “the facts and circumstances in the
affidavit support a commonsense determination that there is continuing
and contemporaneous possession of the property intended to be seized.”
Maddox, 152 Wn.2d at 505 06, 98 P.3d. 1199 (holding that information
discovered in the interim does not render the first probable cause
determination stale so long as it does not negate probable cause).
In evaluating the staleness of facts underlying a warrant, courts
examine the totality of the circumstances; the period of time between the
issuance and execution of the warrant is only one factor to be considered.
Id. Other relevant factors include the “nature of the criminal, the character
of the evidence to be seized, and the nature of the place to be searched.”
State v. Hosier, 124 Wn. App. 696, 715, 103 P.3d 217 (2004). The facts
and circumstances taken together must establish that “criminal activity is
occurring at or about the time the warrant is issued.” State v. Perez, 92
Wn. App. 1, 8 9, 963 P.2d 881 (1998); see also State v. Ague-Masters,
138 Wn. App. 86, 101, 156 P.3d 265 (2007) (information was not stale
after two days when it appeared there could be continued manufacture of
controlled substances). But cf. State v. Higby, 26 Wn. App. 457, 462–63,
613 P.2d 1192, 1195 (1980) (determining that observations weeks in the
past were stale and insufficient to establish probable cause).
3.3(d) Oral Testimony
In Washington, a search warrant may be based on a single affidavit,
on several affidavits, or on oral testimony. CrR 2.3(c). Oral testimony
includes situations in which an affiant makes a sworn telephonic statement
to a judge. Id.; see also State v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 818, 167 P.3d 1156
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(2007); State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 701, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983)
overruled on other grounds by State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 720 P.2d
436 (1986) (finding that the availability of telephonic warrants increased
the quality of police work). However, after the magistrate has taken a
sworn telephonic statement, the magistrate must produce a record of the
conversation. State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d 332, 338, 815 P.2d 761 (1991);
State v. Ettenhofer, 119 Wn. App. 300, 304 06, 79 P.3d 478 (2003). And
the judge must record a summary of any additional evidence on which the
warrant was based. Ettenhofer, 119 Wn. App. at 303 n.2, 79 P.3d 478
(quoting CrR 2.3(c)).
If the affiant’s sworn testimony was not recorded during the
telephonic process, the State is not allowed to reconstruct the affidavit
without corroboration of the magistrate. Myers, 117 Wn.2d at 338, 815
P.2d 761 (finding the warrant invalid when the affiant made a summary of
their own statement, but the magistrate did not summarize the statement
and could not recall the conversation); see also State v. Smith, 87 Wn. App.
254, 257 59, 941 P.2d 691 (1997) (discussing the types of evidence that
may be used to reconstruct a telephonic affidavit). In State v. Garcia, the
court found the lack of a recording did not invalidate the warrant when the
magistrate testified that the affidavit he was presented with matched his
recollection of the conversation. 140 Wn. App. 609, 619 20, 166 P.3d 848
(2007). For a discussion of various objections to this procedure, see 2
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.3(c), at 650 54 (5th ed. 2012).
3.3(e) Administrative Warrants
Administrative warrants are subject to Fourth Amendment protection
but may be issued on less than probable cause when authorized by a
statute. City of Seattle v. McCready (McCready III), 131 Wn.2d 266, 931
P.2d 156 (1997); see Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727,
18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967) (holding that administrative searches to enforce
local codes must be supported by “reasonable legislative or administrative
standards”). An administrative warrant may be based on either (1) specific
evidence of an existing violation, or (2) a general inspection program
based on reasonable legislative or administrative standards derived from
neutral sources. City of Seattle v. Leach, 29 Wn. App. 81, 84, 627 P.2d 159
(1981) (citing Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320–21, 98 S. Ct.
1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978)).
Although a warrant may be issued on less than probable cause
pursuant to an authorizing statute, if there is no authorizing statute, then
the magistrate does not have authority to issue warrants for civil
infractions, even with probable cause. City of Seattle v. McCready
(McCready II), 124 Wn.2d 300, 309, 877 P.2d 686 (1994). See generally
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infra § 6.4 (administrative searches). Pursuant to article I, section 7, when
a magistrate issues a warrant without authority, it is invalid. Bosteder v.
Renton, 155 Wn.2d 18, 117 P.3d 316 (2005), superseded by statute on
other grounds as recognized in Wright v. Terrell, 162 Wn.2d 192, 170
P.3d 570 (2007); see also State v. Lansden, 144 Wn.2d 654, 663, 30 P.3d
483 (2001) (observing that courts of limited jurisdiction have no inherent
authority to issue administrative search warrants). Notably, a statute
giving a right of entry is not sufficient authorization to issue warrants.
McCready II, 124 Wn.2d at 309, 877 P.2d 686. But if, under city
ordinance, the willful or knowing violation of the city code is a
misdemeanor, the court may issue a warrant for a civil violation. Exendine
v. Sammamish, 127 Wn. App. 574, 582, 113 P.3d 494 (2005). If the
administrative warrant was issued for inspection and not in connection to
a crime, then that warrant cannot be used to assemble proof of a crime.
City of Seattle v. See, 26 Wn. App. 891, 894, 614 P.2d 254 (1980).
3.4 PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF PLACE TO BE SEARCHED
Both article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution and the
Fourth Amendment require a detailed description of the places to be
searched and the items to be seized. This requirement prevents the
execution of general searches, the seizure of objects that are not within the
magistrate’s authorization, and the issuance of warrants based on vague,
loose, or doubtful facts. See State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 545, 834
P.2d 611 (1992). The requirement also limits discretion of the officers
executing the warrant. See id.; State v. Rivera, 76 Wn. App. 519, 522, 888
P.2d 740 (1995); see also Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48
S. Ct. 74, 72 L. Ed. 231 (1927).
3.4(a) General Considerations
The description of the place to be searched must be sufficiently
detailed such that “the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable
effort ascertain and identify the place intended.” State v. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d
962, 967, 639 P.2d 743 (1982) (internal quotations omitted) (citing State
v. Rood, 18 Wn. App. 740, 743 44, 573 P.2d 1325 (1977)). This need not
be a brick and mortar location. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251,
268, 76 P.3d 217 (2003) (determining that the “place” to be searched in
attaching a GPS to a car was the travel pattern of the vehicle). However,
if there is a possibility that a mistaken search could occur, the warrant is
not sufficiently particular. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d at 967, 639 P.2d 743; see also
State v. Bohan, 72 Wn. App. 335, 339 40, 864 P.2d 26 (1993) (explaining
the test of whether a mistaken search could occur is one of practical
application given the facts of the case).
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When a warrant contains errors, the burden is on the party
challenging the warrant to show that errors could have resulted in a search
of the wrong premises. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d at 967, 639 P.2d 743; see also
State v. Smith, 39 Wn. App. 642, 649, 694 P.2d 660 (1984) (upholding
search where incorrect town was identified in warrant because defendant
made no showing that a similar address existed that could have been
mistakenly searched). The test is not whether an officer could
hypothetically or theoretically search the wrong premises, but whether,
under the circumstances presented, an officer could reasonably determine
the correct premises to be searched. Bohan, 72 Wn. App. at 339, 864 P.2d
26. Clerical or ministerial errors will invalidate a warrant only if prejudice
is shown. State v. Wible, 113 Wn. App. 18, 25, 51 P.3d 830 (2002); see
State v. Busig, 119 Wn. App. 381, 388, 81 P.3d 143 (2003) (finding a
warrant that did not match the pleading paper for the affidavit to be valid).
In urban areas, places are usually identified by a street address. The
address is unnecessary, however, if other facts make it clear that a
particular place is intended. State v. Trasvina, 16 Wn. App. 519, 522 23,
557 P.2d 368 (1976) (finding sufficient a warrant describing premises as
two-story, white-frame house located directly behind particular address);
see also State v. Chisholm, 7 Wn. App. 279, 283, 499 P.2d 81 (1972)
(holding that a warrant that failed to specify street location was sufficiently
clear when officers could identify premises with reasonable certainty and
when reason for failure to specify street was included in affidavit for
warrant). Rural areas may be identified by a legal description of the
property. See State v. Cockrell, 102 Wn.2d 561, 570, 689 P.2d 32 (1984).
In the execution of the search, carelessness on the part of the officers
executing the warrant will not render the warrant insufficient regarding the
place to be searched; however, it is required that the executing officers
could have confined their search to the areas delineated in the warrant with
a “reasonable effort.” See id. (warrant identified place to be searched but
did not list an address; officers attempted to serve warrant on persons
outside the described area); see also Fisher, 96 Wn.2d at 967, 639 P.2d
743 (finding that with a “reasonable effort” the officers could have
confined themselves to the place listed in the warrant). When there is no
other information that would allow the officer to identify the premises to
be searched, then the search warrant lacks the particularity required by the
Washington State Constitution. See State v. Rood, 18 Wn.App. 740, 745–
46, 573 P.2d 1325 (1977).
3.4(b) Inadequacy and Severability
If a warrant fails to sufficiently describe the place to be searched, the
warrant is invalid even if the magistrate made a probable cause
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determination. In absence of such description, there are three sources of
information from which courts can determine whether the premises to be
searched were sufficiently identified. First, other physical descriptions of
the premises contained in the warrant or affidavit. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d at
967, 639 P.2d 743. Second, an officer’s personal knowledge of the location
of the premises or its occupants. State v. Rood, 18 Wn. App at 744, 573
P.2d 1325. And third, an officer’s personal observations at the time the
warrant was executed. Id. at 744–45. See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 4.5(a) (e) (5th ed. 2012). The initial determination
of whether a description is adequate is made with reference only to the
warrant itself, including any attached documents. See State v. Stenson, 132
Wn.2d 668, 691 93, 696, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997). A description may appear
adequate on its face, but upon execution be found to be ambiguous or
erroneous. Id.
If a warrant is inadequate with respect to one location, the adequate
portion may still be valid if the inadequacy can be severed from the
warrant. For example, if a warrant separately and distinctly describes two
targets and it is determined afterward that probable cause existed for
issuance of the warrant for only one target, the warrant may be treated as
severable and upheld as to the one target. State v. Cockrell, 102 Wn.2d
561, 571, 689 P.2d 32 (1984) (finding portions of the warrant that
identified outbuildings severable from the rest of the warrant that was for
the residence); see also 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.5(c), at 743 48.
3.4(c) Particular Searches and Exceptions
Generally, to be valid a search warrant for a multiple-occupancy
building must describe with sufficient definiteness the particular subunit
to be searched. State v. Alexander, 41 Wn. App. 152, 704 P.2d 618 (1985).
See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.5(b), at 731
(5th ed. 2012). However, the warrant is not defective for failing to specify
a subunit if the building looks like a single occupancy structure from the
outside and the officers have no reason to know that it is a multiple-unit
structure. State v. Chisholm, 7 Wn. App. 279, 282, 499 P.2d 81 (1972).
The Ninth Circuit has recognized that a warrant may authorize the search
of an entire premise containing multiple units while reciting probable
cause to a portion of the premise if the defendant was in control of the
whole premises or they were occupied in common, if the entire premises
were suspect, or if the multiunit character of the premises was not known
to the officers. United States v. Gillman, 684 F.2d 616, 618 (9th Cir. 1982);
see also 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.5(b), at 734 43. Additionally, the
“community living unit” rule will generally apply when several people
occupy the entire premises in common, but have separate bedrooms.
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Under the community living unit rule, a single warrant describing the
entire premises is valid and justifies a search of the entire premises.
Alexander, 41 Wn. App. at 156, 704 P.2d 618 (adopting the community
living unit rule in Washington).
A warrant authorizing the search of an apartment may also include
the search of a padlocked locker located in a storage room next to the
defendant’s apartment. State v. Llamas-Villa, 67 Wn. App. 448, 453, 836
P.2d 239 (1992) (concluding that because the storage locker did not
constitute a separate building and was not intentionally excluded from the
warrant, the officers did not exceed the scope of the warrant when they
searched the locker). In State v. Boyer, the court upheld a search of a
storage room belonging to a different apartment because “the fact that the
outside door was labeled apartment B implied to the casual visitor that the
hallway and its doorways were all part of apartment B.” 124 Wn. App.
593, 604, 102 P.3d 833 (2004).
However, this exception does not extend to outbuildings. In State v.
Kelley, officers’ search of “outbuildings” exceeded the scope of a search
warrant that authorized the search of a residence and the attached carport,
but did not authorize the search of “outbuildings,” which included a barn
and a garage. 52 Wn. App. 581, 586, 762 P.2d 20 (1988). Further, probable
cause to search a house does not provide probable cause to search
outbuildings when the outbuildings are under the control of other persons.
State v. Gebaroff, 87 Wn. App. 11, 16 17, 939 P.2d 706 (1997).
A warrant issued to search a defendant’s premises may include the
defendant’s automobile if it is located on the premises. State v. Claflin, 38
Wn. App. 847, 853, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984) (a search warrant authorizing
search of defendant’s house and premises includes search of his car located
on the premises). However, a warrant to search a house does not include a
search of a vehicle that is not within the curtilage—the area contiguous to
the occupant’s home. State v. Graham, 78 Wn. App. 44, 51 52, 896 P.2d
704 (1995). For a more detailed description, see infra § 3.9.
3.4(d) Particular Searches: Persons
Search warrants may be issued for persons, as well as for places, if
there is probable cause to believe that a specific individual has evidence
on his or her person. CrR 2.3(c); State v. Rollie M., 41 Wn. App. 55, 58 59,
701 P.2d 1123 (1985). When a search warrant is issued for a person, the
general rule requiring particularity still applies. State v. Martinez, 51 Wn.
App. 397, 399 400, 753 P.2d 1011 (1988) (holding that a warrant is
sufficient if it provides a detailed description of the person to be searched,
including the person’s place of residence); Rollie M., 41 Wn. App. at
58 59, 701 P.2d 1123 (finding insufficient a warrant that authorized
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search of a person found in general vicinity of a specified place); see also
2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.5(e), at 755 63 (5th ed. 2012).
For a discussion of when a premises search warrant authorizes the
search of persons not named in the warrant, see infra § 3.8(b). Generally,
when a premises search warrant is executed, police may conduct a
warrantless search of a person only if they have individualized probable
cause to search that person. See State v. Rivera, 76 Wn. App. 519, 524,
888 P.2d 740 (1995); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct. 338,
62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979). Nonetheless, a warrant authorizing the search of
“all persons present” at a location to be searched might be upheld in
Washington if the warrant establishes a nexus between all persons present,
the place, and the criminal activity. State v. Carter, 79 Wn. App. 154, 161,
901 P.2d 335 (1995) (assuming without deciding that such warrants may
pass muster).
3.5 PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF THINGS TO BE SEIZED
As with the location to be searched, article I, section 7 requires that
the courts “never authorize general, exploratory searches.” York v.
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 315, 178 P.3d 995 (2008).
Instead, article I, section 7 requires that “warrants describe with
particularity the things to be seized.” State v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 28, 846
P.2d 1365 (1993). The requirement “eliminates the danger of unlimited
discretion in the executing officer’s determination of what to seize.” State
v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 814, 167 P.3d 1156 (2007) (citing State v.
Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 546, 834 P.2d 611 (1992)). Courts look to the
purposes of the “particular description” requirement to determine whether
the description is valid. These purposes include (1) preventing general
exploratory searches; (2) protecting against “seizure of objects on the
mistaken assumption that they fall within” the warrant; and (3) ensuring
that probable cause is present. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 545, 834 P.2d 611;
see also Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S. Ct. 74, 72 L.
Ed. 231 (1927).
In the Ninth Circuit, three factors are relevant to the existence of
sufficient particularity: (1) whether probable cause exists for all classes of
items in the warrant; (2) whether the warrant sets out objective standards
that allow the executing officer to decide what may be seized and what
may not; and (3) whether the government was able to describe the things
to be seized with any greater particularity. United States v. Mann, 389 F.3d
869, 878 (9th Cir. 2004). For a discussion of searches requiring heightened
protection, see infra § 3.13.
Because the facts in each case differ greatly, the fact patterns of prior
cases generally are not referenced when determining whether a warrant is
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sufficiently particular. See State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 149, 97 P.2d
582 (1999) (citing State v. Helmka, 86 Wn.2d 91, 93, 542 P.2d 115
(1975)). Instead, the degree of specificity required depends on the
circumstances and the type of items involved. State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d
251, 268, 76 P.3d 217 (2003). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 4.6(a) (f) (5th ed. 2012).
Pursuant to a warrant, officers may also seize objects that establish
the defendant’s dominion and control over the premises. State v. Weaver,
38 Wn. App. 17, 22, 683 P.2d 1136 (1984); see Ewing v. Stockton, 588
F.3d 1218, 1229 (9th Cir. 2009) (warrant for articles establishing identity
of persons in control of premises not overbroad). In State v. Weaver, the
court held that although a cardboard box bearing defendant’s name would
not generally be considered “paper,” police could seize the box because
the obvious purpose of the warrant was seizure not only of controlled
substances, but also of evidence enabling the state to demonstrate
defendant’s dominion and control over the premises. 38 Wn. App. at 22,
683 P.2d 1136.
3.5(a) General Rules
While there is no bright-line rule, a few general principles can be
gleaned from case law that indicate when a warrant is sufficiently definite
to allow the executing officer to identify the property with reasonable
certainty.
First, more ambiguity is tolerated when the police have acquired the
most complete description that could reasonably be expected. See State v.
Clark, 143 Wn.2d 731, 754, 24 P.3d 1006 (2001) (finding warrant for
“trace evidence” valid when it would be impossible to know what type of
trace evidence could be present beforehand). Thus, a description need not
be detailed if it is “as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the
activity, or crime, under investigation permits.” State v. Stenson, 132
Wn.2d 668, 692, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997). However, a warrant is overbroad
if the affidavit is much more specific yet the warrant fails to reflect the
affidavit’s specificity. State v. Higgins, 136 Wn. App. 87, 92, 147 P.3d
649 (2006) (finding warrant overbroad when it allowed search for “Assault
2nd DV” when the affidavit listed Glock pistol, spent casings, and entry
and exit points).
The use of a generic term or general description in a warrant is not a
per se violation if a more specific description is impossible and if probable
cause is shown. See State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 547, 834 P.2d 611
(1992). “When the nature of the underlying offense precludes a descriptive
itemization, generic classifications such as lists are acceptable.” State v.
Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 28, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993); see also Stenson, 132
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Wn.2d at 692, 940 P.2d 1239. However, in such instances, “the search
warrant must [also] be circumscribed by reference to the crime under
investigation.” Riley, 121 Wn.2d at 29, 846 P.2d 1365. In State v. Reid, the
“phrase ‘any other evidence of homicide’ specifically limited the warrant
to the crime under investigation [and] specific items listed, such as a
shotgun and shotgun shells provided guidelines for the officers conducting
the search.” 38 Wn. App. 203, 212, 687 P.2d 861 (1984). The warrant must
also be definite enough to allow the searching officer to identify the
objects sought with reasonable certainty. State v. Nordlund, 113 Wn. App.
171, 180, 53 P.3d 520 (2002) (citing Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 691 92, 940
P.2d 1239).
Second, greater care and particularity are required when the property
sought is inherently innocuous as opposed to property that is inherently
illegal. State v. Wible, 113 Wn. App. 18, 28, 51 P.3d 830 (2002) (citing
State v. Chambers, 88 Wn. App. 640, 644, 945 P.2d 1172 (1997)). Thus,
a less precise description is adequate for controlled substances. See
Chambers, 88 Wn. App. at 647 48, 945 P.2d 1172 (finding that a search
for “any and all controlled substances” is sufficient in a search for
marijuana under the circumstances); State v. Olson, 32 Wn. App. 555,
557 58, 648 P.2d 476 (1982).
Third, failure to provide all available descriptive facts is not fatal
when the omitted facts could not have assisted the officer in a more
circumscribed search. See Chambers, 88 Wn. App at 647 48, 945 P.2d
1172 (holding that a warrant authorizing search for “all controlled
substances” when the affidavit recited probable cause for a marijuana
grow operation did not fail to be particular). In State v. Christiansen, the
court held that “[t]he fact the warrant could have been more precise in
terms of identifying marijuana as the focus of the search does not affect its
validity, since reasonable particularity is all that is required.” 40 Wn. App.
249, 254, 698 P.2d 1059 (1985).
Finally, an error is not fatal if the officer is able to determine the
items to be seized from the other facts provided in the warrant. State v.
Dodson, 110 Wn. App. 112, 121, 39 P.3d 324 (2002) (holding that police
officer merely corrected a clerical error in changing a warrant to specify a
search for methamphetamine instead of marijuana where court had
determined probable cause to search for methamphetamine); see also
Wible, 113 Wn. App. at 25 26, 51 P.3d 830 (warrant only invalid for
clerical errors upon a showing of prejudice).
3.5(b) Severability
As with the place to be searched, discussed in section 3.4(b) above,
when one part of the warrant is insufficiently particular regarding the items
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to be seized, the portion sometimes may be severed. However, the
severability doctrine must not be applied when doing so would render the
particularity standards meaningless. State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538,
556 57, 834 P.2d 611 (1992) (holding that a warrant authorizing a general
search of materials protected by the First Amendment was impermissibly
broad and invalid in its entirety).
Washington courts may examine five factors when determining
whether invalid portions of a warrant may be severed from valid portions:
(1) whether the warrant lawfully authorized entry into the premises; (2)
whether the warrant includes at least one particularly described item for
which there is probable cause; (3) whether the portion of the warrant that
is valid is significant when compared to the warrant as a whole; (4)
whether the searching officers found and seized any disputed items while
executing the valid part of the warrant; and (5) whether the officers
conducted a general search in flagrant disregard of the warrant’s scope.
State v. Maddox, 116 Wn. App. 796, 807 09, 67 P.3d 1135 (2003), aff’d,
152 Wn.2d 499 (2004).
3.6 “KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE” REQUIREMENT
Absent exigent circumstances, officers executing a valid warrant
must identify themselves as police officers and announce their purpose
prior to entering private premises. See RCW 10.31.040; Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23, 37 40, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963) (announcing
the rule but leaving the states to administer the standard of
reasonableness). The State has the burden of proving that these
requirements were met. State v. Talley, 14 Wn. App. 484, 490, 543 P.2d
348 (1975). An appropriate remedy for an unexcused violation of the
“knock and announce rule” is the suppression of the evidence obtained as
a result of the violation. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 11 Wn. App. 311, 522
P.2d 1179 (1974). But see Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 126 S. Ct..
2159, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2006) (holding that suppression of evidence is not
required in all cases).
The “knock and announce rule” applies only where an officer
attempts to enter a building by “breaking open” a door or window.
“Breaking open” means simply entering without permission. State v.
Miller, 7 Wn. App. 414, 419, 499 P.2d 241(1972). Therefore, the rule does
not apply when officers enter the premises with the consent of an occupant
as it does not constitute “breaking open.” State v. Hartnell, 15 Wn. App.
410, 418, 550 P.2d 63 (1976). Importantly, this rule applies to both outer
and inner doors. RCW 10.31.040. It also applies to the execution of both
arrest and search warrants. State v. Richard, 87 Wn. App. 285, 289, 941
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P.2d 710 (1997); State v. Shelly, 58 Wn. App. 908, 910, 795 P.2d 187
(1990).
The knock and announce rule is designed to reduce the potential for
violence, to prevent the physical destruction of property, and to protect an
occupant’s privacy. State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 411, 47 P.3d 127
(2002). Strict compliance with this rule is required unless exigent
circumstances exist or police officers have a reasonable belief compliance
would be dangerous or futile. Id. at 411 12, 47 P.3d 127; State v. Richards,
136 Wn.2d 361, 374, 962 P.2d 118 (1998). In some situations, when there
is substantial compliance with the statute, the entry is valid. State v.
Reid, 38 Wn. App. 203, 210, 687 P.2d 861 (1984) (finding substantial
compliance when the police loudly announced themselves after opening a
door that they thought was an outer hallway).
The U.S. Supreme Court, like the Washington State Supreme Court,
has held that a “no-knock” entry is permissible where the police have a
reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under
the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or would
inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by allowing the destruction
of evidence. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394, 117 S. Ct. 1416,
137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997).
3.6(a) Types of Entry Requiring Notice
The phrase “break open” in Washington’s knock and announce
statute refers to all nonconsensual entries, not simply to those involving
forcible breaking. See State v. Richards, 136 Wn.2d 361, 370–73, 962 P.2d
118 (1998). As a consensual entry is not “breaking open,” officers have no
duty to announce themselves in that situation. See State v. Williamson, 42
Wn. App. 208, 211, 710 P.2d 205 (1985). However, the circumstances
must reasonably indicate that the occupant has actually consented to the
officer’s entry. See State v. Sturgeon, 46 Wn. App. 181, 183, 730 P.2d 93
(1986) (holding that the knock and announce statute was violated when
the police knocked, the defendant shouted “yeah,” and the police entered
the apartment). If officers are attempting to gain entry to the residence
through a “knock and talk” procedure and gain consent for a search, then
the officer must announce he or she is an officer and inform the suspect
that he or she has the right to refuse entry. State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d
103, 960 P.2d 927 (1998); see also State v. Schultz, 170 Wn.2d 746, 248
P.3d 484 (2011).
Even if the police are able to freely enter the residence, they must
still announce themselves. For instance, when officers attempt to gain
entry through an unlocked or open door. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 7 Wn.
App. 414, 416, 499 P.2d 241 (1972) (holding an entry unlawful when the
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officer entered through an open door and did not announce his presence);
see also Coyle, 95 Wn.2d at 6, 621 P.2d 1265 (holding that officer entering
dwelling must give notice of his office and purpose even though door to
apartment was partially open). Notice is also required for entry by use of
a pass key. See Ker, 374 U.S. at 38–41, 83 S. Ct. 1623.
An officer’s failure to knock and announce himself before entering a
fenced backyard through an unlocked gate, however, does not violate
RCW 10.31.040 when the officer can observe that the backyard is
unoccupied. State v. Schimpf, 82 Wn. App. 61, 65, 914 P.2d 1206 (1996).
The court in Schimpf determined that “a knock and announcement at the
gate in these circumstances would serve none of the purposes of the rule
and statute.” Id. No one was present in the backyard, so there was little
risk of violence; the unlocked gate allowed the deputy to enter without any
property damage; and the low fence meant that the deputy could already
see into the backyard, suggesting there were no significant privacy
interests involved. Id.
3.6(b) Entry Obtained by Deception
The Washington State Supreme Court has held that consent obtained
by deception may still be effective consent under certain circumstances.
State v. Myers, 102 Wn.2d 548, 552, 689 P.2d 38 (1984), modified on other
grounds by State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 19–21, 921 P.2d 1035 (1996). If
the ruse is unsuccessful, then the “knock and wait” requirement must be
observed. State v. Ellis, 21 Wn. App. 123, 129, 584 P.2d 428 (1978).
For instance, in State v. Myers, the police obtained a search warrant.
102 Wn.2d at 549, 689 P.2d 38 (1984). They were aware it would be
difficult to execute the warrant given that the doors and windows to the
defendant’s house were covered by iron bars and that the defendant kept a
handgun. Id. Officers prepared a fictitious warrant for the defendant’s
arrest for a traffic offense. Id. at 550, 689 P.2d 38. Upon being permitted
to enter his house, the police executed the search warrant. Id. The court
held that even though the officers failed to announce their purpose to
search, the occupant of the house had granted “valid permission” for them
to enter. Id. at 554, 689 P.2d 38; see also State v. Coyle, 95 Wn.2d 1, 5,
621 P.2d 1265 (1980).
The Myers court determined this ruling was consistent with the
interests underlying the knock and announce requirement. See Myers, 102
Wn.2d at 555, 689 P.2d 38. An occupant’s right to privacy is protected
because the occupant may not deny entry to police who possess a valid
search warrant, there is no damage to property as the entry was consensual,
and the possibility for violence is lower with consent. State v. Richards,
136 Wn.2d 361, 373, 962 P.2d 118 (1998). Thus, an officer need not
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announce he is an officer or state his purpose because—as the suspect has
given consent—no “breaking” occurs within the terms of the statute. State
v. Williamson, 42 Wn. App. 208, 211, 710 P.2d 205 (1985).
Similarly, in State v. Huckaby, the court found the knock and
announce statute inapplicable when undercover officers entered the
suspect’s home with the suspect’s consent and for the apparent purpose of
conducting a drug transaction. 15 Wn. App. 280, 290, 549 P.2d 35 (1976).
See generally William D. Bremer, Annotation, What Constitutes
Compliance with Knock-and-Announce Rule in Search of Private
Premises—State Cases, 85 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2001).
3.6(c) Identification and Waiting Period
The police must wait only a reasonable period of time after they
announce their presence before entering the residence if no one answers
their knock. State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 411, 47 P.3d 127 (2002);
see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(c), at 853 62 (5th
ed. 2012). The waiting period is over once “the door of the premises is
open, attended by an occupant, and the police have announced their
identity and purpose while face-to-face with the occupant.” State v.
Alldredge, 73 Wn. App. 171, 177, 868 P.2d 183 (1994). The
announcement of office and purpose may be made to the person answering
the door even when that person is not in possession of the premises. See
State v. Sainz, 23 Wn. App. 532, 537 n.3, 596 P.2d 1090 (1979).
Whether the officer waited a reasonable amount of time is a question
of law and is determined with regard to the particular circumstances of the
case. State v. Richards, 136 Wn.2d 361, 374, 962 P.2d 118 (1998); State
v. Johnson, 94 Wn. App. 882, 890, 974 P.2d 855 (1999). If it is clear that
the inhabitants are aware of the police presence, the police may enter
immediately. See Richards, 136 Wn.2d at 374, 962 P.2d 118 (holding that
officers did not violate the knock and wait rule when they entered the
apartment immediately after announcing their identity because they were
visible through sliding screen door); State v. Woodall, 32 Wn. App. 407,
411, 647 P.2d 1051 (1982) reversed on other grounds by State v. Woodall,
100 Wn.2d 74, 666 P.2d 364 (1983) (holding three to four second wait
reasonable when someone inside the clubhouse had seen the officers long
before they reached the door and announced their presence).
So long as the police wait a reasonable amount of time after
announcing their presence, they need not wait for an affirmative denial.
See United States v. Bustamante–Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 10–11 (9th Cir.
1973); Richards, 136 Wn.2d at 374, 962 P.2d 118. Denial of admittance
may be implied from the occupant’s lack of response. See State v. Schmidt,
48 Wn. App. 639, 644–45, 740 P.2d 351 (1987).
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Because the length of a “reasonable” wait depends on the situation,
courts have held that short waiting periods are appropriate if the suspect
may be armed or the evidence is easily disposable. In State v. Berlin, the
court held that the defendant’s possession of weapons and his history of
violence did “bear upon the reasonableness of the length of time that the
police waited after announcing themselves.” 46 Wn. App. 587, 593–94,
731 P.2d 548 (1987). In State v. Schmidt, the court found that a threesecond wait was reasonable when there was the possibility that the
occupants had been alerted to police presence by barking dogs, the suspect
had a history of gun possession, and the place to be searched was a very
small shed, meaning the knock could have been quickly answered. 48 Wn.
App. at 646, 740 P.2d 351 (1987).
When an officer has satisfied the knock and announce requirements,
but is met with a refusal, the officer may then use reasonable force to
execute the warrant. See RCW 10.31.040; State v. Young, 76 Wn.2d 212,
216, 455 P.2d 595 (1969). The reasonableness of the force used by law
enforcement is determined by the totality of the circumstances. See State
v. Coyle, 95 Wn.2d 1, 9–11, 621 P.2d 1256 (1980).
3.6(d) Exceptions: Useless Gesture and Exigent Circumstances
Police are excused from compliance with the knock and announce
rule when it would be a useless gesture or when the police face exigent
circumstances. The State has the burden of demonstrating that exigent
circumstances exist. Ellis, 21 Wn. App. at 125, 584 P.3d 428. Although
Washington courts have not addressed this situation, at the federal level,
law enforcement officers may be excused from the knock and announce
requirement when covert entry of the premises is the only way to
effectively execute the warrant. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238,
247 48, 99 S. Ct. 1682, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1979).
Under the “useless gesture” exception, compliance with the knock
and announce rule is excused if the officers are “virtually certain” that the
occupants are aware of their presence and purpose on the premises. Coyle,
95 Wn.2d at 11, 621 P.2d 1265; State v. Shelly, 58 Wn. App. 908, 911, 795
P.2d 187 (1990). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
4.8(f), at 879–81 (5th ed. 2012). Once the defendant has opened the door
and the police officers have identified themselves and their purpose,
waiting for a grant or denial of entrance by the defendant is a useless
gesture. See Shelly, 58 Wn. App. at 911, 795 P.2d 187. The useless gesture
exception has also been applied to justify a police officer’s forcible entry
when the officer identified himself but was unable to state his purpose
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before the suspect tried to close the door. State v. Neff, 10 Wn. App. 713,
717, 519 P.2d 1328 (1974).
Officers may enter immediately and with force when exigent
circumstances are present. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37–41, 83
S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963); State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400,
412, 47 P.3d 127 (2002); State v. Young, 76 Wn.2d 212, 216, 455 P.2d 595
(1969). Exigent circumstances exist, for example, when the evidence may
be easily disposed, the defendant may escape, or the defendant poses a
threat to public safety.
Washington has rejected the blanket rule, favored by some courts,
that permits an unannounced entry when the warrant is for easily
disposable items, such as drugs. State v. Jeter, 30 Wn. App. 360, 362, 634
P.2d 312 (1981). In Washington, the police must possess specific
information indicating that the items are in imminent danger of destruction
or removal. See Young, 76 Wn.2d at 215–16, 455 P.2d 595 (holding that
belief of exigent circumstances cannot be based on suspicion or
ambiguous acts); State v. Dugger, 12 Wn. App. 74, 81, 528 P.2d 274
(1974) (holding that destruction of evidence exigency was not established
because prior to their entry police had heard nothing to suggest such
destruction was in progress). See generally 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.8(d).
In Washington, the courts look to six factors to determine if exigent
circumstances exist: (1) the gravity or violent nature of the offense with
which the suspect is to be charged; (2) whether the suspect is reasonably
believed to be armed; (3) whether there is reasonably trustworthy
information that the suspect is guilty; (4) whether there is strong reason to
believe that the suspect is on the premises; (5) the likelihood that the
suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended; and (6) whether the entry
is made peaceably. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d at 406, 47 P.3d 127.
A police officer’s reasonable belief that announcing his or her office
and purpose would jeopardize police or public safety is another type of
exigent circumstance. See id. at 410–12, 47 P.3d 127; State v. Reid, 38
Wn. App. 203, 209–10, 687 P.2d 861 (1984). A mere good faith concern
for safety, however, is not sufficient. Jeter, 30 Wn. App. at 363, 634 P.2d
312 (finding no exigent circumstances existed when officer had prior
knowledge of defendant’s possession of gun but not of any propensity for
defendant to use it to resist arrest). Police must know from prior
information or from direct observation that the suspect both keeps
weapons and has a propensity to use them. State v. Allyn, 40 Wn. App. 27,
31, 696 P.2d 45 (1985).
Finally, law enforcement may rely on the exigent circumstances
exception when they obtained specific prior information that would lead
them to believe that a suspect has made preparations to escape. See State
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v. Gallo, 20 Wn. App. 717, 723–24, 582 P.2d 558 (1978) (holding that
police had probable cause to believe the armed suspect was in his
apartment; knocked and announced repeatedly without a response; and
heard a sound of something being dragged across the floor, indicating
either that “an escape was being attempted or that some fortification was
being effected so as to resist arrest”).
3.7 SEARCH AND DETENTION OF PERSONS ON THE PREMISES
BEING SEARCHED
3.7(a) Detention of Persons on Premises Being Searched
A valid search warrant carries with it the authority to detain the
occupants of the premises while the search is being conducted. Michigan
v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981);
State v. Flores-Moreno, 72 Wn. App. 733, 739, 866 P.2d 648 (1994).
However, this authority is narrower than either a detention supported by
probable cause or a Terry stop. State v. King, 89 Wn. App. 612, 618–19,
949 P.2d 856 (1998) (stating that a “narrower application is that even
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, it is
reasonable for an officer executing a search warrant at a residence to
briefly detain occupants of that residence, to insure officer safety and an
orderly completion of the search”). To detain a person not listed in a search
warrant, the police must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
person has committed or is about to commit a crime or that she is a threat
to safety. See State v. Parker, 139 Wn.2d 486, 498, 987 P.2d 73 (1999).
In executing a search warrant, the police may ascertain whether any
individual arriving on the scene might interfere with the search and may
determine what business, if any, the individual has at the premises. State
v. Galloway, 14 Wn. App. 200, 202, 540 P.2d 444 (1975), abrogated on
other grounds by State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 60, 882 P.2d 747 (1983).
Such a limited stop, however, “is not a license to detain and frisk all
persons approaching within 100 feet of the location of the search[.]” State
v. Melin, 27 Wn. App. 589, 592, 618 P.2d 1324 (1980).
3.7(b) Search of Persons on Premises Being Searched
Generally, a premises search warrant justifies a search of personal
effects of the owner found therein [that] “are plausible repositories for the
objects named in the warrant.” State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 643, 870 P.2d
313 (1994). Officers have only the power to detain other persons who are
present, but they may not conduct personal searches of the persons other
than the occupant. See State v. Worth, 37 Wn. App. 889, 892, 683 P.2d
622 (1984); State v. Galbert, 70 Wn. App. 721, 727, 855 P.2d 310 (1993)
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(rejecting “mere presence” of contraband as a justification to search
persons who are merely located at the search scene). This protection
extends to “readily recognizable personal effects . . . which an individual
has under his control and seeks to preserve as private.” State v. Lohr, 164
Wn. App. 414, 423, 263 P.3d 1287 (2011) (internal quotations omitted)
(citing Worth, 37 Wn. App. at 893, 683 P.2d 622); see also 2 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.9(b) (c), at 894–902 (5th ed. 2012). Thus,
if the police can identify the item as belonging to a person other than the
occupant, they may not search it. See Worth, 37 Wn. App. at 893, 683 P.2d
622; see also State v. Jackson, 107 Wn. App. 646, 649, 27 P.3d 689 (2001)
(holding that police properly searched a jacket where there was confusion
over whether it was owned by the lawfully arrested driver or the nonarrested passenger).
This protection also extends to personal effects that are worn or held
and those effects nearby the person at the time of the search: “A narrow
focus on whether a person is holding or wearing a personal item would
tend to undercut the purpose of the Fourth Amendment and leave
vulnerable readily recognizable effects, such as [a] purse, which an
individual has under [her] control and seeks to preserve as private.” Worth,
37 Wn. App. at 893, 683 P.2d 622. The Washington State Supreme Court
has held, however, that one has no privacy interest in items left at another’s
house. See State v. Reynolds, 144 Wn.2d 282, 287, 27 P.3d 200 (2001)
(holding that the defendant voluntarily abandoned her coat and,
consequently, had no constitutionally protected privacy interest in coat's
contents).
There are limited instances in which the police may conduct a search
of a person on the premises but not named in the warrant. State v.
Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d 289, 301, 654 P.2d 96 (1982). For searches
conducted incident to arrest, see infra § 5.1. If the search is not incident to
a lawful arrest, then police may only detain or search an individual other
than the occupant if there is “presence plus.” Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d at 301,
654 P.2d 96. “Presence plus” is detailed below.
Suspicious behavior. First, a person not named in the warrant but
present on the premises may be searched if the police “have reasonable
cause to believe [that the person] has the articles for which the search is
instituted upon his person.” State v. Halverson, 21 Wn. App. 35, 38, 584
P.2d 408 (1978) (citations omitted). “Reasonable cause” requires that the
person engage in some type of suspicious activity. Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d at
301, 654 P.2d 96. For instance, in the execution of a search warrant for
narcotics, police were justified in searching a person’s fists when, at the
time of the officer’s entry, the person was observed kneeling in front of a
weighing scale and then rising with his fists clenched. Halverson, 21 Wn.
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App. at 36–37, 584 P.2d 408. In contrast, police are not justified in
searching a purse, however, when the owner of the purse gave no evidence
of suspicious behavior. Lohr, 164 Wn. App. at 423, 263 P.3d 1287.
Search for weapons. Second, police may conduct a limited search
for weapons to protect themselves during the execution of the warrant.
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979);
Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d at 301, 654 P.2d 96; State v. Allen, 93 Wn.2d 170,
172, 606 P.2d 1235 (1980). The police must, however, have a reasonable
suspicion that the person searched is armed. State v. Lennon, 94 Wn. App.
573, 580–81, 976 P.2d 121 (1999) (A “[g]eneralized suspicion” that
people present during narcotic searches are often armed is insufficient to
justify a search.). The search must also be limited to ascertaining whether
the individual is armed. See Allen, 93 Wn.2d at 172, 606 P.2d 1235
(holding that an officer conducting a pat-down may not examine the
contents of a wallet found on the individual “after satisfying himself that
the ‘bulge’ [wallet] was not a weapon”). For a more detailed discussion,
see infra § 4.5.
3.8 PERMISSIBLE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF SEARCH
Assuming that a search warrant describes the area and items with the
requisite particularity, the remaining question is the permissible scope and
intensity of the search. The nature of the items to be seized governs the
permissible degree of intensity for the search. State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706,
717, 630 P.2d 427 (1981) (holding that a search for marijuana has a high
degree of intensity). “Any express or implied limitations or qualifications
may reduce the scope of consent in duration, area, or intensity.” State v.
Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 133, 101 P.3d 80 (2004). Once the purpose
of the warrant has been carried out, the authority to search ends. See State
v. Legas, 20 Wn. App. 535, 541, 581 P.2d 172 (1978) (holding that a
warrant permitting a search in a bedroom for papers linking defendant to
the premises did not justify a search of a small box after such papers had
been discovered).
Generally, a premises search warrant “justifies a search of personal
effects of the owner found therein [that] are plausible repositories for the
objects specified in the warrant.” State v. Worth, 37 Wn. App. 889, 892,
683 P.2d 622 (1984) (citing State v. White, 13 Wn. App. 949, 538 P.2d
860 (1975)); see also State v. Anderson, 41 Wn. App. 85, 96, 702 P.2d 481
(1985) (holding that a warrant to search for clothing used in a robbery
extended to the entire residence where clothing might be found, including
the inside of a garbage-can-sized commercial vacuum cleaner).
In a search for documents, courts have recognized that officers must,
out of necessity, examine documents not specifically listed in the warrant.
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See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 478, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed.
2d 627 (1976); State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 692–95, 940 P.2d 1239
(1997). In the course of such a search, officers may also seize evidence
found that is not specifically described in the warrant if “it will aid in a
particular apprehension or conviction, or [if it] has a sufficient nexus with
the crime under investigation.” Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 695, 940 P.2d 1239.
3.8(a) Area
Police “must execute a search warrant strictly within the bounds set
by the warrant.” State v. Cheatam, 112 Wn. App. 778, 783, 51 P.3d 138
(2002), aff’d, 150 Wn.2d 626 (2003) (citing State v. Kelley, 52 Wn. App.
581, 585, 762 P.2d 20 (1988)). But a search of the premises and
outbuildings extends to the curtilage of the house as well. See State v.
Rivera, 76 Wn. App. 519, 525, 888 P.2d 740 (1995) (citing State v. Claflin,
38 Wn. App. 847, 853, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984)). Police may enter areas not
explicitly named in the warrant when such entry is necessary to execute
the warrant. See, e.g., Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 248, 99 S. Ct.
1682, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1979) (holding that a warrant explicitly
authorizing planting of hidden microphone implicitly authorized covert
entry onto premises). Additionally, officers may search for items thrown
outside of the premises if knowledge of police presence at the premises
provoked that action. See State v. Dearinger, 73 Wn.2d 563, 567, 439 P.2d
971 (1968) (finding that officers acted within ambit of warrant in seizing
a sack and its contents thrown by occupant into the adjoining yard during
the search).
As discussed further in section 3.4(c), above, a warrant that
authorizes the search of a house with no mention of outbuildings does not
include a search of outbuildings not under defendant’s control. State v.
Kelley, 52 Wn. App. 581, 586, 762 P.2d 20 (1988) (suppressing evidence
located in a barn and garage that were not specified in the warrant); see
also State v. Gebaroff, 87 Wn. App. 11, 16, 939 P.2d 706 (1997) (holding
that warrant application describing drug buy at a mobile home did not give
rise to probable cause to search travel trailer located on same property but
not under suspect’s control). Generally, where it is reasonable for an
officer to believe that a storage area is appurtenant to the area covered by
a valid search warrant, the officers may search the storage area. See State
v. Boyer, 124 Wn. App. 593, 602, 102 P.3d 833 (2004).
It has been suggested that police may also enter adjacent areas if they
reasonably fear for their safety, i.e., conduct a protective sweep. See 2
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.10(a), at 942 45 (5th ed. 2012).
However, in Washington, the protective sweep incident to arrest has not
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been extended to search warrants because no court has yet considered this
question. Boyer, 124 Wn. App. at 602, 102 P.3d 833.
3.8(b) Personal Effects
See supra § 3.7(b). If officers have a warrant to search a person, they
may conduct a strip search of the defendant to procure evidence if such
search is conducted in a reasonable manner and place as prescribed by
statute. State v. Colin, 61 Wn. App. 111, 114 15, 809 P.2d 228 (1991). In
Colin, the court utilized RCW 10.79.080 and RCW 10.79.100 by analogy
in determining standards of reasonableness. Id. In State v. Hampton, the
court held that the strip search pursuant to a search warrant was reasonable
because it was conducted in a reasonably private place, a police van with
tinted windows, without unnecessary touching, and by persons of the
defendant’s gender. 114 Wn. App. 486, 494 95, 60 P.3d 95 (2002).
3.8(c) Vehicles
Officers with authority to search a residence for illegal drugs also
have authority to search vehicles that are under the control of the defendant
and located on the premises to be searched. State v. Claflin, 38 Wn. App.
847, 853, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984). But a trailer that is used as a residence is
treated as a residential outbuilding rather than as a vehicle. State v.
Gebaroff, 87 Wn. App. 11, 16, 939 P.2d 706 (1997) (holding that because
the trial court found that the defendant treated the trailer as his residence,
the reviewing court treated it like a residential outbuilding). And police
have no authority to search vehicles that are not within the curtilage of the
home. See, e.g., State v. Graham, 78 Wn. App. 44, 51 52, 896 P.2d 704
(1995) (holding that a truck parked next to, and slightly in, a public street
is not within the curtilage of the house where there was no fence or other
barrier between the occupant’s yard and the street).
In State v. Pourtes, the court held that the street and the shoulder of
the roadway were not within the curtilage of a residence. 49 Wn. App. 579,
581, 744 P.2d 644 (1987). Likewise, in State v. Niedergang, the court held
that a vehicle is not within the curtilage of a house when it is parked in a
space that lawfully could be used by anyone coming to the adjoining house
on legitimate business. 43 Wn. App. 656, 662, 719 P.2d 576 (1986).
3.9 SEIZURE OF UNNAMED ITEMS: REQUIREMENTS IN GENERAL
Items not listed in the search warrant may be seized when the seizure
falls within one of the general exceptions to the warrant requirement. See,
e.g., State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 70, 917 P.2d 563 (1996) (search
incident to arrest). See generally infra Chapter 5. For example, officers
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may often see an incriminating object that was not listed in the warrant
during a search and use the plain view and open view exceptions to seize
that object. See State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 392, 909 P.2d 280 (1996)
(explaining the “open view” doctrine); State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d 332,
346, 815 P.2d 761 (1991) (explaining the “plain view” doctrine). Items
may also be seized in order to show dominion and control of the premises.
State v. Weaver, 38 Wn. App. 17, 22, 683 P.2d 1136 (1984).
3.10 DELIVERING WARRANT AND INVENTORY: REQUIREMENTS FOR
EXECUTION OF WARRANTS
Washington statutes or court rules impose requirements on the
execution of warrants beyond those mandated by the U.S. Constitution.
For instance, in Washington, an officer shall give a copy of the warrant to
the person who controls the premises being searched. CrR 2.3(d). If no one
is present, the officer must post a copy of the warrant. Id. An inventory of
articles taken must be made in the presence of at least one person other
than the searching officer. Id.
Washington follows the majority rule which holds that defects
relating to the delivery of a search warrant are ministerial and do not
compel invalidation of the warrant absent a showing of prejudice. State v.
Temple, 170 Wn. App. 156, 161 n.8, 285 P.3d 149 (2012). In State v. Aase,
the court held that suppression was not required under either the federal or
the state constitution when an officer conducted a search and took several
minutes to provide the defendant with copy of warrant. 121 Wn. App. 558,
567, 89 P.3d 721 (2004). “Absent a showing of prejudice to the defendant,
procedural noncompliance does not compel invalidation of the warrant or
suppression of its fruits.” State v. Parker, 28 Wn. App. 425, 426, 626 P.2d
508 (1981).
3.11 CHALLENGING THE CONTENT OF AN AFFIDAVIT
A defendant is generally entitled to examine an affidavit in order to
challenge whether there was probable cause to issue the warrant. Franks
v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978); State
v. Haywood, 38 Wn. App. 117, 120, 684 P.2d 1337 (1984). Relevant issues
relating to a challenge to an affidavit’s contents include the disclosure of
an informant’s identity and misrepresentations or omissions in the
affidavit.
3.11(a) Informant’s Identity
The court may excise portions of an affidavit that identify a
confidential or unnamed informant to protect the State’s interest in
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maintaining the confidentiality of such informants. See State v. Moen, 150
Wn.2d 221, 230, 76 P.3d 721 (2003); see CrR 4.7(f)(2) (“Disclosure of an
informant’s identity shall not be required where the informant’s identity is
a prosecution secret and a failure to disclose will not infringe upon the
constitutional rights of the defendant.”).
When the informant is undisclosed, however, the defendant lacks
access to the very information he or she needs to challenge the veracity of
an affidavit. State v. Casal, 103 Wn.2d 812, 818, 699 P.2d 1234 (1985).
Courts have held that when the “informant provided information relating
to probable cause only, rather than the defendant’s guilt or innocence,
disclosure of the identity of an informant is not required.” State v. Atchley,
142 Wn. App. 147, 156, 173 P.3d 323 (2007); see also Casal, 103 Wn.2d
at 815 16, 699 P.2d 1234.
There are instances, however, where fundamental fairness may
require the disclosure of an informant’s identity to assess the affiant’s
credibility or accuracy. See State v. White, 50 Wn. App. 858, 865, 751 P.2d
1202 (1988). In such cases, the court must balance the risks of disclosure
against the risk that nondisclosure may conceal police perjury. Id.; State v.
Wolken, 103 Wn.2d 823, 829, 700 P.2d 319 (1985). The discretionary
nature of the rule recognizes that search warrant affidavits may contain
some false allegations. White, 50 Wn. App. at 865, 751 P.2d 1202.
A defendant may be entitled to an in camera hearing on whether to
disclose the informant’s identity if the defendant “casts a reasonable doubt
on the veracity of material representations made by the affiant.” White, 50
Wn. App. at 865, 751 P.2d 1202 (quoting Casal, 103 Wn.2d at 820, 699
P.2d 1234). This hearing is available on only a “minimal showing of
inconsistency.” Id. Even so, “a Casal hearing is required only whe[n] a
search warrant affidavit contains no other independent basis for
establishing probable cause.” Id. at 865 n.4, 751 P.2d 1202. If the
informant verifies the affiant’s story and the judge is convinced that
probable cause existed, the informant’s identity is not to be disclosed. Id.
at 822, 751 P.2d 1202. But if the judge finds a substantial showing of
falsehood, an open evidentiary hearing is required. Id.
3.11(b) Misrepresentations and Omissions in an Affidavit
A defendant may challenge the validity of a warrant based on a
misrepresentation of fact in the supporting affidavit. Franks, 438 U.S. at
155 56, 98 S. Ct. 2674; State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 158 P.3d 595
(2007). The Franks test also applies to allegations of material omissions.
State v. Cord, 103 Wn.2d 361, 367, 693 P.2d 81 (1985).
Under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, the
defendant must first make a substantial showing that a false statement in
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the affidavit (1) was made either knowingly and intentionally or in reckless
disregard for the truth, and (2) was necessary or material to the finding of
probable cause. State v. Garrison, 118 Wn.2d 870, 872, 827 P.2d 1388
(1992); see also Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 478 79, 158 P.3d 595. An
omission or misrepresentation that was made in a negligent or grossly
negligent manner will not give rise to a Franks hearing; the omission or
misrepresentation must be made recklessly. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at
478 79, 158 P.3d 595; State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 908, 632 P.2d 44
(1981). The showing must be based on specific facts and offers of proof
rather than on conclusory assertions. Garrison, 118 Wn.2d at 872, 827
P.2d 1388.
If the defendant fails to meet these preconditions, the inquiry ends.
Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 479 81, 158 P.3d 595; State v. Jackson, 111
Wn. App. 660, 677, 46 P.3d 257 (2002). If the defendant is successful in
proving the truth of his allegations, the affidavit must be examined with
the false statements deleted and the omissions inserted. State v. Atchley,
142 Wn. App. 147, 158, 173 P.3d 323 (2007). If the modified affidavit is
insufficient to support a finding of probable cause, the defendant is entitled
to an evidentiary hearing under the Fourth Amendment. Franks, 438 U.S.
at 171 72, 98 S. Ct. 2674; Garrison, 118 Wn.2d at 873, 827 P.2d 1388.
Close cases should be assessed in favor of the defendant when the
misstatements are removed from the affidavit. United States v. Kelley, 482
F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007).
3.12 SPECIAL SITUATIONS
The search and seizures of materials protected by the First
Amendment, intrusions into the body, and warrants directed at nonsuspects require additional limitations.
3.12(a) First Amendment Materials
When a warrant authorizes the search of materials protected by the
First Amendment it must “follow the Fourth Amendment’s particularity
requirement with ‘scrupulous exactitude.’” State v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808,
815, 167 P.3d 1156 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Nothing should be
“left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.” Stanford v.
Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485, 85 S. Ct. 506, 13 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1965). This
includes warrants for books, pictures, films, or recordings. State v.
Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 547, 834 P.2d 611 (1992); see Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 56 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1978).
If the objects to be seized are books or films, and are being seized
because of their content, the requirement of particularity is especially
important.” Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 548, 834 P.2d 611; see also 2 Wayne
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R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.6(e) (5th ed. 2012). Oftentimes, the
seizure of protected materials happens to be allegedly obscene material.
2 LaFave, supra, § 4.6(e), at 812 (“a description of these materials by title
or similar identifying characteristic, or by a specific statement as to the
type of contents which would render the materials presumptively obscene”
is required). For instance, in State v. Perrone, the court held that a warrant
for “child pornography” was insufficiently particular because
pornography implicates “obscenity,” a term that is presumptively
protected by the First Amendment. 119 Wn.2d 538, 547, 834 P.2d 611
(1992).
Likewise, in State v. Reep, the court held that “the fictitious crime of
‘child sex’ is even broader and more ambiguous than the term
‘child . . . pornography.’” 161 Wn.2d 808, 815, 167 P.3d 1156 (2007). In
contrast, in the Ninth Circuit, a warrant for “computers, compact disks,
floppy disks, hard drives, memory cards, printers, and other portable
digital devices, DVDs, and video tapes” was not too broad, as the
computer-related equipment was described in the narrowest terms
reasonably likely to contain the images. States v. Brobst, 558 F.3d 982 (9th
Cir. 2009).
The scrupulous exactitude standard has not been extended to all
searches and seizures involving the First Amendment. State v. Walter, 66
Wn. App. 862, 869, 833 P.2d 440 (1992) (citing New York v. P.J. Video,
Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 875, 106 S. Ct. 1610, 89 L. Ed. 2d 871 (1986))
(determining that greater scrutiny was not required merely because
photographs were involved). For instance, computers themselves are not
subject to heightened protection just because they frequently store material
protected by the First Amendment. United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d
882 (9th Cir. 2008).
Lastly, in some cases, a search warrant has been found to satisfy the
particularity requirement despite having a catchall phrase. In Andresen v.
Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a search warrant that listed
specific documents pertaining to a particular crime, but then added the
catchall phrase “together with other fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence
of crime.” 427 U.S. 463, 479–82, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976).
The Anderson ruling was in sharp contrast to United States v. Heredia. In
Heredia, the Ninth Circuit found a warrant for “any and all” records
related to a certain organization too broad because the organization had
not been shown to be pervasively criminal. 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2007).
3.12(b) Intrusions into the Body
Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 of the
Washington State Constitution, a forced intrusion into the body is a search.
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Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616, 109 S. Ct. 1402,
103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989); State v. Garcia-Salgado, 170 Wn.2d 176, 184,
240 P.3d 153 (2010). This includes, among other things, DNA sampling,
tests of a defendant’s blood for alcohol content, breathalyzer tests, cavity
searches, and strip searches.
If the defendant voluntarily discards bodily fluids, no warrant is
necessary. State v. Athan, 160 Wn.2d 354, 367, 158 P.3d 27 (2007)
(finding no privacy interest in saliva on envelope mailed to the defendant
by a police officer posing as an attorney). A trial court may also order
samples to be taken from the defendant’s body; however, the court’s
power to do so is subject to constitutional limitations. CrR 4.7(b)(2)(vi);
see Garcia-Salgado, 170 Wn.2d at 185 86, 240 P.3d 153 (2010). Thus,
intrusion into the body is covered by the warrant requirement.
For an intrusion into the body, the regular requirements under article
I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment apply. State v. Kalakosky, 121
Wn.2d 525, 532, 852 P.2d 1064 (1993) (holding that valid search warrant
based on probable cause is constitutionally sufficient to obtain blood
sample from suspect). However, three more requirements must be met: (1)
there must be a “clear indication” that the desired evidence will be found
if the search is performed, (2) the method of searching must be reasonable,
and (3) the search must be performed in a reasonable manner. Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770–72, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908
(1966); Garcia-Salgado, 170 Wn.2d at 184 85, 240 P.3d 153.
When alcohol content of the defendant’s blood is an element of the
crime, however, the police may take a blood sample without a warrant if
the test used to measure blood alcohol content is reasonable and performed
in a reasonable manner. State v. Curran, 116 Wn.2d 174, 185, 804 P.2d
558 (1991), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Berlin, 133 Wn.2d
541, 947 P.2d 700 (1997). For example, taking a blood sample from a
defendant charged with negligent homicide was valid when the police
have probable cause to believe that evidence of intoxication will be found
and the test used to measure blood alcohol content is reasonable and
performed in a reasonable manner. State v. Judge, 100 Wn.2d 706, 712,
675 P.2d 219 (1984).
Washington has also upheld mandatory blood testing in certain cases;
for instance, in the case of putative fathers. See State v. Meacham, 93
Wn.2d 735, 739, 612 P.2d 795 (1980). Washington mandatory HIV and
DNA testing of convicted sexual offenders is permissible. Kalakosky, 121
Wn.2d at 536, 852 P.2d 1064 (1993) (upholding mandatory HIV testing of
sexual offenders as it presents a minimal Fourth Amendment intrusion for
which the State’s reasons are compelling); State v. Olivas, 122 Wn.2d 73,
93, 856 P.2d 1076 (1993) (upholding mandatory DNA testing of convicted
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sexual offenders in order to establish DNA databank). It is also permissible
to take DNA samples from convicted felons. State v. Surge, 160 Wn.2d
65, 156 P.3d 208 (2007) (upholding mandatory DNA testing of felons
without a warrant). Once the police have the DNA sample in their
possession, they may compare it to unrelated cases without a warrant. State
v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 826–27, 147 P.3d 120 (2006), overruled on
other grounds by State v. W.R., Jr., 181 Wn.2d 757, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014).
More intrusive procedures may be permitted in special
environments. In prisons and jails, strip searches and cavity searches may
be done without a warrant. State v. Harris, 66 Wn. App. 636, 642, 833
P.2d 402 (1992) (finding exigent circumstances justified strip search of
juvenile before placement in holding cell when police had prior experience
with gang members taping razor blades to their skin); Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 560, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979) (finding full body
cavity searches of prison inmates following contact visits not
unreasonable). Similar intrusive procedures may be allowed at the
country’s borders. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S.
531, 537, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1985) (holding that suspect
fitting the profile for a drug smuggler may be subjected to rectal cavity
search when search warrant was based on profile and suspect’s
unwillingness to eat, drink, or defecate during sixteen-hour confinement).
See generally infra §§ 6.2 (prisons), 6.3. The U.S. Supreme Court also
upheld the use of DNA sampling for persons arrested for, but not convicted
of, a crime. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 186 L.
Ed. 2d 1 (2013).
3.12(c) Warrants Directed at Non-suspects
The Fourth Amendment also applies to non-suspects. Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559 60, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 56 L. Ed. 2d 525
(1978). Critics have argued that a search warrant of a third party is per se
unreasonable and that a subpoena duces tecum can adequately protect law
enforcement interests. See Peter A. Pastore, The Reasonableness of
Warranted Searches of Nonsuspect Third Parties, 44 Alb. L. Rev. 212,
232–35 (1979). In response to Zurcher, Congress enacted the Privacy
Protection Act of 1980 (PPA), which prohibits the government from
searching or seizing any work product material “possessed by a person
reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a
newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public
communication” without first issuing a subpoena duces tecum. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000aa to 2000aa-12.
These protections have not been extended outside the media, and
Washington has not yet addressed the issue. See generally 2 Wayne R.

1366

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:1277

LaFave, Search and Seizure §§ 4.2(c), 4.1(f) (i) (5th ed. 2012). Disputes
often occur over the search of non-suspect attorneys’ offices. See, e.g.,
O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (finding that
the protections of client confidentiality, attorney–client privilege, attorney
work product, and a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to counsel
cannot keep enforcement officers from rummaging through documents in
search of items to be seized when such officers possess a warrant to search
an attorney’s office).

CHAPTER 4
Seizure of the Person: Arrests and Stop-and-Frisks
This chapter covers principles that are unique to seizure of a person.
This chapter will discuss the following: (1) the basics of arrests, both with
and without warrants, for felony charges and misdemeanor charges; (2)
the specifics of arrests, such as force, custodial arrests for minor offenses,
judicial review, and booking charges; and (3) Terry stops, including the
reasonable suspicion standard, frisks, investigative questioning, and the
dimensions of a reasonable stop.
4.0 SEIZURE
Article I, section 7, provides greater protections for individual
privacy interests than the Fourth Amendment. State v. Winterstein, 167
Wn.2d 620, 631, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009). In Washington, a seizure occurs
when a reasonable person under the totality of the circumstances would
not feel free either to leave or to decline an officer’s requests due to the
officer’s use of force or display of authority. State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d
689, 695, 92 P.3d 202 (2004); State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 574, 62
P.3d 489 (2003).
Unlike the Fourth Amendment, Washington’s standard is a purely
objective one. State v. Harrington, 167 Wn.2d 656, 663, 222 P.3d 92
(2009); see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 29, 111 S. Ct.
1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991). To determine whether a reasonable person
would feel free to leave, courts consider the officer’s conduct. See O’Neill,
148 Wn.2d at 574, 62 P.3d 489; see also Harrington, 167 Wn.2d at 663,
222 P.3d 92. Thus, the relevant question is whether, under the
circumstances, the officer’s conduct would have communicated to a
reasonable person that he or she was not free to leave. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d
at 574, 62 P.3d 489; State v. Avila-Avina, 99 Wn. App. 9, 14, 991 P.2d 720
(2000), abrogated on other grounds by Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 220
P.3d 1226. The defendant has the burden of proving that a seizure occurred
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in violation of article I, section 7. See O’Neill, 99 Wn. App. at 574, 62 P.3d
489.
Coercive conduct that constitutes a seizure is established by a series
of acts, rather than a single act. See State v. Soto-Garcia, 68 Wn. App. 20,
25, 841 P.2d 1271 (1992), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thorn,
129 Wn.2d 347, 917 P.2d 108 (1996). The Washington State Supreme
Court has embraced a nonexclusive list of factors that likely result in a
seizure: “the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen,
or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
officer’s request might be compelled.” State v. Young, 135 Wn.2d 498,
512, 957 P.2d 681 (1998) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 554–55, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980)).
If the officers merely ask the defendant a few questions or ask for
identification, however, they have initiated a social contact, not a seizure.
See Harrington, 167 Wn.2d at 664–65, 222 P.3d 92 (finding a social
contact when only one officer was present, the defendant had use of the
sidewalk, and the police officer was on foot); State v. Hansen, 99 Wn.
App. 575, 576, 994 P.2d 855 (2000) (holding that handing defendant’s
identification from one officer to another for the purpose of identification
does not amount to a seizure); see supra Chapter 1.
When an individual consents to the police–civilian contact, that
interaction may or may not constitute a seizure. See, e.g., Morales v. New
York, 396 U.S. 102, 90 S. Ct. 291, 24 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1969) (remanded to
determine whether defendant’s “confrontation with the police was
voluntarily undertaken by him”). Federal courts have considered the
question of whether a defendant’s consent was really “voluntary.” See,
e.g., Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 123 S. Ct. 1843, 155 L. Ed. 2d 814
(2003); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L.
Ed. 2d 497 (1980). In such cases, courts have considered the totality of
circumstances including the following factors:
[T]he time, place and purpose of the encounter; the words used by
the officer, his tone of voice and general demeanor in requesting the
defendant to accompany him to the police station; the officer’s
statements to others who were present during the encounter; the
manner in which the defendant was escorted out of the house and
transported to the stationhouse; the officer’s response to any
questions by the defendant or his parents regarding the defendant’s
right to refuse to go to the stationhouse; and the defendant’s verbal
or non-verbal responses to any directions given to him by the officer.

3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(a), at 5–6 (5th ed. 2012).
Similarly, in Washington, a seizure was found when the defendant
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voluntarily entered a police car that could not be opened from inside.
Avila-Avina, 99 Wn. App. at 14, 991 P.2d 720. In situations where there is
more than one police officer or the officers use a threatening tone, the court
has found seizures as well. See Harrington, 167 Wn.2d at 660, 222 P.3d
92 (arrival of second police officer and request to pat down instigated a
seizure); State v. Gleason, 70 Wn. App. 13, 17, 851 P.2d 731 (1993)
(seizure found when two officers were present, and one officer yelled
“[c]an I talk to you a minute?” to the suspect, approached him, and
requested identification).
4.1 ARREST
A defendant is placed under arrest when “a duly authorized officer
of the law manifests an intent to take a person into custody and actually
seizes or detains such person.” State v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 387, 219
P.3d 651 (2009). The moment of arrest occurs when the officer manifests
this intent, not when the officer actually restrains the defendant. Id.
(holding that a defendant was under arrest at the point when officer told
him he was under arrest even though the defendant ran).
To determine whether a person has been arrested the court asks
“whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position at the time would
have thought so.” State v. Rivard, 131 Wn.2d 63, 75, 929 P.2d 413 (1997).
The subjective intent of the arresting officer is irrelevant. State v. Radka,
120 Wn. App. 43, 50, 83 P.3d 1038 (2004). For instance, in State v. Rivard,
the court found that no arrest occurred because the defendant was not
physically apprehended, restrained, handcuffed, or placed in a police
vehicle. 131 Wn.2d at 75, 929 P.2d 413. Similarly, in State v. Radka, the
court found no arrest even though the defendant was told he was under
arrest and placed in a patrol car because he was neither frisked nor
handcuffed, and he was allowed to make calls on his cell phone. 120 Wn.
App. at 50, 83 P.3d 1038.
Although a seizure restrains an individual’s freedom of movement,
not all seizures amount to arrests. See State v. Lyons, 85 Wn. App. 267,
270, 932 P.2d 188 (1997) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868,
20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968) (finding investigative detention was not
transformed into an arrest when the investigating officer physically
restrained a suspect and stated that he was under arrest)). For instance, a
seizure, but not necessarily an arrest, has taken place when a police officer
asks an individual to step out of his or her car during a stop. See State v.
O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 581 82, 62 P.3d 489 (2003).
It is not a defense in a criminal prosecution that a defendant was
illegally arrested. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444, 7 S. Ct. 225, 30 L. Ed.
421 (1886); State v. Waters, 93 Wn. App. 969, 976, 971 P.2d 538 (1999).
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The legality of the arrest, however, affects the legality of any search or
confession that takes place after the arrest, as well as the admissibility of
evidence derived from the arrest. See generally infra Chapter 7.
4.2 ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS
Arrests are not subject to the same strict warrant requirements as
searches, giving officers more freedom to arrest without a warrant. This
section summarizes general rules for warrantless arrests in public places
and in the home. This section also examines the standards for warrantless
arrests for felony offenses and for misdemeanors.
4.2(a) Public Arrests
An officer may make a warrantless felony arrest in a public place
even though the officer had time to obtain a warrant. State v. Solberg, 122
Wn.2d 688, 696, 861 P.2d 460 (1993) (citing United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411, 422 24, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976)). Such arrests
must be supported by probable cause. Id.; 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 5.1(b), at 22–23 (5th ed. 2012). “Probable cause exists when
the arresting officer is aware of facts or circumstances . . . sufficient to
cause a reasonable officer to believe a crime has been committed.” State
v. Moore, 161 Wn.2d 880, 887, 169 P.3d 469 (2007) (emphasis removed)
(citing State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 70, 93 P.3d 872 (2004)); see
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S. Ct. 795, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769
(2003).
Probable cause must be specific to the individual arrested; thus, if an
officer smells marijuana emanating from a vehicle and two individuals are
present, the officer may not arrest both if he cannot discern where the odor
is coming from. State v. Grande, 164 Wn.2d 135, 146, 187 P.3d 248
(2008). Probable cause, however, is not subject to calculation by formula
or by mathematical certainty. See State v. Morgan, 78 Wn. App. 208, 212,
896 P.2d 731 (1995); see also supra Chapter 2.
A defendant is entitled to a prompt judicial determination of probable
cause following a warrantless arrest. Westerman v. Cary, 125 Wn.2d 277,
295, 892 P.2d 1067 (1994); see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95
S. Ct. 854, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975) (“Once the suspect is in custody . . . the
reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate’s neutral judgment
evaporate.”); see also infra § 4.4(c).
4.2(b) Home Arrests
Although officers may make a warrantless arrest in a public area,
they may not make a warrantless arrest after a nonconsensual entry into a
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suspect’s home. State v. Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d 907, 912, 259 P.3d 172
(2011) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 90, 100 S. Ct. 1371,
63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980)). If the officers have a warrant, they may enter the
home if they reasonably believe the defendant resides therein. State v.
Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 395 96, 166 P.3d 698 (2007); see infra § 4.3(c)
(discussing Hatchie). The defendant’s home includes trailers even when
the “trailer home [is] so small that [the defendant] could open the front
door while lying in his bed.” United States v. Quaempts, 411 F.3d 1046,
1047 (9th Cir. 2005). Washington courts have not extended the protections
provided by Payton beyond the home. See State v. White, 129 Wn.2d 105,
109, 915 P.2d 1099 (1996).
In Washington, the arrest of a suspect who is standing in the doorway
of his or her home is treated the same as an arrest in the home. See State
v. Solberg, 122 Wn.2d 688, 697, 861 P.2d 460 (1993) (citing State v.
Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89 (1985)). The location of the
suspect, not the location of the officer, is material to the issue of whether
an arrest occurs in the home. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d at 429, 693 P.2d 89;
see Solberg, 122 Wn.2d at 697, 861 P.2d 460. And if the officers force the
suspect out of his home, the arrest is considered as taking place inside the
home. United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1985). Notably,
an arrest of a suspect who is on a front porch, as opposed to in the doorway,
is considered a public arrest. See Solberg, 122 Wn.2d at 700, 861 P.2d 460
(“[T]he protections afforded in Payton clearly do not apply outside the
physical boundaries of the home as the theoretical basis of the Payton
decision is that an arrest within a home violates the sanctity of the home
whereas outside the boundaries of the home, no such violation is
present.”).
Washington courts have not adopted the bright-line rule applied
under the Fourth Amendment that an officer may, in all circumstances,
accompany an arrestee into the arrestee’s home after the arrest. See State
v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814, 820 21, 676 P.2d 419 (1984); see also State
v. Kull, 155 Wn.2d 80, 86, 118 P.3d 307 (2005). Under article I, section 7,
when a person is arrested for a minor violation, the arresting officer may
not follow the arrestee into his or her home unless the officer can
reasonably conclude that the officer’s safety is endangered, evidence
might be destroyed, or escape is a strong possibility. Kull, 155 Wn.2d at
88 89, 118 P.3d 307 (finding that the officer could not follow the
defendant into her house because he did not fear for his safety and had no
other justification). If the officer knows of specific, articulable facts that
indicate a threat to the officer’s safety, the officer may follow the
defendant inside. State v. Wood, 45 Wn. App. 299, 308 09, 725 P.2d 435
(1986) (finding that sufficient reason existed to accompany the arrestee
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into residence for security purposes when the officer was executing an
arrest warrant for a felony parole violation). An officer may also enter a
home without a warrant under exigent circumstances or in response to a
medical emergency. Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d at 912, 259 P.3d 172; State v.
Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 386, 5 P.3d 668 (2000); see infra §§ 5.12 5.14
(exigent circumstances).
A warrantless search based on the emergency exception is valid
only if
(1) the officer subjectively believed that someone likely needed
assistance for health or safety reasons; (2) a reasonable person in the
same situation would similarly believe that there was a need for
assistance; and (3) there was a reasonable basis to associate the need
for assistance with the place searched.

Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d at 386, 5 P.3d 668; State v. Gibson, 104 Wn. App. 792,
796 97, 17 P.3d 635 (2001) (upholding arrest of defendant under
emergency exception when officers entered house to secure the safety of
the children before arresting defendant).
4.2(c) Felony Arrest
Under the common law standard and the Fourth Amendment, the
authority to arrest without a warrant applies to felonies. United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 422 23, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976);
Kellogg v. State, 94 Wn.2d 851, 854, 621 P.2d 133 (1980).
An officer may arrest for a felony committed outside of his presence
if “he has reasonable grounds to believe that (1) the offense committed is
a felony, and (2) the person apprehended committed the felony.” RCW
10.31.100; see also Watson, 423 U.S. at 422 23, 96 S. Ct. 820. In deciding
whether an officer had a reasonable belief that a felony was committed,
the court must consider all of the information known to the officer at the
time of the arrest, as well as the officer’s expertise. State v. Rose, 175
Wn.2d 10, 22, 282 P.3d 1087 (2012) (holding that plain view of pipe with
residue, coupled with the detective’s training, provided cause to make a
warrantless arrest).
An officer may also make an arrest without a warrant for the purpose
of preventing the commission of a felony. State v. Baxter, 68 Wn.2d 416,
413 P.2d 638 (1966) (holding that there was probable cause to arrest
without a warrant when the officers first saw the defendant at 4 a.m., he
appeared to have come from behind or out of some business houses in an
area containing just a few such businesses, he was wearing one hat and
was carrying two others, the police automobile drove past him, stopped
and backed up, and he took flight.); State v. Cottrell, 86 Wn.2d 130, 542
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P.2d 771 (1975) (holding that there was probable cause to arrest when the
officer had recently seen the defendant in possession of controlled
substances and had additional reliable information suggesting the same).
4.2(d) Misdemeanor Arrest
To make a warrantless misdemeanor arrest, an officer must have
probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor is being committed in his
presence. RCW 10.31.100; State v. Green, 150 Wn.2d 740, 742, 82 P.3d
239 (2004) (per curiam). Under common law, an officer has the authority
to make a warrantless arrest of a person who breaches the peace, but the
authority is not limited to such offenses. See Kalmas v. Wagner, 133
Wn.2d 210, 218, 943 P.2d 1369 (1997); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 5.1(b), at 15–17 (5th ed. 2012). But see Atwater v. Lago Vista,
532 U.S. 318, 327, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001). If a
misdemeanor is committed in the presence of the officer, the officer may
arrest without a warrant. Green, 150 Wn.2d at 742, 82 P.3d 239. The
common law presence rule is not constitutionally mandated; consequently,
Washington’s rule is broader, allowing an officer to make a warrantless
misdemeanor arrest even when the offense is not committed in the
officer’s presence. RCW 10.31.100; see United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411, 418–21, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976).
In Washington, an officer may make a warrantless misdemeanor
arrest if the offense (1) involves criminal trespass, physical harm, or the
threat of physical harm to persons or property; (2) is for possession of
marijuana, or possession or consumption of alcohol by a minor; (3) is for
violation of a restraining order; (4) is witnessed by another officer; or (5)
is for one of a number of specified traffic offenses. RCW 10.31.100. When
a suspect is arrested for a misdemeanor not committed in the officer’s
presence, the arrest is not illegal if the arresting officer has knowledge of
a felony for which the suspect could have been arrested. See State v.
Stebbins, 47 Wn. App. 482, 485, 735 P.2d 1353 (1987).
The “in the presence” requirement of RCW 10.31.100 is satisfied
whenever the officer directly perceives facts permitting a reasonable
inference that a misdemeanor is being committed. See Tacoma v. Harris,
73 Wn.2d 123, 126, 436 P.2d 770 (1968). See generally 3 LaFave, supra,
§ 5.1(c) (discussing what constitutes “in the presence”). Common issues
include whether the officer must view all the elements of a crime and what
types of information may be used to fill in “gaps.” See Tacoma, 73 Wn.2d
at 126, 436 P.2d 770. The arresting officer need not, however, observe the
events. Under Washington law, an officer may arrest a person without a
warrant for committing a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor when the
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offense is committed in the presence of any officer, not limited to the
presence of only the arresting office. RCW 10.31.100.
4.3 ARRESTS WITH WARRANTS
4.3(a) Issuance of Arrest Warrants
In Washington, the issuance of arrest warrants in all state criminal
proceedings is authorized by court rules. Specifically, the authority to
issue a warrant and the formal requirements for arrest warrants are
governed by CrR 2.2 and CrRLJ 2.02.
For superior court proceedings, CrR 2.2(a) requires that an arrest
warrant be based upon an indictment or information filed by the
prosecuting attorney pursuant to CrR 2.1. If there is an indictment or
information filed, the court may issue an arrest warrant for a defendant. A
warrant of arrest must be supported by an affidavit or sworn testimony
establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant, and the court must
determine that there is probable cause for its issuance. See CrR 2.2(b) (“A
warrant of arrest may not issue unless the court determines that there is
probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense
charged.”). Similarly, in district court, CrRLJ 2.2(a) provides that the
filing of a criminal complaint may support the issuance of an arrest
warrant.
The requirements of an arrest warrant are set forth by CrR 2.2(c) and
CrRLJ 2.2(c). For supervisory court proceedings, “a warrant shall be in
writing and in the name of the State of Washington, shall be signed by the
clerk with the title of the office, and shall state the date when issued and
the county where issued. It shall specify the name of the defendant, or if
the defendant’s name is unknown, any name or description by which the
defendant can be identified with reasonable certainty.” State v. Rollie M.,
41 Wn. App. 55, 701 P.2d 1123 (1985) (“John Doe” warrant; a warrant
authorizing the search of unnamed and undescribed persons is too
unspecific to be valid). The warrant must also designate the offense
charged in statutory terms. CrR 2.2(c) (“The warrant shall specify the
offense charged against the defendant and that the court has found that
probable cause exists to believe the defendant has committed the offense
charged . . . .”).
A defendant who is in custody pursuant to a warrant or summons will
not be released due to an irregularity in the warrant or summons.
CrR(f)(2); CrR(f)(2). Instead, the warrant or summons may be amended
so as to remedy any irregularity. Id.
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4.3(b) Return of Arrest Warrants
In Washington, “[a]t the request of the prosecuting attorney any
unexecuted warrant shall be returned to the issuing court to be canceled.”
CrR 2.2(e); CrRLJ 2.2(e). When a person is delivered a summons, he or
she shall, on or before the return date, file a return with the court. Id. The
court may also order the warrant returned to it upon reasonable cause. Id.
4.3(c) Execution of Arrest Warrants
An officer with a valid warrant may enter a home without permission
to make an arrest. See State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 395–97, 166 P.3d
698 (2007) (holding that a misdemeanor warrant allowed the officers to
enter the residence). However, Washington courts recognize “that the
presence of an officer, which is initially lawful, can be rendered unlawful
by his movement.” State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814, 820, 676 P.2d 419
(1984). A valid arrest warrant gives police “only the limited ability to enter
the residence, find the suspect, arrest him, and leave.” Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d
at 400, 166 P.3d 698.
The principles governing the procurement and execution of search
warrants generally apply to arrest warrants. See supra Chapter 3. Thus, an
invalid warrant will not support an arrest. State v. Nall, 117 Wn. App. 647,
651, 72 P.3d 200 (2003) (holding that an invalid Oregon warrant will not
support arrest in Washington); see Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560,
568 69, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971); 3 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 5.1(h), at 86 88 (5th ed. 2012). Even if the arrest
is based on a mistaken “hot sheet” and is made in goodwill, the arrest is
unlawful. State v. Mance, 82 Wn. App. 539, 542, 918 P.2d 527 (1996).
With a valid warrant, an arrest is lawful if the officer has reasonably
articulable grounds to believe that the suspect is the intended arrestee
named in the warrant. State v. Smith, 102 Wn.2d 449, 453 54, 688 P.2d
146 (1984). If doubt arises as to identity, the officer is expected to
immediately take reasonable steps to confirm or deny that the warrant
applies to the person being held. Id. at 454, 688 P.2d 146. The initial arrest,
however, must be based on more than the individual’s similarity to the
general physical description set forth in the warrant. See id. (applying
Sanders v. United States, 339 A.2d 373, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1975), and finding
the seizure unlawful because the defendant only fit a general description
and the officer failed to take steps to verify the specific information).
A person arrested under the authority of a warrant must first be read
the warrant. See RCW 10.31.030. The rules surrounding the execution of
an arrest warrant are ministerial, and substantial compliance with RCW
10.31.030 is all that is required for a valid arrest. State v. Simmons, 35 Wn.
App. 421, 423, 667 P.2d 133 (1983). After arrest, if the person wishes to
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deposit bail, he or she must be taken without delay before a judge. RCW
10.31.030; State v. Caldera, 84 Wn. App. 527, 528, 929 P.2d 482 (1997)
(per curiam) (finding illegal a search of two defendants when the search
occurred prior to them being read the warrant or being taken before a judge
to deposit bail). However, the plain language of RCW 10.31.030 does not
require the officer to take the defendant to the nearest detention station.
State v. Ross, 106 Wn. App. 876, 881, 26 P.3d 298 (2001).
4.4 ARRESTS: MISCELLANEOUS REQUIREMENTS
Even with a warrant, an officer may not make an arrest in any manner
that he or she chooses. There are further limitations on the use of deadly
force, booking charges, judicial review, and custodial arrest for minor
offenses. This section introduces these various rules in more detail.
4.4(a) Use of Force
An officer is permitted to use reasonable force to make an arrest, and
an officer can use deadly force if such force reasonably appears necessary
to prevent a suspect’s escape from a felony arrest. See Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 13 15, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985). If the
defendant does not pose a threat to the officer, the officer is restricted in
the force he can use. Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 31 (9th
Cir. 2010) (taser following stop for failure to wear seat belt was excessive
when arrestee did not pose immediate threat to officer and officer did not
warn arrestee taser would be used). Deadly force is restricted even further
and is appropriate only when “the officer has probable cause to believe
that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical
injury to the officer or others.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 3, 105 S. Ct. 1694
(holding that police were not permitted to shoot an unarmed, fleeing
burglary suspect).
In Washington, the amount of force an officer may use is governed
by statute to the extent consistent with the Garner ruling. See RCW
10.31.050 (“If after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he or
she either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all necessary means
to effect the arrest.”); RCW 9A.16.040 (listing specific situations in which
an officer is justified in using deadly force). The legislature specifically
limited the use of deadly force under RCW 9A.16.040(1)(c) to instances
in which the officer has “probable cause to believe that the suspect, if not
apprehended, poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer
or . . . others.” RCW 9A.16.040(2). The use of deadly force by a public
officer can be justified “to overcome actual resistance to the execution of
the legal process . . . or in the discharge of a legal duty.” RCW
9A.16.040(1)(b).
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In 2018, Washington voters approved Initiative 940 which imposed
both an objective and subjective good faith standard on the use of deadly
force by law enforcement officers. The objective good faith test is met if
a reasonable officer, in light of all the facts and circumstances known to
the officer at the time, would have believed that the use of deadly force
was necessary to prevent death or serious physical harm to the officer or
another individual. The subjective good faith test is met if the officer
intended to use deadly force for a lawful purpose and sincerely and in good
faith believed that the use of deadly force was warranted in the
circumstance. RCW 9A.16.040.
4.4(b) Significance of Booking and Crime Charged
Courts differ about whether a suspect being booked for one offense
may be formally charged with another offense. On the one hand, if the
booking and formal charges do not need to be similar, police can use an
arrest as a pretext for detaining a suspect for questioning about an
unrelated crime for which the police lack probable cause. On the other
hand, at the time police first establish probable cause for one crime, they
may not possess sufficient information to establish probable cause for
another. See generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(e)
(5th ed. 2012).
In Washington, the formal charge may differ from the booking
charge. See State v. Teuber, 19 Wn. App. 651, 655 56, 577 P.2d 147
(1978). The booking charge has no significance after a formal charge has
been lodged, and booking “for investigation” is permissible provided that
probable cause for an arrest on any charge is present. See State v.
Thompson, 58 Wn.2d 598, 606 07, 364 P.2d 527 (1961).
4.4(c) Judicial Review
A person arrested without a warrant is entitled to a post-arrest
probable cause determination. Westerman v. Cary, 125 Wn.2d 277, 295,
892 P.2d 1067 (1994); see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S. Ct.
854, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975) (“Once the suspect is in custody . . . the
reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate’s neutral judgment
evaporate.”). A neutral and detached magistrate must make the probable
cause determination, but the hearing may be ex parte. See Gerstein, 420
U.S. at 119–23, 95 S. Ct. 854. Courts have not resolved the issue of
whether a violation of the Gerstein rule requires suppression of evidence
seized after the arrest. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
5.1(g), at 70–76 (5th ed. 2012).
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4.4(d) Custodial Arrests for Minor Offenses
“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has
committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may,
without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Atwater v.
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 55, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549
(2001) (upholding the arrest of an individual for failing to secure herself
and her children with safety belts). Washington’s additional protection for
privacy rights, however, requires the court to draw the line differently than
the U.S. Supreme Court. State v. Pulfrey, 120 Wn. App. 270, 283, 86 P.3d
790 (2004), aff’d, 154 Wn.2d 517, 528, 111 P.3d 1162 (2005) (affirming
but not deciding the constitutional issue).
Under RCW 46.64.015, custodial arrests for minor traffic violations
are limited to situations involving specific statutory violations, a
defendant’s refusal to sign a promise to appear, and nonresident arrestees.
RCW 46.64.015; see State v. Radka, 120 Wn. App. 43, 48, 83 P.3d 1038
(2004); see also State v. Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685, 689, 835 P.2d 1019
(1992). “[A]s a matter of public policy . . . custodial arrest for minor traffic
violations is unjustified, unwarranted, and impermissible if the defendant
signs [a] promise to appear” in court. State v. Hehman, 90 Wn.2d 45, 47,
578 P.2d 527 (1978); see also 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 5.2(g), at 162 164 & n.149 (5th ed. 2012). In Hehman, the Supreme
Court of Washington held that an officer was prohibited from making a
custodial arrest for a minor traffic violation unless the officer had “other
reasonable grounds [for the arrest] apart from the minor traffic violation
itself.” 90 Wn.2d at 50, 578 P.2d 527.
Custodial arrests are permissible, however, for non-minor traffic
offenses such as reckless driving and driving with a suspended license.
Pulfrey, 154 Wn.2d at 528, 111 P.3d 1162; State v. Carner, 28 Wn. App.
439, 444, 624 P.2d 204 (1981) (finding arrest proper when minor tried to
evade police on his motorcycle). Also, the officer may make a custodial
arrest when the circumstances surrounding the arrest dictate transferring
the violator to another location for completion of the arrest process. See
State v. LaTourette, 49 Wn. App. 119, 125, 741 P.2d 1033 (1987) (finding
that the officers’ decision to move arrestee to another location to complete
arrest for reckless driving was proper when a hostile crowd gathered in
parking lot).
When civil proceedings are involved, custodial arrests may be
improper. The Supreme Court of Washington has held a statute
unconstitutional that authorized the custodial arrest of any person against
whom a paternity complaint is filed. See State v. Klinker, 85 Wn.2d 509,
524, 537 P.2d 268 (1975). Thus, in the absence of a contrary showing, the
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usual summons and complaint procedure for civil cases is deemed
adequate for securing the defendant’s presence at trial. See id.
4.5 INTRODUCTION TO TERRY STOPS
In some situations, police may make investigatory stops that fall
short of arrests and are based on proof less than probable cause. See Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); State v.
Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 197 98, 275 P.3d 289 (2012). Although these
brief detentions, known as “Terry stops,” fall within the scope of the
Fourth Amendment, the public interests in crime detection and the relative
non-intrusiveness of the stop permit a lower standard of proof. See Terry,
392 U.S. at 20 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868. Thus, the investigatory stop is tested
against the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription of unreasonable
searches and seizures rather than the probable cause requirement. See id.
at 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868.
For a seizure to be permissible, an officer must have a reasonable
suspicion that the person stopped is engaged in criminal conduct. State v.
Doughty, 170 Wn.2d 57, 62 63, 239 P.3d 573 (2010). The question is
“whether the officer had ‘specific and articulable facts, which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the]
intrusion.’” State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 5, 726 P.2d 445 (1986)
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. (1868)); see also Doughty, 170
Wn.2d at 62 63, 239 P.3d 573. Under article I, section 7 of the
Washington Constitution, reasonable suspicion requires consideration of
the totality of the circumstances, including the officer’s subjective belief.
See State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 358 59, 979 P.2d 833 (1999). See
generally supra § 2.9(b). For a discussion of the use of the reasonable
suspicion standard in special environments, see infra §§ 6.1 (schools), 6.3
(borders). See also 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §§ 9.3(b)
(routine traffic stops), 9.7 (roadblocks), 9.8 (other brief detentions) (5th
ed. 2012).
Once an officer possesses a reasonable suspicion, he or she may
forcibly stop the suspect, but the stop must be a more limited intrusion
than an arrest. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209, 99 S. Ct.
2248, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979). The stop must be limited in scope to
“whatever reasonable suspicions legally justified the stop in the first
place.” See State v. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 293 94, 290 P.3d 983 (2012)
(citing Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 350, 979 P.2d 833). Article I, section 7,
provides more protection than the Fourth Amendment in that the
investigative stop may not be a pretext for a search in any situation.
Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 358 59, 979 P.2d 833. See generally Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996).
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During a Terry stop, the officer may ask a moderate number of
questions regarding identity and the purpose of the stop without rendering
the suspect “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda. State v. Heritage,
152 Wn.2d 210, 219, 95 P.3d 345 (2004). Once an intrusion is substantial
enough to constitute an arrest, probable cause is necessary. See State v.
Rose, 175 Wn.2d 10, 18 19, 282 P.3d 1087 (2012); see also infra § 6.3.
However, reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop may ripen
into probable cause for arrest. State v. McIntosh, 42 Wn. App. 579,
583 84, 712 P.2d 323 (1986) (holding that a suspect’s inability to give
rational account of appearance and presence in a high burglary area late at
night, absence of identification, and presence of what appeared to be
burglar’s tools gave rise to probable cause to arrest). If the “suspect’s
freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest,’”
then a Miranda warning must be given. State v. Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d 22, 37,
93 P.3d 133 (2004); State v. Harris, 106 Wn.2d 784, 789 90, 725 P.2d
975 (1986) (adopting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S. Ct.
3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984)).
4.6 NATURE OF THE OFFENSE
“It is generally recognized that crime prevention and crime detection
are legitimate purposes for investigative stops or detentions.” State v.
Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 5 6, 726 P.2d 445 (1986). Thus, Terry stops have
been upheld for offenses ranging from aggravated robbery to possession
of narcotics. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S. Ct. 675,
83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S. Ct. 1921,
32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972). In Washington, a non-traffic, civil infraction is
insufficient to justify a Terry stop. State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 175,
43 P.3d 513 (2002) (declining to extend Terry to general, non-traffic civil
infractions); see also State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 897, 168 P.3d 1265
(2007) (declining to extend Terry to parking infractions). Normal traffic
infractions, however, are sufficient to support a Terry stop. State v. Snapp,
174 Wn.2d 177, 198, 275 P.3d 289 (2012) (failure to illuminate
headlights).
For arguments that Terry stops should be limited to investigations of
serious offenses, see Adams, 407 U.S. at 151 53, 92 S. Ct. 1921 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
9.2(c) (5th ed. 2012).
4.7 SATISFYING THE REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD
To satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, the officer’s belief must
be based on objective facts. State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747, 64 P.3d
594 (2003); State v. Seitz, 86 Wn. App. 865, 869 70, 941 P.2d 5 (1997).
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The facts must be specific and articulable; thus, an “inarticulate hunch[]”
is insufficient. State v. Doughty, 170 Wn.2d 57, 63, 239 P.3d 573 (2010)
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889
(1968)). Courts consider the experience of the officer when determining if
there was reasonable suspicion. See Acrey, 148 Wn.2d at 747, 64 P.3d 594.
Consequently, an experienced officer may be able to detect something
suspicious where a layperson would not. See State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d
509, 514, 806 P.2d 760 (1991) (concluding that officers’ familiarity with
the neighborhood allowed them to lawfully detain man they did not
recognize who claimed to live in an apartment). Generally, the level of
suspicion required for an investigative stop of a pedestrian is the same as
that required for a vehicle. See State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 6, 726 P.2d
445 (1986).
This section will examine the reasonable suspicion standard in
greater depth. Issues include individualized suspicion, information from
informants as the basis for the reasonable suspicion, and the standard as it
is applied to different offenses. For a discussion of stops not requiring
individualized suspicion, see infra §§ 6.3 (stops at or near borders), 5.18
(vehicle spot checks).
4.7(a) Individualized Suspicion
An officer must have an individualized suspicion that the particular
defendant is engaging in unlawful conduct to make a Terry stop. State v.
Kennedy, 38 Wn. App. 41, 45 46, 684 P.2d 1326 (1984); see State v.
Penfield, 106 Wn. App. 157, 162 63, 22 P.3d 293 (2001) (finding that (1)
the officer stopped vehicle without any articulable suspicion of criminal
activity and (2) the officer could not lawfully ask male driver to identify
himself when basis for the stop was the license suspension of the female
registered owner).
When an officer does not have individual suspicion of unlawful
conduct, the search becomes a general search. See York v. Wahkiakum Sch.
Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 315, 178 P.3d 995 (2008). Washington,
however, does not authorize general, exploratory searches. Id. For
instance, under article I, section 7, sobriety checkpoints are deemed
unconstitutional if lacking individualized suspicion. City of Seattle v.
Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 460, 755 P.2d 775 (1988).
There are several exceptions to this general rule. For example, a
school official may detain and search a student with only reasonable
suspicion and not individualized suspicion. York, 163 Wn.2d at 308–09,
178 P.3d 995. Stops at border checkpoints may only require reasonable
suspicion. See infra § 6.3. In such circumstances, however, an officer’s
discretion must be limited. State v. Marchand, 104 Wn.2d 434, 441, 706
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P.2d 225 (1985) (finding spot checks of licenses unconstitutional because
the discretion of the officers was not checked in any way); see also State
v. Thorp, 71 Wn. App. 175, 181–82, 856 P.2d 1123 (1993) (holding that
officers who lack probable cause or a reasonable suspicion may not
randomly stop moving vehicles for questioning).
4.7(b) Information from Informants
When Terry stops are based on information provided by informants,
the information does not have to meet the same criteria required for
probable cause. State v. Lee, 147 Wn. App. 912, 916 17, 199 P.3d 445
(2008) (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110
L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990)). See generally supra § 2.5. However, “[a]n
informant’s tip cannot constitutionally provide police with such a
suspicion unless it possesses sufficient ‘indicia of reliability.’” State v.
Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 47, 621 P.2d 1272 (1980) (quoting Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972)). To
determine whether the informant possesses the requisite “indicia of
reliability,” the court will consider (1) whether the informant is reliable;
(2) whether the information was obtained in a reliable fashion; and (3)
whether the officers can corroborate any details of the informant’s tip.
State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 7, 726 P.2d 445 (1986); Sieler, 95 Wn.2d
at 47, 621 P.2d 1272; State v. Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940, 944, 530 P.2d 243
(1975).
Citizen-informants that witnessed the crime firsthand are generally
reliable. See State v. Vandover, 63 Wn. App. 754, 759, 822 P.2d 784
(1992). Indeed, citizen-informants are given greater credence than
professional informants because they act with only an intent to aid the
police. Lee, 147 Wn. App. at 918–19, 199 P.3d 445 (tip from eyewitness
citizen-informant sufficient when corroborated by officer’s observations);
see State v. Garcia, 125 Wn.2d 239, 242, 883 P.2d 1369 (1994) (holding
that information provided by a citizen does not require a showing of the
same degree of reliability as an informant because a citizen is not a
“professional” informant); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
3.4(a), at 265–70 (5th ed. 2012).
Surrounding circumstances may decrease the level of reliability
required to conduct a Terry stop. For example, the Supreme Court of
Washington has suggested that when the tip involves a serious crime or
potential danger, less reliability is required for a stop than is required in
other circumstances. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d at 50, 621 P.2d 1272; Lesnick, 84
Wn.2d at 944 45, 530 P.2d 243; see 4 LaFave, supra, § 9.5(i), at 806 11.
However, the informant must still be reliable either by the circumstances
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of the tip or by police corroboration. Vandover, 63 Wn. App. at 760, 822
P.2d 784.
Police may also make a Terry stop based on information provided by
other divisions or agencies. See State v. Mance, 82 Wn. App. 539, 542,
918 P.2d 527 (1996); see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221,
230 31, 105 S. Ct. 675, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985). The collective knowledge
of law enforcement agencies that gives rise to a dispatch will be imputed
to the officers who act on it. State v. O’Cain, 108 Wn. App. 542, 544 45,
31 P.3d 733 (2001). If the issuing agency lacked the authority to make a
Terry stop on the information, however, so did the officer. State v. Gaddy,
152 Wn.2d 64, 71, 93 P.3d 872 (2004).
In any case, the length and intrusiveness of the detention may not
exceed that which would have been accomplished by the police agency
providing the information. State v. Dorsey, 40 Wn. App. 459, 470, 698
P.2d 1109 (1985) (citing Hensley, 469 U.S. at 233, 105 S. Ct. 675).
4.7(c) Situations that Satisfy or Fail to Satisfy the
Reasonable Suspicion Standard
The mere fact that a suspect is in a high-crime area will not justify a
Terry stop. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d
357 (1979); State v. Seitz, 86 Wn. App. 865, 867–70, 941 P.2d 5 (1997)
(holding that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop when they saw
occupants of a car speaking to a man on the sidewalk but did not observe
drugs, money, or anything else change hands); State v. Soto-Garcia, 68
Wn. App. 20, 25, 841 P.2d 1271 (1992) (stating that merely walking in the
street in a known drug area late at night does not suggest that someone has
committed a crime), abrogated, State v. Thorn, 129 Wn.2d 347, 917 P.2d
108 (1996). Similarly, officers may not stop an individual merely because
the individual is in proximity to others who are suspected of criminal
activity. State v. Thompson, 93 Wn.2d 838, 841, 613 P.2d 525 (1980). See
generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.9(d) (5th ed.
2012); see also supra § 4.7(b).
A person who simply acts suspiciously is not the proper subject of a
stop in the absence of other circumstances implicating a crime. State v.
Walker, 66 Wn. App. 622, 629, 834 P.2d 41 (1992) (finding that an officer
investigating a report of suspicious behavior in a neighborhood
inappropriately stopped a man who appeared startled when he saw the
officer and turned onto another street to avoid him), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 647, 870 P.2d 313 (1994); State
v. Henry, 80 Wn. App. 544, 552, 910 P.2d 1290 (1995) (nervousness is
not sufficient for a Terry stop.). In addition, being “out of place” in a
particular location because of race is not suspicious. State v. Barber, 118
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Wn.2d 335, 346, 823 P.2d 1068 (1992) (holding that a person of a specific
race being “out of place” in a particular geographic area can never amount
to a reasonable suspicion).
Taken together, the suspect’s actions, whether they are furtive
gestures or flight, may satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard. State v.
Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711, 725–26, 927 P.2d 227 (1996); State v. Little,
116 Wn.2d 488, 496, 806 P.2d 749 (1991) (flight from the police may be
considered.). Crouching down or dropping an object upon seeing the
officer may also give rise to reasonable suspicion. State v. Jones, 117 Wn.
App. 721, 728, 72 P.3d 1110 (2003) (holding that suspect in an area known
for narcotics crouching down with item consistent with the appearance of
crack cocaine was reasonably suspicious when the suspect quickly began
to leave the area upon noticing the presence of the officer). However, it is
not sufficient if the officer does not see what the suspect is hiding. State v.
Gatewood, 163 Wn.2d 534, 540, 182 P.3d 426 (2008).
An officer’s familiarity with the location or with the narcotics
involved, when combined with another circumstance, is considered when
determining whether there was reasonable suspicion. State v. Garcia, 125
Wn.2d 239, 242, 883 P.2d 1369 (1994) (per curiam). In Garcia, the Court
determined that information given to police, combined with an officer’s
experience in narcotics and knowledge of location as a high-crime area,
justified investigative restraint. Id. Similarly, in State v. Little, the court
found sufficient suspicion to conduct a Terry stop where officers were
generally familiar with residents of a complex and did not recognize the
suspects, and the defendant subsequently fled from the officers. 116
Wn.2d at 497–98, 806 P.2d 749.
4.8 DIMENSIONS OF A PERMISSIBLE STOP
A valid Terry stop “must be temporary, lasting no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop,” and “the investigative
methods employed must be the least intrusive means reasonably available
to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.” State
v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 738, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984) (discussing
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229
(1983)); see also State v. Smith, 115 Wn.2d 775, 784–85, 801 P.2d 975
(1990). To determine whether the stop was valid, the court examines (1)
the purpose of the stop; (2) the amount of physical intrusion upon the
suspect’s liberty; and (3) the length of time the suspect is detained. State
v. Wheeler, 108 Wn.2d 230, 235, 737 P.2d 1005 (1987). This section
examines duration, investigative techniques, transporting the suspect, and
seizure of persons in proximity to the suspect.
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4.8(a) Duration
The U.S. Supreme Court has declined to set an absolute limit on the
permissible duration of a Terry stop in terms of minutes or hours. The
duration of a stop is evaluated by asking “whether the police diligently
pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the
[suspect].” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568,
84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985); see also Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064,
1080 82 (9th Cir. 2011) (45-minute detention permissible). If the
“investigation should have taken no more than a few minutes,” and the
officers unnecessarily delayed it, the stop is unlawful. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical
Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff Dept., 533 F.3d 780, 795 (9th
Cir. 2008) (the fact that officers needed a supervisor to clarify the law for
them was not a sufficient basis to extend the stop.).
“‘[A]n officer may briefly stop an individual based upon reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity if necessary to maintain the status quo while
obtaining more information.’” State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172, 43
P.3d 513 (2002) (quoting State v. Miller, 91 Wn. App. 181, 184, 955 P.2d
810 (1998)). In Washington, the court has found a 45-minute wait
permissible when it was caused by the defendant’s refusal to provide
identification. State v. Cunningham, 116 Wn. App. 219, 228–29, 65 P.3d
325 (2003). Similarly, officers may temporarily detain a suspect pending
results of a police radio check. State v. Perea, 85 Wn. App. 339, 342, 932
P.2d 1258 (1997). This also includes detaining a suspect in a room for
approximately 20 minutes while the robbery victim was brought to the
room for identification. State v. Moon, 45 Wn. App. 692, 695, 726 P.2d
1263 (1986), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Cheatam, 150 Wn.2d
626, 81 P.3d 830 (2003).
4.8(b) Investigative Techniques
During a Terry stop, the police may request both identification from
the suspect and a description of the suspect’s purpose in the area. State v.
Little, 116 Wn.2d 488, 495, 806 P.2d 749 (1991) (citing State v. White, 97
Wn.2d 92, 105, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982)); see also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S.
47, 51, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979). “An officer making a
Terry stop may ask a moderate number of questions to determine the
identity of the suspect and to confirm or dispel the officer’s
suspicions . . . .” State v. Heritage, 152 Wn.2d 210, 219, 95 P.3d 345
(2004). However, the officers must use the least intrusive means
reasonably available. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687, 105 S.
Ct. 1568, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985); State v. Johnston, 38 Wn. App. 793,
798–99, 690 P.2d 591 (1984) (ordering three juveniles out of the house at

1386

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:1277

gunpoint was not the least intrusive means possible to confirm suspicion
of burglary). The officer may expand the stop and use greater force such
as frisking, secluding, gun drawing, or cuffing if the officer perceives a
reasonable threat to his or her safety. State v. Mitchell, 80 Wn. App. 143,
145 46, 906 P.2d 1013 (1995); see infra § 4.10.
Police may not subject the suspect to custodial interrogation during
a Terry stop. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 211, 99 S. Ct. 2248,
60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979); Heritage, 152 Wn.2d at 219, 95 P.3d 345. The
police also may not transport the suspect to the police station for the
purposes of interrogation or fingerprinting, although it may be permissible
to fingerprint the suspect in the field. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811,
816 18, 105 S. Ct. 1643, 84 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1985).
4.8(c) Transporting the Suspect
Transporting a suspect to the police station “is usually impermissible
because it is not reasonably related to the investigation.” State v. Gardner,
28 Wn. App. 721, 727–28, 626 P.2d 56 (1981); see also Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. 200, 212–13, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979). Thus,
if there is no probable cause to arrest, such transportation is illegal. State
v. Gonzales, 46 Wn. App. 388, 396, 731 P.2d 1101 (1986) (handcuffing
and transporting a suspect to a police station before probable cause to
arrest arises constitutes an illegal arrest under the Fourth Amendment and
article I, section 7).
However, if the transportation is reasonably related to the
investigative purpose of the initial detention, it may be permissible.
Gardener, 28 Wn. App. at 728, 626 P.2d 56 (1981) (finding it lawful to
transport the suspect a short distance to the crime scene); see also State v.
Wheeler, 108 Wn.2d 230, 237, 737 P.2d 1005 (1987) (transporting the
suspect a short distance for identification purposes). An unrelated
emergency occurring nearby or other exceptional circumstances may also
warrant transportation. See State v. Sweet, 44 Wn. App. 226, 232–33, 721
P.2d 560 (1986) (stating a transport was permissible when police received
radio call summoning officers to an apparently unrelated crime scene a
block away and the suspect told them he was a lookout).
4.8(d) Detention of Persons in Proximity to Suspect
The mere fact that an individual is close in proximity to someone
who is suspected of criminal activity is insufficient to justify a Terry stop.
State v. Horrace, 144 Wn.2d 386, 398, 28 P.3d 753 (2001) (citing State v.
Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d 289, 295, 654 P.2d 96 (1982), abrogated on other
grounds by Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 124
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L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 9.2(b) (5th ed. 2012).
For example, a passenger must give some indication of suspicious
activity before the police can ask the passenger for identification. See State
v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689, 697, 92 P.3d 202 (2004) (citing State v. Larson,
93 Wn.2d 638, 642, 611 P.2d 771 (1980)); Horrace, 144 Wn.2d at 394, 28
P.3d 753 (holding reasonable suspicion existed to frisk passenger because
the driver was making furtive gestures as if handing the passenger
something even though the passenger did not move). In State v. Chelly, the
court found that the fact the passenger was not wearing a safety belt
provided the officer with the authority to detain him for a reasonable
period of time in order to identify him. 94 Wn. App. 254, 260, 970 P.2d
376 (1999).
4.8(e) Pretextual Traffic Stops
Pretextual traffic stops are impermissible under article I, section 7
when their purpose is to conduct a warrantless investigation of crime
unrelated to a traffic infraction. State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 353, 979
P.2d 833 (1999). In this respect, the Washington Constitution provides
greater protection because pretextual traffic stops have been found
permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Compare Gustafson v. Florida,
414 U.S. 260, 266, 94 S. Ct. 488, 38 L. Ed. 2d 456 (1973) (holding search
incident to arrest valid even though it followed an admittedly pretextual
traffic stop); with State v. Hehman, 90 Wn.2d 45, 50, 578 P.2d 527 (1978)
(declining to limit protection to that provided under federal law). For
further discussion of the Fourth Amendment requirements concerning
pretextual stops and a critique of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on the
matter, see generally Lewis R. Katz, “Lonesome Road”: Driving Without
the Fourth Amendment, 36 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1413 (2013).
Under article I, section 7, “the reasonable articulable suspicion that
a traffic infraction has occurred which justifies an exception to the [search]
warrant requirement for an ordinary traffic stop does not justify a stop for
criminal investigation.” State v. Myers, 117 Wn. App. 93, 98, 69 P.3d 367
(2003) (citing Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 349, 979 P.2d 833). “A stop for a
traffic infraction can be extended only when an officer has articulable facts
from which the officer could reasonably suspect criminal activity.” State
v. Lemus, 103 Wn. App. 94, 101, 11 P.3d 326 (2000) (internal quotations
omitted). If the initial traffic stop is unlawful, “the subsequent search and
fruits of that search are inadmissible.” State v. Gatewood, 163 Wn.2d 534,
542, 182 P.3d 426 (2008) (citing State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 4, 726
P.2d 445 (1986)). See generally infra Chapter 7 (exclusionary rule).

1388

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:1277

When determining if a traffic stop is pretextual, courts consider the
totality of the circumstances, including both the subjective intent of the
officer and the objective reasonableness of the officer’s behavior. State v.
Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 199, 275 P.3d 289 (2012); State v. Hoang, 101
Wn. App. 732, 742 43, 6 P.3d 602 (2000). In State v. Snapp, the court
found a stop was not pretextual because the officer could not see how
many occupants were inside the vehicle, the officer testified that he
routinely pulled people over who did not have their headlights illuminated,
and the car began moving in the opposite direction when his police car
came into view. 174 Wn.2d at 199 201, 275 P.3d 289.
In contrast, in State v. Ladson, the court held that the stop was
pretextual because the officer admitted the reason for the stop was rumored
drug use by one of the occupants. See 138 Wn.2d at 359 60, 979 P.2d 833
(1999). Likewise, in State v. DeSantiago, the court found a stop pretextual
because the officer believed the suspect had just bought or sold drugs and
he deliberately followed the suspect for ten blocks looking for a reason to
pull him over. 97 Wn. App. 446, 448, 983 P.2d 1173 (1999).
4.8(f) Mixed-Motive Traffic Stops
In State v. Arreola, the Washington Supreme Court distinguished
between the impermissible pretextual traffic stops in Ladson and the
permissible “mixed-motive” traffic stops. 176 Wn.2d at 297 300, 290
P.3d 983. A traffic stop falls under the latter category when it is based on
both legitimate and illegitimate grounds—i.e., partially grounded on
pretext. Id. The court held that a “mixed-motive” stop was constitutional
under article I, section 7:
a traffic stop is not unconstitutionally pretextual so long as
investigation of either criminal activity or a traffic infraction (or
multiple infractions), for which the officer has a reasonable
articulable suspicion, is an actual, conscious, and independent cause
of the traffic stop. In other words, despite other motivations or
reasons for the stop, a traffic stop should not be considered pretextual
so long as the officer actually and consciously makes an appropriate
and independent determination that addressing the suspected traffic
infraction (or multiple suspected infractions) is reasonably necessary
in furtherance of traffic safety and the general welfare.

Id. at 298, 290 P.3d 983. The ruling did not overrule Ladson, however.
See id. According to the court, the stop in Ladson continues to be
unconstitutional because the police officer’s reasons for stopping the car
were entirely pretextual. See id. at 298. The police officer in that case
recognized that reason for stopping the defendant’s vehicle was based on
an unsubstantiated street rumor, and only then did the officer notice the
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license plates were expired and think of pulling over the car. Id. The traffic
infraction was not an independent cause for the traffic stop. Id.
4.9 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON COMPELLED RESPONSES TO
INVESTIGATORY QUESTIONS
Even when a police officer possesses a reasonable suspicion and
makes a valid Terry stop, the officer may not compel the suspect to answer.
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6, 89 S. Ct. 1394, 22 L. Ed. 2d
676 (1969); State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 105 06, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982).
A suspect’s refusal to answer an investigating officer’s questions cannot
provide the basis for an arrest. White, 97 Wn.2d at 106, 640 P.2d 1061.
To remedy this limitation, Washington has enacted a stopand-identify statute to facilitate police investigations of ongoing or
imminent crimes. RCW 9A.76.020; State v. Lalonde, 35 Wn. App. 54, 57,
665 P.2d 421 (1983), review denied, 100 Wn.2d 1014 (1983) (finding the
statute constitutional as amended). The amended RCW 9A.76.020
provides, “A person is guilty of obstructing a law enforcement officer if
the person willfully hinders, delays, or obstructs any law enforcement
officer in the discharge of his or her official powers or duties.” However,
refusing to identify oneself, when viewed in isolation, is still insufficient
to support a charge of obstructing a law enforcement officer.” State v.
Steen, 164 Wn. App. 789, 265 P.3d 901 (2011), review denied as amended,
173 Wn.2d 1024 (2012).
4.10 GROUNDS FOR INITIATING A FRISK DURING A TERRY STOP
An officer conducting a valid Terry stop may conduct a limited
search for weapons to protect himself or herself or persons nearby from
physical harm. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d
889 (1968); State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 250, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009)
(citing State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 895, 168 P.3d 1265 (2007)). After
the officer has made a valid stop supported by reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity, a frisk may then be undertaken if the officer reasonably
believes that the “suspect is armed and ‘presently’ dangerous.” State v.
Xiong, 164 Wn.2d 506, 513 14, 191 P.3d 1278 (2008) (officers did not
have right to frisk the defendant because he cooperated with police, made
no attempt to flee, and could not reach his pockets). “Reasonable belief
that the suspect is armed and presently dangerous means . . . [that there is]
some basis from which the court can determine that the detention was not
arbitrary or harassing.” State v. Setterstrom, 163 Wn.2d 621, 626, 183 P.3d
1075 (2008) (emphasis removed) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(finding no reasonable belief when the suspect was under the influence,
lied about his name, and was nervous and fidgety). Once the officer dispels
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his belief that the suspect is armed, the frisk must end. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d
at 254 55, 207 P.3d 1266 (officer exceeded the scope of the search when
he continued to squeeze the defendant’s pocket after concluding there was
no weapon).
Washington requires the following for a valid frisk: (1) the initial
stop is legitimate; (2) there is a reasonable safety concern justifying a
protective frisk for weapons; and (3) the scope of the frisk is limited to
protective purposes. State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172, 43 P.3d 513
(2002). The fact that a detention occurs in a high-crime area is not in itself
sufficient to justify a search. See State v. Smith, 102 Wn.2d 449, 452 53,
688 P.2d 146 (1984) (holding that the inquiry must focus on the defendant
and his actions, not the area where he was found). Thus, police may not
frisk when they cannot articulate a reason for believing that a suspect is
dangerous other than that the suspect was seen leaving in his car from the
scene of a possible burglary. State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 740 41,
689 P.2d 1065 (1984). The most common situation is where the suspect
makes a furtive gesture or appears to be concealing something. State v.
Chang, 147 Wn. App. 490, 496, 195 P.3d 1008 (2008) (holding the search
of the passenger compartment of the car was valid when the suspect
appeared to be concealing something when police approached).
For certain crimes in which the offender is likely to be armed, the
right to conduct a protective search is much more accepted, but for other
crimes, such as possession of marijuana, additional circumstances must be
present. See United States v. Flatter, 456 F.3d 1154, 1158–59 (9th Cir.
2006) (absent other circumstances, a frisk was not proper for a postal
employee suspected of mail theft because it “is not a crime that is
frequently associated with weapons”); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 9.6(a), at 852 62 (5th ed. 2012). Consequently, in State v.
Guzman-Cuellar, an officer was justified in initiating a frisk where the
suspect matched the description of a murder suspect. 47 Wn. App. 326,
332, 734 P.2d 966 (1987). Likewise, in State v. Harvey, a frisk was
justified when the crime under investigation was burglary because it is
well known that burglars often carry weapons. 41 Wn. App. 870, 875, 707
P.2d 146 (1985).
The time of day can also contribute to the reasonableness of a
protective search. State v. Horrace, 144 Wn.2d 386, 398–99, 28 P.3d 753
(2001) (considering “early morning darkness” as a factor justifying a
protective search). Not only does “[t]he darkness ma[k]e it more difficult
for [the officer] to get a clear view into the car,” but “an individual who
has been stopped may be more willing to commit violence against a police
officer at a time when few people are likely to be present to witness it.”
State v. Collins, 121 Wn.2d 168, 174–75, 847 P.2d 919 (1993).
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Under certain circumstances, officers may seize evidence pursuant
to a Terry stop even in the absence of grounds for believing that the suspect
is armed and dangerous. For example, a police officer may seize property
from a suspect if the suspect’s actions give rise to a reasonable suspicion
that evidence of a crime is in danger of being destroyed. State v. Pressley,
64 Wn. App. 591, 598, 825 P.2d 749 (1992) (holding that officer asking
the suspect to remove her hand from her pocket after seeing a bag in the
suspect’s palm was proper given his experience with disposal of narcotics
and her furtive gesture); see also State v. Dorsey, 40 Wn. App. 459, 472,
698 P.2d 1109 (1985). However, some courts have expressly rejected this
rationale for a search. State v. Rodriguez–Torres, 77 Wn. App. 687, 693,
893 P.2d 650 (1995) (rejecting Pressley and stating that a Terry frisk may
be conducted only based on protective purposes).
4.10(a) Scope of a Permissible Frisk
A frisk must be justified in its inception and scope. State v. Hudson,
124 Wn.2d 107, 112, 874 P.2d 160 (1994). The scope of a valid frisk is
strictly limited to protective purposes. State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242,
250, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009); see also State v. Alcantara, 79 Wn. App. 362,
366, 901 P.2d 1087 (1995) (holding that a search exceeded the scope of a
Terry stop because the officer gave no indication that the search was based
on concerns for the officer’s safety). Thus, the officer may only conduct a
search of the suspect’s outer clothing for weapons that might be used to
harm the officer or others nearby. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 30, 88 S.
Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); Hudson, 124 Wn.2d at 112, 874 P.2d
160. However, a frisk need not conform to the conventional pat down.
Hudson, 124 Wn.2d at 112, 874 P.2d 160 (if pat down is inconclusive, the
officer may reach into the clothing); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 147 49, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972) (finding an officer
was justified in reaching through a window and removing a revolver from
the suspect’s waistband when officer knew that the suspect carried a gun
in his waistband and he refused to step out of the car). See generally 4
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §§ 9.5(b) 9.6(b) (5th ed. 2012).
When in the course of a frisk an officer feels what may be a weapon,
the officer may only take such action as is necessary to examine the object.
Hudson, 124 Wn.2d at 113, 874 P.2d 160 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88
S. Ct. 1868). See generally 4 LaFave, supra, § 9.6(c). Once police
ascertain that no weapon is involved, their authority to conduct even a
limited search ends. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d at 254, 207 P.3d 1266 (continuing
squeeze of pocket after the officer determined no weapon was present was
not permissible under the “plain feel” doctrine); Hudson, 124 Wn.2d at
113, 874 P.2d 160.

1392

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:1277

4.10(b) Frisks of Persons in Proximity to Suspect
Police may not frisk persons merely because they are present on the
premises of a place being lawfully searched. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85, 94, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979); see also supra §
3.8(a). Thus, a passenger frisk is justified “only [when] the officer is able
to point to specific, articulable facts giving rise to an objectively
reasonable belief that the passenger [may] be armed and dangerous.” State
v. Horrace, 144 Wn.2d 386, 399 400, 28 P.3d 753 (2001); State v. Parker,
139 Wn.2d 486, 489, 987 P.2d 73 (1999) (officers may not search purse
of passenger); see also State v. Larson, 93 Wn.2d 638, 641 42, 611 P.2d
771 (1980). In other words, whether an officer has a reasonable
apprehension of danger, depending on the nature of the crime, the time and
place of the arrest, the number of officers and suspects, and whether the
companion has made any threatening movements. See 4 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.6(a), at 871 73 (5th ed. 2012).
4.10(c) Protective Measures Other Than Frisks
An officer may take self-protective measures other than a frisk. For
instance, a police officer may order a driver who has been validly stopped
to get out of his or her car, regardless of whether the driver is suspected of
being armed or dangerous or whether the offense under investigation is
serious. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S. Ct. 330, 54 L.
Ed. 2d 331 (1977) (noting that intrusion is de minimis while risks
confronting an officer are substantial); State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 12,
726 P.2d 445 (1986). The Supreme Court of Washington, however, has
declined to extend Mimms to passengers of the vehicle under article I,
section 7, unless the officer has an objective reason based on safety
concerns. State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 220, 970 P.2d 722 (1999)
(declining to follow Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S. Ct. 882,
137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997)), abrogated in part on other grounds by Brendlin
v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2007);
see 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.6(a), at 885 n.192 (5th
ed. 2012).
If the officer is merely controlling the scene and not detaining the
passenger for investigatory reasons, he must meet the standard set out in
Mendez. Namely, he must be “able to articulate an objective rationale
predicated specifically on safety concerns . . . for ordering a passenger to
stay in the vehicle or to exit the vehicle.” Mendez, 137 Wn.2d at 220, 970
P.2d 722. However, if the purpose of the officer’s interaction with the
passenger is investigatory, then the interaction must meet the standard set
out in Terry, and the officer must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. State v. Horrace, 144 Wn.2d 386, 393, 28 P.3d 753 (2001).
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4.10(d) Search of Area: Measures Beyond Frisks
Officers may extend a Terry search for weapons to the passenger
compartment of a detained person’s vehicle “‘if there is a reasonable
suspicion that the suspect is dangerous and may gain access to a weapon
in the vehicle.’” State v. Glossbrener, 146 Wn.2d 670, 680–81, 49 P.3d
128 (2002) (quoting State v. Terrazas, 71 Wn. App. 873, 879, 863 P.2d 75
(1993)) (officer did not have concern for safety when he allowed suspect
to sit in the car while he checked for warrants and search was an
afterthought); see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 50, 103 S.
Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983). The search must be confined to the
area within the suspect’s immediate control. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d
1, 12, 726 P.2d 445 (1986). However, that includes immediate control
once the suspect has returned to the vehicle. Thus, the officer may still
search the compartment if both occupants of the vehicle are outside the car
and do not have access to the passenger compartment so long as the officer
intends to return them to the car following the stop. State v. Chang, 147
Wn. App. 490, 496, 195 P.3d 1008 (2008).
In State v. Kennedy, the court upheld a search where the officer
observed the suspect leaning forward as if to place something under his
seat while the officer was stopping the suspect’s vehicle for investigation
of a possible drug buy. 107 Wn.2d at 12, 726 P.2d 445. Likewise, in State
v. McIntosh, the search of the passenger compartment was lawful when
the driver of a vehicle was armed with a knife and a weapon-like object
was visibly protruding from under the passenger seat. 42 Wn. App. 579,
582 84, 712 P.2d 323 (1986).
A police officer may also search a container carried by a suspect who
is detained for questioning if the officer reasonably believes that the
suspect possesses a weapon. State v. Miller, 91 Wn. App. 181, 185 86,
955 P.2d 810 (1998) (officer could search a tin found with defendant that
was capable of holding a gun after officer found knife on the defendant);
State v. Franklin, 41 Wn. App. 409, 415, 704 P.2d 666 (1985) (finding
search of backpack proper when the defendant told the officer it contained
a firearm). For a discussion of whether an officer may search items carried
by a suspect, see generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
9.5(f) (5th ed. 2012).

CHAPTER 5
Warrantless Searches and Seizures:
Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
5.0 INTRODUCTION
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless justified by a
limited set of carefully drawn exceptions. State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177,
187–88, 275 P.3d 289 (2012); State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 171, 43
P.3d 513 (2002). Article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution
not only “prohibits unreasonable searches, but also provides no quarter for
ones that, in the context of the Fourth Amendment, would be deemed
reasonable [warrantless] searches and thus constitutional.” State v. Valdez,
167 Wn.2d 761, 772, 224 P.3d 751 (2009). “This creates ‘an almost
absolute bar to warrantless arrests, searches, and seizures.’” Id. (quoting
State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 690, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983)).
The State bears the burden of proving that a warrantless search or
seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. State
v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 746, 64 P.3d 594 (2003). Even when a search or
seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, the
search or seizure may be invalid if it infringes upon other rights. See
generally State v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 167 P.3d 1156 (2007) (holding
that search warrants for documents protected under the First Amendment
must have a higher standard of particularity).
The following sections examine the various exceptions to the warrant
requirement, including searches incident to a lawful arrest, the plain view
and open view doctrines, consent, exigent circumstances, Terry stops, and
inventory searches.
5.1 SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
Generally, police may conduct a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 63, 89 S. Ct. 2034,
23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969). Under article I, section 7, a custodial arrest
provides the necessary “authority of law” to search, so long as the arrest is
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lawful. State v. Grande, 164 Wn.2d 135, 139, 187 P.3d 248 (2008); State
v. Moore, 161 Wn.2d 880, 885, 169 P.3d 469 (2007). The rationale behind
this rule is to ensure officer safety and to prevent the concealment or
destruction of evidence. State v. MacDicken, 171 Wn. App. 169, 174–75,
286 P.3d 413 (2012). The search, however, may only extend to the area
within the arrestee’s “immediate control”—the area in which an arrestee
may be able to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence. Chimel, 395 U.S. at
762 63, 89 S. Ct. 2034. Thus, “searching any room other than that in
which an arrest occurs” or “searching through all the desk drawers or other
closed or concealed areas in that room itself” is not justified absent a
search warrant. Id. at 763, 89 S. Ct. 2034.
This exception to the warrant requirement applies, however, only
when (1) there was a lawful arrest, and (2) the search incident to the arrest
was “restricted in time and place in relation to the arrestee and the arrest,”
as opposed to being “a wide-ranging exploratory, rummaging, ransacking”
search. State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 127, 135, 559 P.2d 970 (1977). For a
discussion of automobile searches incident to arrest, see infra § 5.1(c).
As the following sections demonstrate, while Washington’s search
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement is similar to the
federal exception, it is subject to a different analysis under the Washington
Constitution.
5.1(a) Lawful Arrest
Chapter 4 discusses the criteria for a lawful arrest. If the arrest is
invalid, then the search incident to the arrest is invalid as well. State v.
Moore, 161 Wn.2d 880, 885–86, 169 P.3d 469 (2007); State v. Hehman,
90 Wn.2d 45, 50, 578 P.2d 527 (1978); State v. Terrazas, 71 Wn. App.
873, 878, 863 P.2d 75 (1993). If an arrest is lawful, then a search incident
to that arrest may be permissible. State v. Pulfrey, 154 Wn.2d 517, 522–
23, 111 P.3d 1162 (2005).
In Washington, however, even when an arrest is valid, a search is not
properly “incident” to the arrest if the arrest is merely a pretext for
conducting a search to obtain evidence of a different offense. State v.
Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 353, 979 P.2d 833 (1999) (declining to interpret
article I, section 7 according to federal law, under which pretextual traffic
stops did not violate the Fourth Amendment, because the Washington
State constitution “requires we look beyond the formal justification for the
stop to the actual one”). Furthermore, additional searches of the same
individual made in retaliation for the defendant’s previous criminal
behavior are unreasonable. State v. Carner, 28 Wn. App. 439, 445–46, 624
P.2d 204 (1981). For discussion of the need for the search to be
contemporaneous with the arrest, see infra § 5.3.
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The search incident to arrest exception requires a custodial arrest. See
State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 587, 62 P.3d 489 (2003); State v. Radka,
120 Wn. App. 43, 50, 83 P.3d 1038 (2004) (search of vehicle not valid as
incidental to arrest because driver’s detention at a traffic stop was
noncustodial); see also State v. McKenna, 91 Wn. App. 554, 564, 958 P.2d
1017 (1998) (search unreasonable because noncustodial arrest had ended).
Under article I, section 7, a custodial arrest provides the “authority of law”
for the search. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d at 585, 62 P.3d 489. In Washington, a
custodial arrest for minor traffic violations is generally not permitted. See
RCW 46.64.015; State v. Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685, 689 90, 835 P.2d 1019
(1992). Rather, officers are required to cite and release motorists stopped
for minor traffic offenses if the motorist gives a signed promise to appear
in court. See RCW 46.64.015; Reding, 119 Wn.2d at 689–90, 835 P.2d
1019. Moreover, officers explicitly lack authority to arrest after witnessing
only a minor traffic infraction. RCW 46.63.020. Thus, a search is generally
unlawful if it is incident to a stop for a minor traffic violation. See
Terrazas, 71 Wn. App. at 876–78, 863 P.2d 75.
Police officers are authorized to make a custodial arrest for a traffic
violation if (1) the violation is one of the “nonminor” traffic violations
specifically designated in RCW 10.31.100, or (2) the motorist is a
nonresident. See RCW 46.64.015(1)–(2). Absent either of these
conditions, police need other reasonable grounds to arrest and conduct a
valid search incident to arrest if a motorist is stopped for a “minor” traffic
violation. See Reding, 119 Wn.2d at 691–92, 835 P.2d 1019 (upholding
custodial arrest for the nonminor offense of reckless driving); Terrazas,
71 Wn. App. at 875–78, 863 P.2d 75 (an officer may arrest a defendant for
driving without a valid driver’s license only if facts suggest the defendant
will not appear in court if cited and released).
Property seized incident to a lawful arrest may be used to prosecute
the arrested person for a crime other than the one for which the person was
initially arrested so long as the initial arrest was not merely a pretext to
conduct a search for evidence of some other offense. State v. Cormier, 100
Wn. App. 457, 463, 997 P.2d 950 (2000) (evidence from a search of the
defendant was admissible after the defendant’s lawful arrest for assaulting
an officer, even though the defendant assaulted the officer after being
illegally stopped). In State v. Smith, after police lawfully arrested the
defendant for consuming liquor in public, the court held that the drug
paraphernalia found in the defendant’s fanny pack was admissible. State
v. Smith, 119 Wn.2d 675, 684, 835 P.2d 1025 (1992); see also State v.
Gammon, 61 Wn. App. 858, 863, 812 P.2d 885 (1991); State v.
LaTourette, 49 Wn. App. 119, 127–29, 741 P.2d 1033 (1987); State v.
White, 44 Wn. App. 276, 278, 722 P.2d 118 (1986).

1398

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:1277

5.1(b) “Immediate Control”
There is no hard and fast rule for determining whether the area
searched or the object seized was within the “immediate control” of the
defendant under the Fourth Amendment. The court has considered various
factors, including (1) whether the arrestee was physically restrained; (2)
the position of the officer in relation to the defendant and the place
searched; (3) the difficulty of gaining access into the container or
enclosure searched; and (4) the number of officers present as compared
with the number of arrestees or other persons. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 6.3(c), at 462 75 (5th ed. 2012); see also id. § 7.1(b),
at 676–79. For the purposes of a search incident to an arrest, an object or
container is considered within the control of an arrestee if the object was
within the arrestee’s reach immediately prior to arrest or at the moment of
arrest. State v. Smith, 119 Wn.2d 675, 681, 835 P.2d 1025 (1992)
(upholding search of a fanny pack that was within one or two steps of the
defendant at the time of the arrest); see also United States v. Turner, 926
F.2d 883, 888 (9th Cir. 1991) (plastic baggies under arrestee’s pillow were
within immediate control of arrestee who was on the bed when he was
arrested); United States v. Andersson, 813 F.2d 1450, 1455–56 (9th Cir.
1987) (closed suitcase on the bed next to arrestee was searchable incident
to arrest “as long as the search of the suitcase occurred at about the same
time of the arrest”).
Article I, section 7 places greater restraints on a search incident to
arrest in someone’s home, compared to the Fourth Amendment. Entry into
rooms beyond the immediate control of the suspect requires that police
have a reasonable fear for their safety or a reasonable belief that the
arrestee is about to destroy evidence or escape. State v. Chrisman, 100
Wn.2d 814, 815, 821, 676 P.2d 419 (1984); see also State v. Boyer, 124
Wn. App. 593, 602, 102 P.3d 833 (2004) (warrantless protective sweep of
basement rooms that belonged to an upstairs apartment not justified when
search was done incident to execution of a search warrant for a basement
apartment); 3 LaFave, supra §§ 6.3(c), at 468, 6.4(a) (c), at 476 510,
7.1(b), at 693.
Conversely, under the Fourth Amendment, and in certain limited
situations, some courts have permitted police to extend a search incident
to an arrest in the home into an area that is beyond the arrestee’s immediate
control. If the police permit an arrestee to move into other rooms to gather
clothing, for example, the police may accompany the arrestee and search
the rooms and any areas, such as closets or bureau drawers, where the
arrestee has been. See id. § 6.4(a), at 477 80. Federal courts have also
permitted police to search premises to determine whether accomplices
who could aid the arrestee are present, see id. § 6.4(b), at 484, and to
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conduct a protective sweep of the premises when the officers fear that third
parties may offer resistance, id. § 6.4(c), at 488–90. See also Maryland v.
Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333–36, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990).
Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may search an arrestee in
custody even when the officer does not believe that the arrestee is armed
or in possession of evidence of the crime for which the suspect was
arrested. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38
L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973). The lawful arrest establishes the authority to search
the arrestee; the arresting officer need not have a subjective fear that an
arrestee is armed or will destroy evidence. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S.
260, 263–64, 94 S. Ct. 488, 38 L. Ed. 2d 456 (1973). The rule applies even
when the custodial arrest follows a stop for a minor traffic violation, unless
such an arrest would be illegal. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235, 94 S. Ct. 467;
see State v. Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685, 691 92, 835 P.2d 1019 (1992).
However, if a police officer merely cites a driver for speeding without
making an arrest, a search is impermissible. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S.
113, 118 19, 119 S. Ct. 484, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1998).
Under article I, section 7, an arrestee’s diminished expectation of
privacy permits an officer to search an arrestee’s clothing, including small
containers found on the arrestee. See, e.g., Smith, 119 Wn.2d at 681 82,
835 P.2d 1025 (upholding search of fanny pack following lawful arrest);
State v. Gammon, 61 Wn. App. 858, 864, 812 P.2d 885 (1991) (upholding
search of prescription pill bottle found on defendant following lawful
arrest); State v. White, 44 Wn. App. 276, 278–79, 722 P.2d 118 (1986)
(upholding police examination of cosmetic case found in arrestee’s coat
pocket). In addition, an arrestee does not have to be in actual physical
possession of a container at the time of the search so long as the container
is within the arrestee’s reach. Smith, 119 Wn.2d at 681, 835 P.2d 1025.
Further, evidence seized pursuant to the search of an arrestee’s person does
not need to relate to the crime for which the defendant was arrested, nor
must the grounds for the initial search encompass the evidence seized. See
id. (allowing admission of drug paraphernalia found in a fanny pack during
a search subsequent to a lawful arrest for consuming liquor in public); see
also Gammon, 61 Wn. App. at 863, 812 P.2d 885; State v. LaTourette, 49
Wn. App. 119, 127 28, 741 P.2d 1033 (1987); White, 44 Wn. App. at 278,
722 P.2d 118. A greater expectation of privacy is extended, however, to
possessions that are not closely related to the person’s clothing, such as
“purses, briefcases or luggage,” and some additional reason must be
present to justify the search of those items. White, 44 Wn. App. at 279,
722 P.2d 118; see also State v. Kealey, 80 Wn. App. 162, 170, 907 P.2d
319 (1995) (stating that “a purse is inevitably associated with an

1400

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:1277

expectation of privacy”). For a discussion of the search of purses in
conjunction with automobile searches, see infra § 5.3(b).
An intrusion into a suspect’s body, such as a draw of blood samples,
is a search and seizure under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth
Amendment. State v. Dunivin, 65 Wn. App. 501, 507, 828 P.2d 1150
(1992). It may be justified under the exigent circumstances exception
rather than the search incident to arrest exception. Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 71, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966);
see 3 LaFave, supra § 5.3(c), at 215. See generally infra § 5.13(b) and
supra § 3.13(b). For example, in Washington, bodily intrusions are
authorized by statute in order to allow police to take blood samples of
motorists arrested for certain serious traffic violations. See RCW
46.20.308(4). If the suspect is attempting to swallow apparent contraband,
less intrusive physical measures, such as a choke-hold, are permissible.
See State v. Taplin, 36 Wn. App. 664, 666 67, 676 P.2d 504 (1984); State
v. Williams, 16 Wn. App. 868, 871 72, 560 P.2d 1160 (1977). Officers
attempting to prevent a suspect from swallowing evidence may not,
however, prevent the suspect from breathing or obstruct the suspect’s
blood supply to the head, although they may pinch his nose shut. Williams,
16 Wn. App. at 872, 560 P.2d 1160. For a brief discussion of postdetention body searches, see infra § 6.2(c).
5.1(c) Vehicles and Containers
Under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, police
may not search the passenger compartment of an automobile as a search
incident to the arrest of the occupant except in certain circumstances.
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485
(2009); State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 197, 275 P.3d 289 (2012).
However, Washington’s application of the search incident to arrest
exception in the context of vehicles is much narrower than the Fourth
Amendment application. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d at 192, 275 P.3d 289
(declining to adopt federal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment for
article I, section 7). In Washington, an officer may search the vehicle only
when there are (1) concerns for officer safety, or (2) concerns for
destruction of the evidence. Id. passim; State v. Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 761,
772, 224 P.3d 751 (2009); State v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 395, 219 P.3d
651 (2009). Once the defendant is in custody, fears for officer safety or
destruction of the evidence evaporate. Patton, 167 Wn.2d at 395, 219 P.3d
651. Thus, once a defendant is handcuffed, removed from the vehicle, or
placed in a police vehicle, there can be no vehicle search. Id. In contrast,
under the more expansive exception to the Fourth Amendment, an officer
may search if the officer believes that evidence relevant to the crime of
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arrest will be found in the vehicle. Gant, 556 U.S. at 355, 129 S. Ct. 1710.
For a more detailed explanation of vehicle searches, see infra § 5.15.
5.2 PRE-ARREST SEARCH
If a warrantless search is closely related in time and place to a lawful
arrest, the search may be considered incidental to the arrest and valid as
long as probable cause to arrest exists at the time of the search, even if the
search occurs before the arrest. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111,
100 S. Ct. 2556, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1980); State v. Harrel, 83 Wn. App.
393, 400, 923 P.2d 698 (1996). If probable cause does not exist at the time
of the search, a search that provides probable cause is not considered a
valid search incidental to the arrest. Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 543, 110
S. Ct. 1288, 108 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1990) (warrantless search of the
defendant’s paper bag could not be justified as a search incidental to arrest
when the bag contained drug paraphernalia and the search was followed
by the arrest of the defendant for drug abuse). See generally 3 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.5(a) (5th ed. 2012).
Under limited circumstances, pre-arrest searches are permitted even
when the arrest does not closely follow the search. See generally 3 LaFave,
supra § 5.4(b). A search may be considered incidental to the arrest of a
suspect in the following circumstances: (1) the police have probable cause;
(2) the police believe the suspect is in the process of destroying highly
evanescent evidence; and (3) the evidence can be preserved by a limited
search. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296, 93 S. Ct. 2000, 36 L. Ed. 2d
900 (1973). See generally 3 LaFave, supra § 5.4(b). Pre-arrest searches
are Terry searches, see supra § 2.9(b), and should be subject to the same
standard applied and discussed in sections 4.5 through 4.9.
5.3 POST-DETENTION SEARCHES: SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST AND
INVENTORY SEARCHES
5.3(a) Post-Detention Searches Incident to Arrest
The search incident to arrest exception can apply to a search at both
the place of detention as well as the place of arrest. See generally 3 Wayne
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.3(a) (5th ed. 2012). However, a
significant delay between the arrest and the search may render the search
unreasonable if the search is no longer contemporaneous with the arrest.
State v. Smith, 119 Wn.2d 675, 683, 835 P.2d 1025 (1992) (delay of 17
minutes between arrest and search of a fanny pack was not unreasonable
under the circumstances). Whether a delay is sufficient to render a search
unreasonable under the search incident to arrest exception depends on the
facts of the individual case. Id. at 683 n.4, 835 P.2d 1025; see State v.
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Boursaw, 94 Wn. App. 629, 635, 976 P.2d 130 (1999) (a 10-minute delay
between arrest and arrival of dog to complete search by sniffing behind
vehicle’s ashtray was reasonable). Likewise, any post-arrest search is
unlawful if probable cause to arrest dissipates by the time the suspect is
taken into custody. State v. Lemus, 103 Wn. App. 94, 105, 11 P.3d 326
(2000) (search of vehicle was invalid because no probable cause existed
to arrest driver prior to police performing a positive field test for cocaine
powder found from vehicle search).
Under article I, section 7, when an arrestee is searched upon booking,
officers may later conduct a warrantless “second look” into the arrestee’s
belongings. State v. Cheatam, 150 Wn.2d 626, 642, 81 P.3d 830 (2003);
see also United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 805, 94 S. Ct. 1234, 39
L. Ed. 2d 771 (1974) (a search of the defendant’s clothing long after the
defendant had been searched and placed in a jail cell was a permissible
search incident to an arrest). An arrestee no longer has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his personal items once state officials have
viewed them during a valid inventory search. Cheatam, 150 Wn.2d at 642,
81 P.3d 830. The same is true for a pretrial detainee transferred to a
hospital for a competency evaluation. State v. Puapuaga, 164 Wn.2d 515,
523, 192 P.3d 360 (2008). Additionally, the police do not need a warrant
when comparing an individual’s DNA profile already in the State’s
possession with evidence from a new crime scene. State v. Gregory, 158
Wn.2d 759, 828, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006), overruled on other grounds by
State v. W.R., Jr., 181 Wn.2d 757, 760, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014).
A difficult question arises when police detain a suspect only because
the police have failed to comply with laws allowing release. See generally
3 LaFave, supra § 5.3(d). A search conducted after police have decided to
release a suspect is improper when there is no probability that the suspect
possesses relevant evidence or weapons. State v. Carner, 28 Wn. App.
439, 445, 624 P.2d 204 (1981). Similarly, a search based on consent from
someone who was illegally detained is invalid. State v. Avila–Avina, 99
Wn. App. 9, 14 15, 991 P.2d 720 (2000), abrogated, State v.
Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009); State v. O’Day, 91
Wn. App. 244, 253, 955 P.2d 860 (1998) (search was invalid where “the
illegality and the consent were contemporaneous”).
5.3(b) Post-Detention Inventory Search
Under article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, police officers
may search containers or packages as part of an inventory of the arrestee’s
possessions prior to storing the items for safekeeping. Illinois v. Lafayette,
462 U.S. 640, 643 48, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 77 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1983); State v.
Smith, 76 Wn. App. 9, 16, 882 P.2d 190 (1994). However, an inventory
search that is “a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover
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incriminating evidence” is unreasonable. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4,
110 S. Ct. 1632, 109 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990); State v. Mireles, 73 Wn. App.
605, 871 P.2d 162 (1994).
Consistent with the greater protection provided under article I,
section 7, inventory searches in Washington must be conducted “‘in good
faith for the purposes of (1) finding, listing, and securing from loss during
detention property belonging to a detained person; (2) protecting police
from liability due to dishonest claims of theft; and (3) protecting temporary
storage bailees against false charges.’” Smith, 76 Wn. App. at 16, 882 P.2d
190 (quoting State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424, 428, 518 P.2d 703 (1974)).
Thus, it is reasonable for police, as part of routine procedure before
incarcerating an arrestee, to search any container or article in the arrestee’s
possession according to inventory procedures. Id. (upholding the search of
defendant’s purse upon arrival to jail). But see State v. Smith, 56 Wn. App.
145, 150 52, 783 P.2d 95 (1989) (holding that a booking search of an
arrestee’s purse was unlawful because she was not given timely
opportunity to post bail, and police were not concerned that she was
carrying weapons). Officers may also conduct an inventory search of a
validly impounded automobile and its containers. See Colorado v. Bertine,
479 U.S. 367, 374 75, 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987); State v.
McFadden, 63 Wn. App. 441, 448, 820 P.2d 53 (1991), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Adel, 136 Wn.2d 629, 640, 965 P.2d 1072 (1998); see
also infra § 5.19.
Inventory searches, however, are not unlimited in scope, and “must
be restricted to effectuating the purposes that justify their exception to the
Fourth Amendment.” State v. Dugas, 109 Wn. App. 592, 597–98, 36 P.3d
577 (2001) (holding that while police could inventory arrestee’s jacket,
they could not search the closed container within the jacket when there
was no indication of dangerous contents or illegal drugs). See generally 3
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.5(b) (5th ed. 2012).
5.4 SEARCHES CONDUCTED IN GOOD FAITH AND WITHOUT PURPOSE OF
FINDING EVIDENCE: COMMUNITY CARETAKING AND
MEDICAL EMERGENCY
The police also do not need a warrant to assist persons who are
seriously injured or threatened with such injury. Brigham City v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006); State v.
Guevara, 172 Wn. App. 184, 288 P.3d 1167 (2012). This “community
caretaking” exception is “totally divorced from the detection,
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a
criminal statute,” Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S. Ct. 2523,
37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973), and is distinct from the “exigent circumstances”
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exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Leupp, 96 Wn. App. 324,
330, 980 P.2d 765 (1999). Both exceptions involve instances “in which
the police must act immediately, but for distinctly different purposes.”
State v. Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 387 n.39, 5 P.3d 668 (2000). Unlike the
exigent circumstances exception, “community caretaking” arises from a
police officer’s responsibility to come to the aid of persons in danger. Id.
Additionally, if officers undertake a search as part of their “community
caretaking” function, any evidence discovered may be admissible. See
State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 802 03, 92 P.3d 228 (2004)
(community caretaking function does not include simply retrieving a
guest’s jacket from defendant’s home).
Whether a search or seizure made for such “noncriminal
noninvestigatory purposes is reasonable depends on a balancing of the
individual’s interest in freedom from police interference against the
public’s interest in having the police perform this ‘community caretaking
function.’” Kalmas v. Wagner, 133 Wn.2d 210, 216 17, 943 P.2d 1369
(1997). Thus, even when police lack probable cause to believe a crime has
been committed, they may conduct a warrantless search of the premises
when the premises contains any of the following: (1) persons in imminent
danger of death or harm; (2) objects likely to burn, explode, or otherwise
cause harm; or (3) information that will disclose the location of a
threatened victim or the existence of such a threat. State v. Downey, 53
Wn. App. 543, 545, 768 P.2d 502 (1989); see also State v. Menz, 75 Wn.
App. 351, 353 56, 880 P.2d 48 (1994) (police entry was justified in
response to a domestic violence call).
The “community caretaking” exception, however, must be motivated
by a need to render assistance, and cannot be used as simply a “pretext for
conducting an evidentiary search.” State v. Schlieker, 115 Wn. App. 264,
270, 62 P.3d 520 (2003) (held search invalid when officers failed to
inquire about the defendants’ safety and proceeded to search for drugs).
See generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.5(d) (5th ed.
2012). Consequently, the officer must be able to articulate specific facts
and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that justify the warrantless
entry. State v. Davis, 86 Wn. App. 414, 420, 937 P.2d 1110 (1997) (entry
was proper when, after check-out time, the motel occupant did not respond
to repeated telephone calls and knocks at the door). Finally, however, no
court has yet fully articulated the precise contours of this exception,
including whether and to what extent it applies to a search of a home. See
Feis v. King County Sheriff’s Dep’t., 165 Wn. App. 525, 545−47, 267 P.3d
1022 (2011).
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5.4(a) Minors
The community caretaking exception may apply when officers are
attempting to protect children. State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 64 P.3d 594
(2003). When determining whether police have exceeded their scope of
authority in trying to protect children under community caretaking, courts
consider various circumstances, including whether a minor is found late at
night, unaccompanied by a parent. See State v. Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 5
P.3d 668 (2000). In Kinzy, police physically detained a 16-year-old girl
after seeing her walking in downtown Seattle at 10 p.m. on a weeknight
with an adult male known to be involved with narcotics. Id. at 378, 5 P.3d
668. The court held that under the community caretaking exception, police
could approach Kinzy and ask if she needed help, but without articulable
suspicion that she had committed a criminal offense, police could not
physically detain her. Id. at 395, 5 P.3d 668. In contrast, in Acrey, the court
upheld the detention of a 12-year-old, whom the officers found while
responding to a 911 call on a weeknight, after midnight, in an isolated area,
and with no adult supervision. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d at 742 43, 64 P.3d 594.
Police contacted the mother, who asked police to give the boy a ride home.
Id. at 743, 64 P.3d 594. Before transporting the boy in the police car, police
conducted a pat-down frisk for safety purposes and found drugs. Id. The
court held that the police acted reasonably in this instance because there
was a heightened concern that Acrey may be engaging in conduct that
could bring harm to himself or others. Id. at 751, 64 P.3d 594. The court
found persuasive the young age of the defendant, the late hour, and his
presence in an isolated area without adults. Id. at 752, 64 P.3d 594. Most
importantly, the officers had initially made a Terry stop of the defendant
to investigate a possible crime. Id.
5.4(b) Rendering Aid to Victims
Courts of appeal have recognized that police may make a warrantless
entry into a residence in response to a report of ongoing domestic violence.
State v. Menz, 75 Wn. App. 351, 353 56, 880 P.2d 48 (1994). “Police
officers responding to a domestic violence report have a duty to ensure the
present and continued safety and wellbeing of the occupants” of a
residence. State v. Raines, 55 Wn. App. 459, 465, 778 P.2d 538 (1989). In
deciding whether police entry was lawful, the court can consider the
specific instance and likelihood of domestic violence as it relates to the
requirements of the emergency-aid exception. State v. Schultz, 170 Wn.2d
746, 750, 248 P.3d 484 (2011) (a report of a couple yelling, the presence
of “loud voices,” and an agitated woman answering the door was not
enough to uphold a warrantless entry).
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When the medical emergency is a homicide, officers may enter to aid
the victim and make a quick check to see if the perpetrator or other victims
are present. See Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 14, 120 S. Ct. 7, 145
L. Ed. 2d 16 (1999) (noting that, while officers may enter a murder scene
to aid victims or to see if the perpetrator is present, there is no general
“murder scene” warrant exception). Thus, the police may seize any
evidence observed in plain view during the course of legitimate police
emergency activities. State v. Stevenson, 55 Wn. App. 725, 729–30, 780
P.2d 873 (1989); see infra § 5.5. Any such search must be brief; a general
exploratory search lasting several hours is not permissible. Thompson v.
Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 21, 105 S. Ct. 409, 83 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1984).
In the course of rendering aid, police may conduct a warrantless
search of a victim’s personal effects so long as the search is motivated by
a need to render assistance. State v. Loewen, 97 Wn.2d 562, 568, 647 P.2d
489 (1982) (the search of the defendant’s tote bag for identification was
improper when the defendant regained consciousness prior to the search).
The scope of the search must remain limited to whatever is reasonable to
conduct the community caretaking function, and the necessity must exist
at the time of the search. Id. at 568, 647 P.2d 489; State v. Schroeder, 109
Wn. App. 30, 45, 32 P.3d 1022 (2001) (searching coat pocket for
identification of suicide victim was beyond scope of community
caretaking function because the deceased no longer needed emergency
medical attention, and the object of the search was not in plain view); State
v. Dempsey, 88 Wn. App. 918, 922, 947 P.2d 265 (1997), abrogated on
other grounds by State v. Neeley, 113 Wn. App. 100, 52 P.3d 539 (2002).
5.4(c) Property Damage
Similarly, police may make a warrantless entry to protect property,
and in doing so, may seize evidence in plain view. State v. Bakke, 44 Wn.
App. 830, 839 41, 723 P.2d 534 (1986). Firefighters may enter a house to
extinguish a fire and immediately thereafter conduct a limited warrantless
investigation to determine the fire’s cause. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.
499, 510, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1978). Once a fire has been
extinguished, however, a warrant is required for arson investigators to
search the premises to investigate a possible criminal cause of the fire.
Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294 95, 104 S. Ct. 641, 78 L. Ed. 2d
477 (1984); Tyler, 436 U.S. at 511, 98 S. Ct. 1942.
5.4(d) Second Entry
Police officers may enter a private residence without a warrant when
officials of another government agency have validly entered the residence
and discovered contraband. State v. Bell, 108 Wn.2d 193, 201, 737 P.2d
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254 (1987) (marijuana-growing operation discovered in plain view by
firefighters justified a warrantless entry and seizure by police), abrogated
on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S. Ct. 2301,
110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990). However, the entry of the initial party must be
valid. State v. Browning, 67 Wn. App. 93, 97, 834 P.2d 84 (1992)
(contraband sighted during building inspector’s entry could not be used as
the basis for later police entry under warrant because inspector’s initial
entry was unlawful).
5.5 THE “OPEN VIEW” AND “PLAIN VIEW” DOCTRINES DISTINGUISHED
Courts have used the “plain view” and “open view” doctrines
interchangeably to describe a variety of situations, but the two doctrines
are distinct. See State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 901–02, 632 P.2d 44
(1981); State v. Barnes, 158 Wn. App. 602, 612, 243 P.3d 165 (2010).
“Open view” often describes one of two situations: (1) a search in which
an officer observes an item that is exposed to public view in a public place
or in a location that is not constitutionally protected; or (2) a search in
which an officer, standing in an unprotected area, observes an object that
is located inside a constitutionally protected area. Barnes, 158 Wn. App.
at 612, 243 P.3d 165; State v. Perez, 41 Wn. App. 481, 483, 704 P.2d 625
(1985); see also State v. O’Herron, 153 N.J. Super. 570, 579, 380 A.2d
728 (1977) (discussing the “chameleon-like quality of the phrase ‘plain
view’”) (quoting Brown v. State, 15 Md. App. 584, 606, 292 A.2d 762
(1972)); 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.2(a), at 596 97 (5th
ed. 2012). The “open view” doctrine is characterized by the defendant’s
lower expectation of privacy because in both cases the officer views the
contraband from an unprotected place. See supra § 1.3. The plain view
doctrine, as opposed to the open view doctrine, may justify the seizure of
objects without a warrant. See generally LaFave, supra § 2.2(a). This
doctrine usually applies to the discovery and seizure of an object after
entry into a constitutionally protected area. See generally id.
5.6 “OPEN VIEW”
In the first situation, the discovery of an object in a public place or in
a location that is not constitutionally protected is not a true search because
the defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in objects exposed
to public view. State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 392, 909 P.2d 280 (1996).
Thus, this situation is referred to as “open view” and not “plain view.”
State v. Dykstra, 84 Wn. App. 186, 191 n.4, 926 P.2d 929 (1996); see
supra § 1.3.
Likewise, in the second instance, an officer viewing contraband in a
protected area while standing in an unprotected place also constitutes an
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“open view” situation. State v. Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304, 312, 4 P.3d 130
(2000). This is because a search does not occur when an object located in
a protected area is merely observed from a location in an unprotected area.
See id. at 312–13, 4 P.3d 130. However, even if observations from an
unprotected vantage point do not constitute a search, privacy rights are
implicated when police enter a constitutionally protected area to seize an
object. See State v. Dyreson, 104 Wn. App. 703, 713 14, 17 P.3d 668
(2001). In other words, “[w]herever the eye may go, the body of the
policeman may not necessarily follow.” Charles E. Moylan, Jr., The Plain
View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great “Search Incident”
Geography Battle, 26 Mercer L. Rev. 1047, 1096 (1975); see also Dykstra,
84 Wn. App. at 192 93, 926 P.2d 929.
Therefore, although the “open view” doctrine may justify observing
an object located in a constitutionally protected area, it will not justify
seizing the object but may serve as the basis for a search warrant. See
Dykstra, 84 Wn. App. at 191, 926 P.2d 929; State v. Mierz, 72 Wn. App.
783, 791, 866 P.2d 65 (1994), aff’d, 127 Wn.2d 460, 901 P.2d 286 (1995)
(view of prohibited coyote pups from legal vantage point outside of the
defendant’s fence did not justify an officer’s warrantless entry onto
property); State v. Ferro, 64 Wn. App. 181, 182, 824 P.2d 500 (1992).
In limited instances, seizure of an object may be permissible under
the “open view” doctrine if an officer is reasonably certain that a container
holds contraband based on the container’s appearance. State v. Courcy, 48
Wn. App. 326, 330, 739 P.2d 98 (1987) (a paper “bindle” containing
cocaine was observed by an officer during a lawful investigative stop).
This is because “‘some containers . . . by their very nature cannot support
any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be
inferred from their outward appearance.’” Id. (quoting Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1979)).
Consequently, the suspect does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy that would prevent opening the container or field-testing its
contents. Courcy, 48 Wn. App. at 330, 739 P.2d 98.
5.7 CRITERIA FOR FALLING WITHIN THE “PLAIN VIEW” EXCEPTION
5.7(a) Discovery of Object in Plain View Following Entry into
a Constitutionally Protected Area: Requirements
In contrast to “open view,” “plain view” often involves an officer
lawfully entering a constitutionally protected area and unexpectedly
discovering incriminating evidence. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971);
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State v. Rodriguez, 65 Wn. App. 409, 416, 828 P.2d 636 (1992). For a
warrantless seizure to fall within this “plain view” exception, the following
two requirements must be met: (1) the police must have a prior
justification for the intrusion into the constitutionally protected area; and
(2) the police must immediately realize that the object they observe is
evidence—the incriminating character of the evidence must be
immediately apparent. State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 395, 166 P.3d 698
(2007); see also State v. Cotten, 75 Wn. App. 669, 683, 879 P.2d 971
(1994) (shotgun did not come within the plain view doctrine when it was
not immediately apparent to FBI officers that the gun was evidence of a
crime). Previously, courts imposed a third requirement: the discovery of
the incriminating evidence must be inadvertent. See Cotten, 75 Wn. App.
at 683, 879 P.2d 971. However, neither article I, section 7, nor the Fourth
Amendment still require inadvertent discovery to justify a seizure under
the plain view exception. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130, 110
S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990); State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107,
114 n.1, 874 P.2d 160 (1994) (noting the Horton revision to the plain view
test).
5.7(a)(1) Prior Justification for Intrusion
The plain view doctrine applies only when police are lawfully
occupying the position from which they observe the illegal object or
activity. State v. McKague, 143 Wn. App. 531, 539, 178 P.3d 1035 (2008).
Thus, if an initial entry into a residence or onto property is illegal,
confiscation of evidence will constitute an illegal seizure. Id.; see also
State v. Kull, 155 Wn.2d 80, 85, 118 P.3d 307 (2005). Similarly, when the
initial stop of a vehicle is unlawful—the police therefore having no right
to be in a position to observe the vehicle’s interior—the observation of
contraband within the vehicle constitutes an unlawful search. State v.
Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940, 942 43, 530 P.2d 243 (1975); see also
Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9, 102 S. Ct. 812, 70 L. Ed. 2d 778
(1982), on remand, 100 Wn.2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984).
Because the plain view exception to the warrant requirement rests on
the lawfulness of the officer’s presence, plain view cases will have
different outcomes under the federal and state constitutions when the two
constitutions differ as to the underlying lawfulness. For example, when the
arresting officer follows the arrestee into his or her home, the inspection
of objects within the room may be lawful under the Fourth Amendment,
yet unlawful under article I, section 7. Chrisman, 455 U.S. at 9, 102 S. Ct.
812 (determining that Fourth Amendment permits officer to accompany
arrestee wherever arrestee goes), on remand, 100 Wn.2d at 822
(concluding that article I, section 7 prohibits an officer from entering
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misdemeanor arrestee’s home unless the officer can demonstrate threat to
own safety, possibility of destruction of evidence of misdemeanor
charged, or strong likelihood of escape). Essentially, any application of the
plain view exception in confluence with article I, section 7 requires “a
close examination of the facts and not a bright line rule” for determining
when officers exceed their lawful presence. Id. at 820, 102 S. Ct. 812; see
State v. Link, 136 Wn. App. 685, 697, 150 P.3d 610 (2007).
5.7(a)(2) Immediate Knowledge: Incriminating Character
Immediately Apparent
The plain view exception applies only when the police immediately
recognize the incriminating nature of the object seized. State v. Cotten, 75
Wn. App. 669, 683, 879 P.2d 971 (1994) (seizure of shotgun not valid
under the plain view doctrine because it was not immediately apparent to
the FBI officers that it was evidence of a crime). Although the officer need
not have absolute knowledge that the object is related to a crime, the
officer cannot tamper with the evidence in order to come to this belief, and
the object must have a nexus to the crime under investigation or lead to an
arrest. Id.
It is sufficient that an officer has probable cause to believe that the
object is evidence of a crime. State v. Sistrunk, 57 Wn. App. 210, 214, 787
P.2d 937 (1990). For example, in State v. Gonzales, a clear vial of capsules
and pills, “viewed in context” of other items of drug paraphernalia, was
properly seized. State v. Gonzales, 46 Wn. App. 388, 400 01, 731 P.2d
1101 (1986). On the other hand, a closed paper bag containing marijuana
was improperly seized because the marijuana was clearly not visible. Id.
at 400, 731 P.2d 1101; see also Sistrunk, 57 Wn. App. at 214, 787 P.2d
937 (no probable cause to seize empty beer cans when the condition of
cans was consistent with driver’s explanation that they had been picked up
for recycling).
If an object is moved or tampered with in any way to determine
whether it is evidence of a crime, the “immediately apparent” prong of the
plain view test will fail. State v. King, 89 Wn. App. 612, 622 n.31, 949
P.3d 856 (1998) (citing State v. Murray, 84 Wn.2d 527, 527 P.2d 1303
(1974)). Police officers must connect items to a crime based solely on what
is exposed to their view; they cannot move the object even a few inches.
Murray, 84 Wn.2d at 527, 527 P.2d 1303 (holding that the police may not
move a television to view the serial number).
Officers may seize objects only if the objects are connected with the
crime under investigation or will lead to an arrest. State v. Terrovona, 105
Wn.2d 632, 648, 716 P.2d 295 (1986) (officers may only seize evidence
that is not described in the warrant if “it will aid in a particular
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apprehension or conviction, or if it has a sufficient nexus with the crime
under investigation”). This nexus may include documents providing the
motive for a crime or evidence of the crime itself. See State v. Stenson,
132 Wn.2d 668, 695, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997) (insurance documents were
“related to the crime” because they could provide a motive for the murder),
post-conviction relief granted, In re Stenson, 174 Wn.2d 474, 476, 276
P.3d 286 (2012)).
An officer’s knowledge and experience are also relevant to
determining whether an object is legally seized under the plain view
doctrine. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 13, 726 P.2d 445 (1986) (the
police officer “could immediately conclude, based on his own prior
experience investigating narcotics and the information he had about the
Smith household and about Kennedy, that the bag contained contraband”).
Baggies may be considered evidence of a crime if other factors are present,
such as the baggies’ appearance of having contained illicit substances or
presence in an area of high drug crime. State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 185
n.3, 196 P.3d 658 (2008).
Article I, section 7 provides the same protection as the Fourth
Amendment in this respect. State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 582, 62 P.3d
489 (2003). Under the Fourth Amendment, officers must also immediately
recognize the illicit nature of the object. See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 4.11(d) (5th ed. 2012). But they may not move the
object to uncover its illicit nature. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 466, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971); Arizona v. Hicks, 480
U.S. 321, 328, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 94 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1987) (the scope of plain
view was exceeded when police lifted stereo components to read serial
numbers). Officers may also, however, be informed in their determination
by their expertise. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 483, 96 S. Ct.
2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976) (use of specially trained investigators
supported the seizure of business records).
5.8 EXTENSIONS OF THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
5.8(a) Plain Hearing
Some circuit courts have recognized a “plain hearing” analog to the
plain view doctrine based on the premise that defendants have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations that are overheard with
unaided ears. See United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046, 1051 52 (5th
Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068, 1071 (6th
Cir. 1990) (inadvertently intercepted nontelephonic conversations were
authorized under “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement). Use
of hearing enhancement devices may “raise very different and far more
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serious questions” from visual enhancement devices when determining the
reasonable expectation of the privacy of defendants and, consequently,
when determining whether a warrant is required. Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 39, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 90 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1986).
In Washington, eavesdropping by means of an electronic device or
the interception of private telephone, telegraph, radio, or other electronic
communications is governed by Washington’s Violating Right of Privacy
Act. RCW ch. 9.73. Tape recordings made by federal agents pursuant to
the federal wiretap statute are inadmissible in state court when the
recordings are made in violation of the Washington statute. State v.
Williams, 94 Wn.2d 531, 541, 617 P.2d 1012 (1980). Police testimony
about such recorded conversation is also inadmissible. See infra § 7.3(a)
(discussing the use of illegally obtained evidence at probable cause
hearings); see also Tara McGraw Swaminatha, The Fourth Amendment
Unplugged: Electronic Evidence Issues & Wireless Defenses, 7 Yale J.L.
& Tech. 51 (2005).
5.8(b) Plain Smell
Courts have generally accepted the “plain smell” exception as a
branch of the plain view doctrine. See generally 1 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 2.2(a), at 596 97 (5th ed. 2012). Thus, police
officers have used odor to justify warrantless entries and seizures so long
as the officer was lawfully in the location where the odor was detected.
See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d
842 (2005) (warrantless search of car trunk valid when dog sniff of
exterior of car detected drugs inside trunk and when police lawfully pulled
car over for traffic stop). But see Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 12–13,
133 S. Ct. 1409, 1418, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring)
(Drug-detection dogs are “super-sensitive instrument[s], . . . deployed to
detect things inside that [police] could not perceive unassisted. . . . They
are to the poodle down the street as high-powered binoculars are to a piece
of plain glass. Like the binoculars, a drug-detection dog is a specialized
device for discovering objects not in plain view (or plain smell).”)
(majority opinion found search unconstitutional as an intrusion into the
home, grounded in property law).
Washington has permitted the warrantless seizure of an object based
on its odor when the odor established probable cause or when the odor was
in “open view.” See State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d 332, 345, 815 P.2d 761
(1991) (odor of marijuana was in “open view”); State v. Huckaby, 15 Wn.
App. 280, 290 91, 549 P.2d 35 (1976). Odor can also support a
warrantless entry and can serve as probable cause for a search warrant. See
State v. Gave, 77 Wn. App. 333, 336, 890 P.2d 1088 (1995) (odor of
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marijuana supported warrant probable cause requirement); State v.
Gocken, 71 Wn. App. 267, 278, 857 P.2d 1074 (1993) (odor of decaying
flesh justified warrantless entry at homicide scene).
5.8(c) Plain Feel
The court has recognized the “plain feel” or “plain touch” doctrine
as a corollary of the plain view doctrine. Under the plain touch exception
to the warrant requirement, police may seize nonthreatening contraband
detected through the officer’s sense of touch during a legitimate pat down
search. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 76, 113 S. Ct. 2130,
124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993); State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 251, 207 P.3d
1266 (2009). The object will be admissible only if its “contour or mass
makes its identity immediately apparent.” Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 365 76,
113 S. Ct. 2130; State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107, 115, 874 P.2d 160
(1994). Any “squeezing, sliding or [otherwise] manipulating” the object
extends the search beyond the scope of Terry, thus rendering the search
constitutionally invalid. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d at 248–50, 207 P.3d 1266
(excluding evidence when officer continued to squeeze defendant’s pocket
after feeling no weapon); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334,
337 39, 120 S. Ct. 1462, 146 L. Ed. 2d 365 (2000) (border patrol agent’s
exploratory manipulation of bus passenger’s opaque bag violated the
Fourth Amendment).
5.9 INTRODUCTION TO CONSENSUAL SEARCHES
A warrantless search is constitutional when valid consent is granted.
Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9 10, 102 S. Ct. 812, 70 L. Ed. 2d
778 (1982), on remand, 100 Wn.2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984); State v.
Cantrell, 124 Wn.2d 183, 187, 875 P.2d 1208 (1994). A valid consensual
search requires that (1) the consent be “voluntary”; (2) the consent be
granted by a party having the authority to consent; and (3) the search be
limited to the scope of the consent granted. State v. Hastings, 119 Wn.2d
229, 234, 830 P.2d 658 (1992). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 8.1 (5th ed. 2012). Furthermore, while the Fourth
Amendment does not require targets of searches to be told they have the
right to refuse the search, article I, section 7 provides heightened
protection against unreasonable searches. United States v. Drayton, 536
U.S. 194, 207, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2002). Thus, “where
the State seeks to justify a search on the basis of consent it has the burden
of showing that the consent was voluntary, an essential element of which
is knowledge of the right to refuse consent.” State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d
103, 116, 960 P.2d 927 (1998) (quoting State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349,
353 54, 346 A.2d 66 (1975)).
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The State has the burden of proving that consent to a search was
voluntary. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d at 116, 960 P.2d 927 (citing State v. Smith,
115 Wn.2d 775, 789, 801 P.2d 975 (1990)). The level of proof required is
“clear and convincing evidence.” Smith, 115 Wn.2d at 789, 801 P.2d 975.
For a discussion of the distinctions between voluntary consent and waiver
of constitutional rights, see generally 4 LaFave, supra § 8.1(a), at 10 17.
5.9(a) Factors Considered in Determining Voluntariness
The court analyzes the validity or voluntariness of consent to a search
in a similar manner as the voluntariness of a confession. See Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 49, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854
(1973). However, consent to search is distinguishable from testimonial
admissions since the former is consistent with innocence. State v.
Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466, 471, 755 P.2d 797 (1988). In Washington, the
issue “is clearly an interest of local concern . . . due to ‘[t]he heightened
protection afforded state citizens against unlawful intrusion into private
dwellings [that] places an onerous burden upon the government to show a
compelling need to act outside our warrant requirement.’” State v. Ferrier,
136 Wn.2d 103, 114, 960 P.2d 927 (1998) (quoting Washington v.
Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814, 822, 676 P.2d 419 (1984)).
In Washington, if the police officers conduct a “knock and talk” for
the purpose of gaining consent, they must “inform the person[s] from
whom consent is sought that [they] may lawfully refuse to consent to the
search and that they can revoke, at any time, the consent that they give,
and can limit the scope of the consent to certain areas of the home.”
Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d at 118 19, 960 P.2d 927; see supra § 3.7. Failure to
do so vitiates any consent given afterwards. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d at 118 19,
960 P.2d 927. The Washington Supreme Court has declined to extend the
Ferrier rule to situations where police seek entry to (1) question a resident
in the course of investigating a crime, State v. Khounvichai, 149 Wn.2d
557, 559, 69 P.3d 862 (2003); (2) execute arrest warrants, State v. Thang,
145 Wn.2d 630, 636−37, 41 P.3d 1159 (2002); and (3) identify residents
of the home, State v. Williams, 142 Wn.2d 17, 27, 11 P.3d 714 (2000). In
other words, police need not give a Ferrier warning when the purpose of
the visit is something other than searching for contraband or evidence of a
crime. Thus, in State v. Tagas, the court concluded that under article I,
section 7, the validity of defendant’s consent to the search of her purse did
not depend on the officer advising her of her right to refuse consent to
search. 121 Wn. App. 872, 878, 90 P.3d 1088 (2004).
A prior voluntary confession or other type of cooperation with the
police will weigh in favor of a finding that the consent to search was
voluntary. See State v. Raines, 55 Wn. App. 459, 462, 778 P.2d 538
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(1989). A prior refusal to consent to a search will suggest that a subsequent
consent was not voluntary. See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 8.2(f) (5th ed. 2012).
A suspect’s behavior may also indicate consent even when verbal
consent is withheld. See Raines, 55 Wn. App. at 462, 778 P.2d 538 (failure
to expressly object after police requested permission to enter “to look
around” amounted to implied waiver of right to exclude them); State v.
Sabbot, 16 Wn. App. 929, 938, 561 P.2d 212 (1977) (although the
undercover investigator followed the defendant into the defendant’s home
after the defendant had told him to wait outside, the investigator’s presence
in house was with the defendant’s tacit acquiescence).
5.9(b) Police Claim of Authority to Search
An express or implied claim by the police that they will proceed
immediately to conduct the search even without the individual’s consent
is likely to indicate that the subsequent consent was involuntary. See
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 20 L. Ed.
2d 797 (1968); State v. Browning, 67 Wn. App. 93, 97 98, 834 P.2d 84
(1992) (acquiescence to a claim of authority is not equivalent to free and
voluntary consent to a search). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 8.2(a) (5th ed. 2012).
A threat to seek a warrant if the person refuses to allow a search does
not, however, automatically invalidate consent. See State v. Smith, 115
Wn.2d 775, 790, 801 P.2d 975 (1990) (no coercion where the defendant
was told officers would seek a search warrant if consent was not given to
search the trunk of car). See generally 4 LaFave, supra § 8.2(c). On the
other hand, police misrepresentation regarding the existence of a search
warrant may invalidate consent to a search or seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548, 88 S. Ct. 1788; Rental Owners
Ass’n v. Thurston Cty., 85 Wn. App. 171, 183, 931 P.2d 208 (1997)
(“threats to obtain a search warrant may invalidate consent when grounds
for obtaining a warrant do not exist”), superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in Potala Vill. Kirkland, LLC v. Kirkland, 183 Wn. App.
191, 198, 334 P.3d 1143 (2014); State v. McCrorey, 70 Wn. App. 103, 112
n.8, 851 P.2d 1234 (1993), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Head,
136 Wn.2d 619, 964 P.2d 1187 (1998).
5.9(c) Coercive Surroundings
If the officers make a show of force while seeking consent, or if the
surroundings are coercive in other respects, the consent will generally not
be considered voluntary. See McNear v. Rhay, 65 Wn.2d 530, 537, 398
P.2d 732 (1965), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d
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641, 870 P.2d 313 (1994); State v. Dresker, 39 Wn. App. 136, 139, 692
P.2d 846 (1984). For example, where officers placed a defendant under
physical restraint, searched her home illegally without consent, and had
searched her home illegally without consent two days prior, the defendant
did not voluntarily consent. State v. Werth, 18 Wn. App. 530, 535 36, 571
P.2d 941 (1977); see supra § 1.4(a). However, the U.S. Supreme Court has
held that surroundings were not coercive when police officers boarded a
bus and obtained permission to search where “[t]here was no application
of force, no intimidating movement, no overwhelming show of force, no
brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat, no command,
[and] not even an authoritative tone of voice.” United States v. Drayton,
536 U.S. 194, 203 04, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2002). See
generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(b) (5th ed. 2012).
Coercive effects can, however, “be mitigated by requiring officers who
conduct [knock and talk searches] to warn home dwellers of their right to
refuse consent to a warrantless search.” State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103,
116, 960 P.2d 927 (1998).
The fact that a defendant is in custody when he consents to a search
does not by itself establish coercion or involuntary consent. McNear, 65
Wn.2d at 538, 398 P.2d 732; United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424,
96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976). Custodial restraint is, however, a
significant factor in assessing voluntariness. See State v. Avila-Avina, 99
Wn. App. 9, 14 15, 991 P.2d 720 (2000), abrogated on other grounds by
State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 634–35, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009) (en
banc). In Avila-Avina, the court concluded that consent was invalid where
the defendant was illegally detained and held in a patrol car for four hours
after the initial purpose of the detainment was satisfied. Id. at 16, 991 P.2d
720; see also Werth, 18 Wn. App. at 535 36, 571 P.2d 941; State v.
Rodriguez, 20 Wn. App. 876, 881, 582 P.2d 904 (1978).
Consent is likely voluntary even if, after arrest, the officers will not
allow the defendant to return inside his dwelling unaccompanied to
retrieve necessary belongings. In State v. Nelson, the court held the
consent was voluntary and uncoerced where the defendant, arrested on the
porch of his home in midwinter wearing only pants and a t-shirt, consented
to officers accompanying him into his home; the arresting officers had
given the defendant the alternative of proceeding to the police station as
he was, but indicated that if he returned inside, they would have to
accompany him. State v. Nelson, 47 Wn. App. 157, 163 64, 734 P.2d 516
(1987). There, the court did not consider the defendant’s fear that his
behavior might appear “crazy” if he accepted arrest without his jacket and
keys equal to coercion. Id. at 163, 734 P.2d 516.
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5.9(d) Awareness of the Constitutional Right to Withhold Consent
Although courts consider an individual’s knowledge of the right to
refuse a search when determining whether consent is voluntary, the State
may prove that consent was voluntary without establishing such
knowledge. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S. Ct.
2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973); State v. Shoemaker 85 Wn.2d 207, 212,
533 P.2d 123 (1975); State v. Rodriguez, 20 Wn. App. 876, 880−81, 582
P.2d 904 (1978) (consent was voluntary despite the defendant’s assertion
that he was not told and did not know of the right to refuse consent). See
generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(i) (5th ed. 2012).
Where police seek to justify a warrantless search of a private home,
however, knowledge of the right to refuse consent is an essential element.
State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 116, 960 P.2d 927 (1998) (“the only sure
way to give such a protection substance is to require a warning of its
existence”). But informing occupants of their right to refuse might not be
required when the officers are simply providing backup for another
investigatory agency. State v. Bustamante-Davila, 138 Wn.2d 964, 984,
983 P.2d 590 (1999) (no Ferrier warning required when officers were
simply providing backup to a requesting INS agent and suspect permitted
agent and officers into home in which officers saw rifle in plain sight).
5.9(e) Prior Illegal Police Action
A prior illegal act by the police may suggest that the defendant’s
consent was involuntary. See, e.g., State v. Werth, 18 Wn. App. 530, 535,
571 P.2d 941 (1977) (“In view of the additional circumstance that [two]
days before, Werth’s home had been searched illegally without her
consent, it is apparent that overall, the situation was rife with coercion.”).
See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(d) (5th ed.
2012). Thus, a prior illegal search or arrest may taint the subsequent
consent and thereby render the consent invalid. See State v. McCrorey, 70
Wn. App. 103, 111−12, 851 P.2d 1234 (1993) (prior illegal police activity
is one factor when considering the totality of the circumstances),
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Head, 136 Wn.2d 619, 964 P.2d
1187 (1998). See generally 4 LaFave, supra § 8.2(d).
The State has the burden of proving that consent was not obtained by
the exploitation of a prior illegal search. State v. Bustamante-Davila, 138
Wn.2d 964, 981, 983 P.2d 590 (1999). In State v. Jensen, the court found
that the State had met this burden when it showed that although only two
hours intervened between the search and the consent, the consent was valid
because, in the intervening period, the defendant was advised of his right
to refuse consent, had verbally consented twice, was allowed to call his
sister, and there was no evidence that police did anything to frighten or
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intimidate defendant. State v. Jensen, 44 Wn. App. 485, 488–89, 723 P.2d
443 (1986); see also Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690, 102 S. Ct.
2664, 73 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1982); State v. Tijerina, 61 Wn. App. 626, 629,
811 P.2d 241 (1991).
5.9(f) Maturity, Sophistication, and Mental or Emotional State
In assessing the voluntariness of consent, the court always considers
the sophistication and the emotional state of the defendant. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973)
(“The traditional definition of voluntariness we accept today has always
taken into account evidence of minimal schooling [and] low
intelligence.”); State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wn.2d 207, 212, 533 P.2d 123
(1975) (determination of voluntariness should include consideration of
“the degree of education and intelligence of the consenting person”); see
also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64
L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 8.2(e) (5th ed. 2012). While the mental condition of a defendant
is a significant factor in determining voluntariness, the presence of mental
illness itself is insufficient to render a consent to search invalid. See State
v. Sondergaard, 86 Wn. App. 656, 662, 938 P.2d 351 (1997); see also
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473
(1986) (voices directing the defendant to confess to murder were not the
result of police coercion).
5.9(g) Police Deception as to Identity or Purpose
The use of deception by a police officer does not necessarily affect
the voluntariness of consent to a search. Police may use a ruse to gain entry
to a residence to conduct a criminal investigation if they have a justifiable
and reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity within the residence. State
v. Hastings, 119 Wn.2d 229, 233, 830 P.2d 658 (1992) (the defendant had
no constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in the residence where
undercover officers had purchased cocaine); State v. Hashman, 46 Wn.
App. 211, 216, 729 P.2d 651 (1986) (a police officer disguised as a
building contractor gained entry into a residence after another officer, who
had lawfully been within the residence, reported evidence of a marijuanagrowing operation). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 8.2(m)–(n) (5th ed. 2012).
5.10 SCOPE OF CONSENT
A consensual search must be limited to the area covered by the
authority given by the consenting party. State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d
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126, 133, 101 P.3d 80 (2004); State v. Davis, 86 Wn. App. 414, 423, 937
P.2d 1110 (1997). The consenting party, expressly or implicitly, may limit
the scope of consent by only consenting to a search with reduced duration,
area, or intensity. Davis, 86 Wn. App. at 423, 937 P.2d 1110. Any search
exceeding the scope of consent is invalid because exceeding the scope of
consent is comparable to exceeding the scope of a search warrant. Id. at
423–24, 937 P.2d 1110. See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 8.1(a) (5th ed. 2012).
“A general and unqualified consent to search an area for a particular
type of material permits a search of personal property within the area in
which the material could be concealed.” State v. Mueller, 63 Wn. App.
720, 722, 821 P.2d 1267 (1992). For example, in State v. Jensen, the
defendant consented to a “complete” search of his vehicle for materials of
any evidentiary value. State v. Jensen, 44 Wn. App. 485, 486, 723 P.2d
443 (1986). Officers conducting the search found cocaine in the pocket of
a jacket in the back seat of the defendant’s car. Id. at 487–88, 723 P.2d
443. The court held that the officers had not exceeded the scope of consent
since the defendant did not expressly or implicitly limit his consent. Id. at
492, 723 P.2d 443. Furthermore, the defendant consented to the search for
evidence that could have reasonably been kept in a jacket pocket. Id. A
consensual search is not invalidated if it results in the discovery of
evidence that the consenting party did not expect to be discovered. State
v. Johnson, 40 Wn. App. 371, 382–83, 699 P.2d 221 (1985). A general,
unqualified consent does not extend to locked containers, which have
additional privacy expectations under article I, section 7. State v.
Monaghan, 165 Wn. App. 782, 791, 266 P.3d 222 (2012) (citing State v.
Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986)) (finding that the search of a
locked container in the trunk of defendant’s car was without warrant or the
defendant’s consent and was therefore without the authority of law
required in Washington).
To determine whether consent to one search is extended to a later
search, courts consider (1) whether the search is conducted by the same
officers; (2) whether the second search has the same objectives; and (3)
whether the time elapsed between the two searches suggests an
abandonment or completion of the initial search. State v. Koepke, 47 Wn.
App. 897, 905 06, 738 P.2d 295 (1987) (citing State v. Gallo, 20 Wn.
App. 717, 725, 582 P.2d 558 (1978)).
Lastly, consent to a search or seizure may be implied by statute. For
example, drivers of motor vehicles in Washington give implied consent to
a breath test if, at the time of arrest, the arresting officer reasonably
believes the person had been driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or drugs. RCW 46.20.308(1).
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5.11 CONSENT BY THIRD PARTIES
In some situations, third parties may give consent for searches, and
evidence discovered as a result of such searches may be used against a
non-consenting defendant. See State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 543, 688
P.2d 859 (1984). The relationship between the defendant and the third
party, among other considerations, affects the validity of third-party
consent.
Under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, thirdparty consent may be valid under the “common authority” or actual
authority standard articulated in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,
170, 94 S. Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed. 2d. 242 (1974). See also Mathe, 102 Wn.2d
at 543, 688 P.2d 859. Actual authority requires a sufficient relationship to,
or mutual use of, property by people with joint access or control. State v.
Rison, 116 Wn. App. 955, 961, 69 P.3d 362 (2003). Under this standard,
if the non-consenting party is absent, (1) the consenting party must be able
to permit the search in her own right, and (2) it must be reasonable to find
that the defendant had assumed the risk that a person with joint control
might permit a search. State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 803 04, 92
P.3d 228 (2004); Mathe, 102 Wn.2d at 543 44, 688 P.2d 859.
Under article I, section 7, if the person only appears to have authority
to consent and in fact does not, the search is invalid. See State v. Eisfeldt,
163 Wn.2d 628, 638 39, 185 P.3d 580 (2008) (repairman lacked actual
authority to consent to search of home, and police officers’ reasonable
belief that he did was irrelevant). The Fourth Amendment imposes a lesser
standard, which is satisfied when consent is given by one who only
appears to have authority to consent, and so long as the police reasonably
believe that the individual has this authority. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497
U.S. 177, 186, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990). This “apparent
authority” doctrine is grounded in the reasonableness of the search
whereas the “common” or “actual authority” doctrine is grounded in
reasonable expectations of privacy and the appropriate scope of the
consent. State v. Morse, 156 Wn.2d 1, 8, 123 P.3d 832 (2005). See
generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.3(g) (5th ed. 2012).
The following sections discuss the relationships between a defendant
and a third party that may give rise to third-party consent, including family
members, co-tenants, landlords, employers, bailees, and guests.
5.11(a) Defendant’s Spouse
Washington cases involving spousal consent are consistent with the
“common authority” approach of State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 543, 688
P.2d 859 (1984). For example, a defendant’s spouse, having an equal right
to use an object or occupy the property, may consent to a search of the
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object or premises, regardless of whether the area is kept for the exclusive
use of the non-consenting spouse. See State v. Gillespie, 18 Wn. App. 313,
317, 569 P.2d 1174 (1977). However, also consistent with the “common
authority” standard, the consent of a spouse is only valid against the nonconsenting spouse if the non-consenting spouse is not present at the time
of the search. State v. Walker, 136 Wn.2d 678, 679, 965 P.2d 1079 (1998).
When police request entry pursuant to “knock and talk” in conducting a
search pursuant to a warrant, either spouse may validly allow police entry.
State v. Hartnell, 15 Wn. App. 410, 417 18, 550 P.2d 63 (1976); see supra
§ 3.7. See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.4(a) (5th
ed. 2012).
5.11(b) Defendant’s Parents
A parent has authority over all rooms in his or her home and
consequently can consent to a search of a dependent child’s room
regardless of whether the child is a minor. State v. Summers, 52 Wn. App.
767, 772, 764 P.2d 250 (1988); see also State v. Cotten, 75 Wn. App. 669,
685, 879 P.2d 971 (1994) (finding that the defendant’s mother could give
valid consent to seizure of a shotgun found in defendant’s bedroom).
Furthermore, an adult child living rent-free with his parents does not create
the type of relationship that would prevent his parents from consenting to
a search. State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 807, 92 P.3d 228 (2004)
(finding that police did not need defendant’s consent to search his parents’
boathouse, which he used while living with his parents rent-free).
However, when the child pays rent and the status of the parent is similar
to that of a landlord rather than a custodial parent, the relationship is more
akin to a landlord and tenant relationship, leaving the parent without
authority to consent to a search of the child’s room. Summers, 52 Wn. App.
at 771 73, 764 P.2d 250.
5.11(c) Defendant’s Child
The defendant’s child, in appropriate circumstances, may consent to
police entry of the parent’s home but not to police search of the home. See,
e.g., State v. Jones, 22 Wn. App. 447, 451 52, 591 P.2d 796 (1979)
(reasoning that a minor child may consent to entry but declining to rule on
the legal question of consent to search). For a general discussion of the
scope and limitations of a child’s consent to a search of the parent’s house,
see generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.4(c) (5th ed.
2012).
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5.11(d) Co-Tenant or Joint Occupant
A co-tenant or joint occupant of the defendant’s dwelling with
common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or
effects sought to be inspected may give valid consent to a search of the
premises or effects. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S. Ct.
988, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1974); see State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 543,
688 P.2d 859 (1984); see also State v. Jeffries, 105 Wn.2d 398, 414, 717
P.2d 722 (1986) (common authority rule applicable to validate consent to
search a homeless encampment located outside the city of Wenatchee).
See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.5(c) (5th ed.
2012). But when the non-consenting cohabitant is actually present on the
premises, Washington courts have held that a cohabitant cannot give
consent if the non-consenting cohabitant has equal or greater control over
the premises. State v. Morse, 156 Wn.2d 1, 13, 123 P.3d 832 (2005)
(“‘[T]hat consent remains valid against a cohabitant, who also possesses
equal control, only while the cohabitant is absent.’”) (quoting State v.
Leach, 113 Wn.2d 735, 744, 782 P.2d 1035 (1989)); State v. Floreck, 111
Wn. App. 135, 142 43, 43 P.3d 1264 (2002); see also Mathe, 102 Wn.2d
at 541, 688 P.2d 859. Although a cohabitant cannot give valid consent to
bedrooms or private areas when a non-consenting cohabitant is present, a
cohabitant can give valid consent to police officers to enter the living room
or an area that customarily receives visitors. State v. Hoggatt, 108 Wn.
App. 257, 269, 30 P.3d 488 (2001); see Leach, 113 Wn.2d at 744, 782 P.2d
1035.
Courts have not extended the dual consent rule for cohabitants to the
common authority shared by a driver and passenger in an automobile.
State v. Cantrell, 124 Wn.2d 183, 192, 875 P.2d 1208 (1994) (passenger’s
consent to search automobile was sufficient to support warrantless search
even though the defendant driver did not consent to the search; the court
noted that a situation where a co-occupant overtly objected to search was
not before the court).
5.11(e) Landlord, Lessor, or Manager
A landlord lacks authority to consent to a search when a tenant has
the sole or undisputed possession of leased premises. State v. Birdsong, 66
Wn. App. 534, 537 39, 832 P.2d 533 (1992). This rule also applies to
limited rental arrangements such as those found in motels, boarding
homes, and room rentals. State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 544, 688 P.2d
859 (1984); see also George L. Blum, Annotation, Admissibility of
Evidence Discovered in Warrantless Search of Rental Property
Authorized by Lessor of Such Property—State Cases, 61 A.L.R. 5th 1, 124
(1998). However, the lessor or manager of an apartment building may
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consent to a search of an area that is not within the lessee’s exclusive
possession. State v. Talley, 14 Wn. App. 484, 487, 543 P.2d 348 (1975)
(finding the common areas of a property were not under exclusive control
of the lessee-defendant); see also State v. Kreck, 86 Wn.2d 112, 123, 542
P.2d 782 (1975) (finding that the rental manager could consent to a search
of an unrented half of a garage). Upon expiration of the tenancy, a tenant
abandons his or her interest in the property and, likewise, an expectation
of privacy. State v. Christian, 95 Wn.2d 655, 659, 628 P.2d 806 (1981).
See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.5(a), at 279 80
(5th ed. 2012).
Tenants, conversely, may consent to searches of common areas under
the “common authority” rule, even over the objection of the landlord.
Cranwell v. Mesec, 77 Wn. App. 90, 103 04, 890 P.2d 491 (1995). For
additional discussion of consent by a lessee, see generally 4 LaFave, supra
§ 8.5(b).
5.11(f) Bailee
A bailee may consent to a search of the bailor’s belongings when the
bailee has a sufficient relationship to or a degree of control over the chattel.
See State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 127, 139 40, 559 P.2d 970 (1977) (when
hospital had joint control over patient-defendant’s clothing, hospital ward
clerk could consent to police seizure of the clothing); see also State v.
Bobic, 140 Wn.2d 250, 259, 996 P.2d 610 (2000) (manager of storage units
facility could give police permission to enter; officers subsequently
viewed contraband through existing hole in container). See generally 4
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.6(a) (5th ed. 2012). For a
discussion of consent by a bailor, see generally id. § 8.6(b).
5.11(g) Employee and Employer
An employer may consent to a search of the place of employment,
even when the search would affect the belongings of an employee. Thus,
under the common authority rule analysis, see supra § 5.11, an employer
may validly consent to a search of that portion of the employer’s premises
used by an employee for personal purposes. State v. Kendrick, 47 Wn.
App. 620, 632 33, 736 P.2d 1079 (1987) (finding that the defendant
shared the area but knew that his employer had greater authority and
access to the area, decreasing his expectation of privacy). Further, under
some circumstances, an employee may give consent to a search of an
employer’s premises. For a discussion of the rules governing consent
within the employer–employee relationship, see 4 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 8.6(c) (d) (5th ed. 2012).
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5.11(h) Hotel Employee
A hotel or motel employee may not grant valid consent to a search
of a guest’s room because a motel guest generally has the same expectation
of privacy during his or her tenancy as the renter of a private residence.
State v. Davis, 86 Wn. App. 414, 419, 937 P.2d 1110 (1997). However,
the hotel guest’s expectation of privacy generally expires at checkout time.
See id. at 419, 937 P.2d 1110 (finding that a motel guest loses expectation
of privacy at the expiration of tenancy, unless late payment has been
accepted by the motel or the motel has tolerated previous overtime stays).
In Washington, courts require particularized suspicion to search a hotel
registry, even if the hotel employee consents to such a search. See State v.
Jorden, 160 Wn.2d 121, 130, 156 P.3d 893 (2007); supra § 1.3; see also
In re Nichols, 171 Wn.2d 370, 376, 256 P.3d 1131 (2010).
5.11(i) Host and Guest
Generally, a host has the authority to consent to a search of a guest’s
bedroom and any other room occupied by the guest. See State v.
Rodriguez, 65 Wn. App. 409, 414 15, 828 P.2d 636 (1992); State v.
Koepke, 47 Wn. App. 897, 903 04, 738 P.2d 295 (1987) (host–guest
relationship found between lessee and defendant temporarily using one of
lessee’s rooms such that lessee’s consent to search the room was valid).
However, when numerous guests are present and police do not inquire
about ownership of property, a host’s consent to search may not be valid
against guests’ personal property. See State v. Rison, 116 Wn. App. 955,
962, 69 P.3d 362 (2003), review denied, 151 Wn.2d 1008, 87 P.3d 1184
(2004). For additional discussion, see 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 8.5(e) (5th ed. 2012). See also supra § 5.11 (common authority
rule).
5.12 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES: INTRODUCTION
The exigent circumstances exception justifies a warrantless search
when law enforcement officers establish probable cause but have a
pressing need for an immediate search or seizure that would be delayed by
securing a warrant. See State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 405 06, 47
P.3d 127 (2002); State v. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d 51, 101, 804 P.2d 577
(1991). Washington courts use the following six factors as a guide in
determining whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry and
search:
(1) the gravity or violent nature of the offense with which the
suspect is to be charged;
(2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed;
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(3) whether there is reasonably trustworthy information that the
suspect is guilty;
(4) [whether] there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is
on the premises;
(5) a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly
apprehended; and
(6) [whether] the entry is made peaceably.
Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d at 406, 47 P.3d 127 (citing State v. Terrovona, 105
Wn.2d 632, 644, 716 P.2d 295 (1986)); see Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d at 101,
804 P.2d 577 (same factors used in determining justification of warrantless
home arrest). Not every factor must be present to find that exigent
circumstances justified the officer’s entry, only those factors necessary to
show that the officer needed to act quickly. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d at 408,
47 P.3d 127; see, e.g., State v. Patterson, 112 Wn.2d 731, 736, 774 P.2d
10 (1989) (no single factor is conclusive; weight varies with
circumstances); State v. Flowers, 57 Wn. App. 636, 644, 789 P.2d 333
(1990) (the fact that some factors are not present is not controlling).
The courts have identified five situations in which exigent
circumstances support a departure from the warrant requirement: “(1) hot
pursuit; (2) fleeing suspect; (3) danger to arresting officer or to the public;
(4) mobility of the vehicle; and (5) mobility or destruction of the
evidence.” State v. Counts, 99 Wn.2d 54, 60, 659 P.2d 1087 (1983)
(internal citations omitted); see State v. Pressley, 64 Wn. App. 591, 598,
825 P.2d 749 (1992) (police may seize evidence without a warrant if
probable cause exists and the actions of the detainee give rise to a
reasonable suspicion that evidence is in danger of loss or destruction);
2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.1(b), at 566–73 (5th ed.
2012); see also State v. Carter, 151 Wn.2d 118, 128, 85 P.3d 887 (2004)
(no warrant needed to seize a gun placed in open view because of exigent
circumstances); Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d at 644–45, 716 P.2d 295.
However, exigent circumstances are not created merely because a serious
offense has been committed. See State v. Stevenson, 55 Wn. App. 725,
732, 780 P.2d 873 (1989); see also Counts, 99 Wn.2d at 59 61, 825 P.2d
749.
When a crime is committed in an officer’s presence after the officer
has been admitted into a residence, exigent circumstances need not exist
in order for the officer to lawfully make a warrantless arrest in the
residence. See State v. Dalton, 43 Wn. App. 279, 286 87, 716 P.2d 940
(1986). In Dalton, an officer who obtained entry into a student’s college
dormitory room under the pretense of buying drugs, but with the actual
intent of making an arrest, could make an arrest under RCW 10.31.100,
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which permits an arrest without a warrant where the police officer has
reasonable cause to believe a felony was or is being committed. Id. at 286,
716 P.2d 940.
5.13 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING WARRANTLESS
ENTRY INTO THE HOME
An arrest on the street does not create an exigent circumstance
justifying a warrantless search of an arrestee’s house. See Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35, 90 S. Ct. 1969, 26 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1970). Both
the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 draw a firm line at the
entrance of the house and maintain “that threshold may not reasonably be
crossed without a warrant.” State v. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426, 429, 693
P.2d 89 (1985) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S.
Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980)). Police may, however, make a
warrantless entry into a home under the following circumstances: (1) when
they attempt to arrest the suspect in a public place and the suspect retreats
into the home; and (2) when the police reasonably fear that delay will
result in the suspect’s escape, in injury to the officers or to the public, or
in the destruction of evidence. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–
99, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967); United States v. Weaklem,
517 F.2d 70, 72 (9th Cir. 1975) (injury); United States v. BustamanteGamez, 488 F.2d 4, 8 9 (9th Cir. 1973) (escape; destruction of evidence).
While police are on the premises, the scope of the intrusion is limited to
its purpose; if the purpose is to prevent escape or harm, for example, the
search is limited to finding the suspect or weapons that could be used
against the police. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 299, 87 S. Ct. 1642.
Washington courts hold that the location of the arrestee, not the
location of the arresting officer, is critical in determining whether an arrest
takes place in a home. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d at 429, 693 P.2d 89.
Accordingly, absent exigent circumstances such as hot pursuit, an officer
may not arrest a suspect without a warrant—and, subsequently, conduct a
warrantless search incident to arrest—if the suspect is standing in the
doorway to his or her home. Id.; see also supra § 3.7 (knock and announce
rule). The unenclosed front porch of a home, however, is a public place
for purposes of arrest once probable cause has been established. State v.
Solberg, 122 Wn.2d 688, 699–702, 861 P.2d 460 (1993). A police officer
can arrest a suspect who voluntarily exits his or her home onto the
unenclosed porch, even in the absence of exigent circumstances. See id. at
700, 861 P.2d 460; see also State v. Bockman, 37 Wn. App. 474, 481, 682
P.2d 925 (1984).
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5.13(a) Hot Pursuit
In determining whether a warrantless entry into a home is justified
by the exigent circumstance of hot pursuit, courts have focused on the
immediate need to continue a promising criminal investigation in addition
to the factors listed in Cardenas. State v. Patterson, 112 Wn.2d 731, 736,
774 P.2d 10 (1989); see supra § 5.13; see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466
U.S. 740, 752–53, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1984) (no hot pursuit
when police did not engage in immediate or continuous pursuit of
defendant from the scene of the crime); State v. Counts, 99 Wn.2d 54, 60,
659 P.2d 1087 (1983) (no hot pursuit when police stood outside
defendant’s home for one hour after defendant retreated therein). Other
Washington cases involving hot pursuit include State v. Bessette, 105 Wn.
App. 793, 21 P.3d 318 (2001); State v. Griffith, 61 Wn. App. 35, 808 P.2d
1171 (1991) (escape, destruction of evidence); State v. Hendricks, 25 Wn.
App. 775, 610 P.2d 940 (1980) (escape); State v. Gallo, 20 Wn. App. 717,
582 P.2d 558 (1978) (intent to kill).
5.13(b) Imminent Arrest
Even when a suspect has not been arrested, police officers may make
a warrantless entry into a home when they reasonably believe that the
suspect has been alerted to his or her imminent arrest and is likely to
destroy evidence or escape. United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349,
1356 (9th Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds by United States v.
McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1984). The exception also applies
when the police reasonably believe that the suspect is either armed or
sought in connection with a violent crime. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 298–300, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967); see State v.
Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 412, 47 P.3d 127 (2002) (holding that officers
were excused from complying with knock and announce statute where
officers suspected defendants were dangerous, the evidence could be
easily destroyed, and officers observed defendants rushing toward back of
the motel room following their knock). In addition, police officers may
make a warrantless entry when they believe a suspect has alerted another
accomplice of the arrest and the crime was one of violence. State v. Reid,
38 Wn. App. 203, 209 10, 687 P.2d 861 (1984). Police may not, however,
make a warrantless entry when the likelihood of escape is slight, the
offense is minor, and the police do not believe that the suspect is armed.
State v. Dresker, 39 Wn. App. 136, 139 40, 692 P.2d 846 (1984).
Probable cause to believe a home contains contraband does not
constitute an exigent circumstance justifying the absence of a warrant;
police must have reason to believe the contraband will be destroyed before
they are able to obtain a warrant. See State v. Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836, 840,
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904 P.3d 290 (1995) (exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry of
motel room where there was a risk of drugs being destroyed if persons in
motel room were alerted to police presence by noises and scuffle in
hallway). “A belief that contraband will be destroyed must be based upon
sounds or activities observed at the scene or specific prior knowledge that
a particular suspect has a propensity to destroy contraband”; mere
presence of easily disposable drugs does not by itself constitute an
exigency. State v. Jeter, 30 Wn. App. 360, 362, 634 P.2d 312 (1981).
Police may enter a home without a warrant in response to an
emergency (including the imminent destruction of evidence) so long as
they do not themselves create the exigency through conduct that violates
the Fourth Amendment. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 464–466, 131 S.
Ct. 1849, 179 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2011) (officers do not create an exigency by
conducting a knock and talk instead of obtaining a warrant even when it is
reasonably foreseeable that their investigative tactics would “lead a drug
suspect to destroy evidence”); see State v. Drumhiller, 36 Wn. App. 592,
596–97, 675 P.2d 631 (1984) (exigent circumstances existed when police
observed occupants in the process of inhaling what police reasonably
believed to be cocaine); see also supra § 3.7 (knock and announce rule).
5.13(c) Less Intrusive Alternatives
Courts have held warrantless home entries illegal when police
officers could have kept the residence under surveillance until they
obtained a warrant. State v. Bessette, 105 Wn. App. 793, 799 800, 21 P.3d
318 (2001). For example, exigent circumstances do not justify entry into a
home when there is no threat to the health, safety, and welfare of citizens,
or no risk of escape by a suspect once the suspect enters his or her home.
State v. Werth, 18 Wn. App. 530, 536 37, 571 P.2d 941 (1977); State v.
Peele, 10 Wn. App. 58, 63–64, 516 P.2d 788 (1973) (search warrant
necessary when the suspect was not fleeing, but might be expected to hide
out on the premises until morning). See generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 6.5(c) (5th ed. 2012) (discussing the impoundment
alternative).
Similarly, police officers are sometimes required to keep the
occupants of a home under surveillance, instead of searching them, until
they procure a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Grummel, 542 F.2d 789,
791 (9th Cir. 1976); State v. Lewis, 19 Wn. App. 35, 40, 573 P.2d 1347
(1978). Police may use methods that do not involve a search in order to
secure premises in which they are legally present while awaiting the
issuance of a search warrant. Non-search activity may include brief
detention of a defendant while awaiting a warrant if there is sufficient
probable cause and a risk that potential evidence would be destroyed.
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Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 33, 121 S. Ct. 946, 148 L. Ed. 2d
838 (2001); see also State v. Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d 632, 645 46, 716 P.2d
295 (1986) (prior warrantless entry and arrest of defendant in his residence
was justified by exigent circumstances; nothing observed by the police
contributed to the issuance of the search warrant, nor was anything in
“plain view” used as evidence).
5.14 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING WARRANTLESS SEARCH
AND SEIZURE OF THE PERSON
Warrantless searches and seizures of persons may be justified by the
exigent circumstances exception when police reasonably fear injury to
themselves or the public, flight, or the destruction of evidence. With regard
to the officer and public safety exception, a pat-down search is
unconstitutional absent a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and
currently dangerous. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92 93, 100 S. Ct. 338,
62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979); see, e.g., State v. Smith, 165 Wn.2d 511, 199 P.3d
386 (2009) (finding exigencies to justify detaining suspect upon exiting
home because of the grave and imminent safety risk posed by a tanker
truck filled with a dangerous chemical parked next to a house in which a
rifle had been seen). In addition, “even without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, it is reasonable for an officer
executing a search warrant at a residence to briefly detain occupants of
that residence, to ensure officer safety and an orderly completion of the
search.” State v. King, 89 Wn. App. 612, 618 19, 949 P.3d 856 (1998).
Regarding the destruction-of-evidence exception, the brief seizure of
a person outside his home is permissible when police have probable cause
to believe that the home contains illegal drugs and a reasonable belief that
the person could destroy evidence before police could obtain a search
warrant. See State v. Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836, 840, 904 P.3d 290 (1995);
see also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 33, 121 S. Ct. 946, 148
L. Ed. 2d 838 (2001). For a definition of what constitutes a seizure, see
supra § 1.4. As explained in section 5.12(b), the officers must have
concrete facts to back up their belief that the evidence is in fact in danger.
State v. Jeter, 30 Wn. App. 360, 362, 634 P.2d 312 (1981).
As the following sections discuss, exigent circumstances are used to
justify the following three kinds of warrantless searches of persons: (1)
fresh pursuit of a suspect fleeing from police; (2) searches that penetrate
the body, such as blood tests and other invasive medical procedures; and
(3) searches of persons located on the premises being searched.
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5.14(a) Hot Pursuit
In Wenatchee v. Durham, 43 Wn. App. 547, 718 P.2d 819 (1986),
the court identified the five criteria to be used when analyzing hot pursuit:
(1) a felony must have occurred in the area; (2) the suspect must be
attempting to flee or know that he is being pursued; (3) the police must
pursue the suspect without delay; (4) the pursuit must be continuous; and
(5) there must be a relationship between the time the crime was committed,
the beginning of the pursuit, and the apprehension of the suspect. Id. at
550 51, 718 P.2d 819. Although the statutory definition of hot pursuit, or
“fresh pursuit,” relies in part on the common law, Tacoma v. Durham, 95
Wn. App. 876, 881, 978 P.2d 514 (1999), “courts are not limited by the
common law definition, but may consider the Legislature’s overall intent
to use practical considerations in deciding whether a particular arrest
across jurisdictional lines was reasonable.” Vance v. Dep’t of Licensing,
116 Wn. App. 412, 416, 65 P.3d 668 (2003), review denied, 150 Wn.2d
1004, 77 P.3d 651 (2003).
Police officers in Washington may engage in pursuit of anyone “who
is reasonably believed to have committed a violation of traffic or criminal
laws.” RCW 10.93.070(6), 10.93.120. However, barring the presence of
exceptional circumstances, a passenger may walk away from or stay at the
traffic stop scene. State v. Rehn, 117 Wn. App. 142, 149, 69 P.3d 379
(2003).
5.14(b) Warrantless Searches Involving Intrusion into the Body
A medical procedure performed without a warrant under exigent
circumstances must be reasonable and performed in a reasonable manner.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767−68, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed.
2d 908 (1966); see 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.3(c), at
215 16 (5th ed. 2012). In addition, the state must show more than probable
cause because of the intrusive nature of the search. Schmerber, 384 U.S.
at 770 72, 86 S. Ct. 1826. The fact that evidence is likely to be destroyed
will not automatically justify an intrusive medical procedure; the evidence
must be essential to a conviction. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753,
765 66, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1985) (no need to retrieve
bullet from defendant’s body where other substantial evidence was
available to convict him).
Where a serious crime involving intoxication is at issue, the natural
dissipation of alcohol in the blood of a suspect may be an exigent
circumstance justifying the nonconsensual extraction of a blood sample to
determine the suspect’s blood alcohol level. See State v. Curran, 116
Wn.2d 174, 185, 804 P.2d 558 (1991); see also Schmerber, 384 U.S. at
770 71, 86 S. Ct. 1826. But see Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 145,
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133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) (dissipation of blood alcohol
not sufficient per se to conduct a warrantless blood draw); see also State
v. Baird, 187 Wn.2d 210, 221, 386 P.3d 239 (2016) (nor is dissipation of
alcohol sufficient per se to conduct a less invasive breath test). Blood tests
without a warrant have been upheld as reasonable searches under both the
Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 as long as a trained medic
performs the test in a reasonable manner. Curran, 116 Wn.2d at 185, 804
P.2d 558.
In Washington, blood tests for alcohol intoxication are also justified
by implied consent under RCW 46.20.308(4). Curran, 116 Wn.2d at 185,
804 P.2d 558 (no violation of article I, section 7 when a blood sample is
taken pursuant to RCW 46.20.308(4)); see also State v. Baldwin, 109 Wn.
App. 516, 518, 37 P.3d 1220 (2001). Notably, the lawful arrest of a
motorist is a prerequisite for operation of the implied consent statute;
otherwise, express consent is required for the blood test of a motorist who
is not under arrest. State v. Wetherell, 82 Wn.2d 865, 870 71, 514 P.2d
1069 (1973). The exigent circumstance of dissipation of blood alcohol has
also been used to justify a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a
residence to arrest a suspect and seize a blood sample. State v. Komoto, 40
Wn. App. 200, 211 13, 697 P.2d 1025 (1985) (officer used a passkey to
enter an apartment and arrest suspect following felony hit and run). But,
as stated above, the natural dissipation of blood alcohol does not provide
an exigency per se in every case. See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 145, 133 S. Ct.
1552; Baird, 187 Wn.2d at 221, 386 P.3d 239.
In order to deter recidivism and identify persons who commit crimes,
no warrant is required under the Fourth Amendment to collect a DNA
sample from every adult or juvenile convicted of a felony, harassment,
stalking, or communication with a minor for immoral purposes, or
adjudicated guilty of an equivalent juvenile offense. See RCW
43.43.754(1); State v. Surge, 122 Wn. App. 448, 450, 94 P.3d 345 (2004)
(holding that State v. Olivas, 122 Wn.2d 73, 856 P.2d 1076 (1993), is
controlling on this issue); see also Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 466,
133 S. Ct. 1958, 186 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2013).
5.14(c) Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Persons Located on
Premises Being Searched
In limited instances, police may conduct a search of a person on the
premises but not named in the warrant. State v. Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d 289,
301, 654 P.2d 96 (1982), abrogated on other grounds by Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993). To
detain or search an individual other than the occupant, there must be
“presence plus.” See id. In other words, the officers must have “reasonable
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cause” to believe that the person is concealing evidence sought and
immediate seizure is necessary to prevent its destruction. State v.
Halverson, 21 Wn. App. 35, 38, 584 P.2d 408 (1978) (although a specific
warrant to search premises cannot automatically be converted into a
general one to search individuals, “defendant’s suspicious conduct gave
the police reasonable cause to search his person”). “Reasonable cause”
requires that the person engage in some type of suspicious activity.
Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d at 301, 654 P.2d 96. Officers may also conduct a
limited search for weapons to protect themselves during the execution of
the warrant. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed.
2d 238 (1979); State v. Allen, 93 Wn.2d 170, 172, 606 P.2d 1235 (1980).
For a more complete discussion of when occupants may be searched
during the execution of a premises search warrant, see supra § 3.7(b).
5.15 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF MOTOR VEHICLES:
INTRODUCTION
The court treats automobiles and other motor vehicles as a special
category in search and seizure law for two reasons. First, the reasonable
expectation of privacy in a vehicle is less than that in a home or an article
on a person. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424, 124 S. Ct. 885, 157
L. Ed. 2d 843 (2004) (“The Fourth Amendment does not treat a motorist’s
car as his castle.”). Second, the mobility of a vehicle may make obtaining
a warrant prior to a search or seizure impractical. See id.; State v. Johnson,
128 Wn.2d 431, 449, 453 54, 909 P.2d 293 (1996). Under both article I,
section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, the fact that it is possible to sleep in
a vehicle does not give rise to the same privacy rights that attach to fixed
dwellings. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 L.
Ed. 2d. 406 (1985); Johnson, 128 Wn.2d at 449, 909 P.2d 293 (lessened
privacy interest for sleeper compartment of a tractor-trailer rig); State v.
Cantrell, 124 Wn.2d 183, 190, 875 P.2d 1208 (1994). The reasonable
expectation of privacy in motor vehicles is discussed in section 1.3(e). See
also 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.2(b), at 731 49 (5th ed.
2012).
A vehicle may be the subject of a warrantless search when the
circumstances of the search are consistent with other exceptions to the
warrant requirement, such as the search incident to arrest or the Terry stopand-frisk exceptions. See 3 LaFave, supra § 7.1(b), at 673–96; see also 2
LaFave, supra § 4.9(d) (discussing the Terry stop-and-frisk search). Courts
have also held that police may enter a vehicle to aid a person in distress or
to seek information about a person in distress, United States v. Haley, 581
F.2d 723, 725 26 (8th Cir. 1978), but no Washington case has directly
addressed the issue.
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The search of a motor vehicle and its contents are treated differently
under the Fourth Amendment than they are under article I, section 7.
Compare Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed.
2d 485 (2009) (police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s
arrest to obtain evidence of the crime of arrest), with State v. Valdez, 167
Wn.2d 761, 779, 224 P.3d 751 (2009) (only preservation of evidence and
officer safety are valid reasons to search a vehicle incident to arrest). The
next sections set forth the standards under article I, section 7 and the
Fourth Amendment. Then, the general principles governing automobile
impoundment and inventory searches are addressed.
5.16 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF A VEHICLE UNDER THE WASHINGTON
STATE CONSTITUTION
The warrantless search of a vehicle is much more restricted under
article I, section 7 than it is under the Fourth Amendment. First,
Washington does not allow warrantless searches of vehicles on probable
cause grounds—the “automobile exception” applied in federal court. State
v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 394–95, 219 P.3d 651 (2009). Second, exigent
circumstances will be found only where obtaining a warrant is not practical
because the delay inherent in securing a warrant would compromise
officer safety, facilitate escape, or permit the destruction of evidence. State
v. Tibbles, 169 Wn.2d 364, 373, 236 P.3d 885 (2010). Lastly, search of a
vehicle incident to arrest is only proper if there are concerns for officer
safety or destruction of the evidence. State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 197,
275 P.3d 289 (2012); State v. Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 761, 779, 224 P.3d 751
(2009); State v. Glenn, 140 Wn. App. 627, 636, 166 P.3d 1235 (2007)
(vehicle search justified under the officer safety exception by credible
report that a gun had been displayed from the vehicle).
Once the immediate danger of harm to police or destruction of
evidence is removed by arrest and police control of the vehicle, police
must obtain a warrant or have another exception to search the vehicle.
State v. Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169, 179, 233 P.3d 879 (2010) (the search of a
vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant is unlawful absent a
reasonable basis to believe that the arrestee poses a safety risk). In Snapp,
the court held there could be no concerns for officer safety because the
defendant was in custody and removed from the vehicle; therefore, the
officers exceeded the scope of the search incident to arrest when they
searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d at
197, 275 P.3d 289.
Even if the officers may properly search the passenger compartment,
they may not open locked containers. State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 152,
720 P.2d 436 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Valdez, 167 Wn.2d
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761, 224 P.3d 751. This contrasts with the federal standard, which permits
the warrantless search incident to arrest of both locked and unlocked
containers. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.1(c), at
697 707 (5th ed. 2012). “The rationale for this departure from the federal
standard is that use of a lock demonstrates the individual’s expectation of
privacy and the presence of a lock minimizes the danger of an arrestee
gaining access to the contents of the container.” State v. Johnson, 77 Wn.
App. 441, 446, 892 P.2d 106 (1995), aff’d, 128 Wn.2d 431, 909 P.2d 293
(1996) (discussing Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 720 P.2d 436). Therefore,
police in Washington must obtain a search warrant prior to searching any
locked glove compartment or other locked container.
Police officers may make a limited entry and investigation into a
vehicle that they have probable cause to believe has been the subject of a
burglary, tampering, or theft. State v. Lynch, 84 Wn. App. 467, 477 78,
929 P.2d 460 (1996). Officers may search those areas they reasonably
believe to have been affected and those areas reasonably believed to
contain some evidence of ownership. Id. at 477 78, 929 P.2d 460. Officers
may also make a warrantless entry into a vehicle to look in places where
registration papers might be kept if the driver has fled the vehicle and the
officer reasonably believed the vehicle had been stolen. State v. Orcut, 22
Wn. App. 730, 734 35, 591 P.2d 872 (1979).
5.17 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF A VEHICLE UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
In contrast to article I, section 7, the Fourth Amendment includes the
“automobile exception,” which allows officers to search a vehicle without
a warrant so long as they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle
contains contraband. United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 483, 105 S. Ct.
881, 83 L. Ed. 2d 890 (1985) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 149, 162, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925)); United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982). A warrant is
not required because “the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” Carroll, 267 U.S. at
153, 45 S. Ct. 280. Because the vehicle itself presents an exigency, the
officers do not need a separate exigency to perform a warrantless search.
Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467, 119 S. Ct. 2013, 144 L. Ed. 2d 442
(1999) (no need for a separate finding of exigency in addition to probable
cause); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 52, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L.
Ed. 2d 419 (1970) (actual exigent circumstances not necessary to justify
warrantless probable cause search). But see Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct.
1663, 1671, 201 L. Ed. 2d 9 (2018) (automobile exception does not justify
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a warrantless intrusion into the curtilage of a home to reach a parked
motorcycle).
A search may extend to a vehicle in its entirety, including any of the
vehicle’s contents, both locked and unlocked. Ross, 456 U.S. at 821, 825,
102 S. Ct. 2157; California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579, 111 S. Ct. 1982,
114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407,
125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 842 (2005) (warrantless search of car trunk
valid where narcotics-detection dog alerted on trunk when police lawfully
pulled the car over for a traffic stop). Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that, even prior to arrest, police officers with probable cause to
search a car may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are
capable of concealing the object of the search. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526
U.S. 295, 307, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1999). The scope of
the permissible search is limited to the size and shape of the items sought,
and police may only search where it is reasonable to believe the items
sought may be hidden. See id.
The police may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle even after
they have taken the vehicle into custody and its contents are in no danger
of removal or disturbance. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153 54, 45 S. Ct. 280;
Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 382, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 80 L. Ed. 2d 381
(1984). The rationale is that the initial justification for the warrantless
search does not disappear after impoundment. Johns, 469 U.S. at 484, 105
S. Ct. 881. The vehicle, however, must have been mobile at the time of
impoundment for the Carroll rule to apply. Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 460–62, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971) (a warrant
was required when defendant was arrested in his home and had no access
to a vehicle after arrest), overruled in part on other grounds by Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990); see
also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390–91, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 L.
Ed. 2d. 406 (1985). As discussed in section 5.15, Washington State has
rejected the “automobile exception.”
Under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, officers may
also search a vehicle absent probable cause incident to the lawful arrest of
an occupant. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L.
Ed. 2d 485 (2009). However, the difference between the Fourth
Amendment’s application and article I, section 7 is in the scope of the
exception. Under the Fourth Amendment, officers may search the vehicle
when there are concerns for officer safety, when there are concerns for
destruction of the evidence, and when it is reasonable to believe that
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest will be found in the vehicle. Id.
The first two instances apply when the arrestee is unsecured and within
reaching distance of the passenger compartment. Id. Thus, these two
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instances will rarely justify a search. The third prong, allowing officers to
search when evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may be found in the
vehicle, is permissible only under the Fourth Amendment, not under
article I, section 7. State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 197, 275 P.3d 289
(2012) (allowing search incident to arrest only under the “unrestrained”
exceptions).
5.18 WARRANTLESS VEHICLE SEARCHES BASED ON GENERALIZED
SUSPICION: SPOT CHECKS OF MOTORISTS
Under the Fourth Amendment, a reasonable vehicle roadblock, or
spot check, may be another exception to the warrant requirement. See
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660
(1979); see also Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449 50,
110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990); United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 56, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (1976).
To determine the reasonableness of spot checks or vehicle checkpoints,
the court will weigh the government’s interest in the checkpoints, the
extent to which the program advances the government’s goals, and the
amount of intrusion on the individual motorist. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S.
419, 427, 124 S. Ct. 885, 157 L. Ed. 2d 843 (2004). For police to institute
general spot check procedures, the procedures must constitute “a
sufficiently productive mechanism to justify the intrusion.” State v.
Marchand, 104 Wn.2d 434, 437, 706 P.2d 225 (1985). In addition, the spot
check procedures must be such that “the exercise of discretion by law
enforcement officials [is] sufficiently constrained.” Id. at 438, 706 P.2d
225.
Article I, section 7 prohibits sobriety checkpoints that impose no
statutory constraints on officers’ discretion to conduct intrusive searches
involving extensive invasions of privacy, such as smelling suspect’s
breath, visual inspections of automobile, and tests of physical dexterity.
City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 459–60, 755 P.2d 775 (1988);
see also Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48, 121 S. Ct. 447, 148 L.
Ed. 2d 333 (2000) (a highway drug checkpoint is unconstitutional where
officers and drug-detecting canine would examine, through open view, a
predetermined number of drivers). Lastly, roadblocks randomly enforced
or implemented to detect ordinary criminal wrongdoing are unreasonable.
Indianapolis, 531 U.S. at 41, 121 S. Ct. 447. In the absence of a valid spot
check program, police officers may stop a motor vehicle to check for valid
registration or possible automobile violations only when they have a
reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 999 S.
Ct. 1391 (randomly stopping drivers to check registration violated the
Fourth Amendment).
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The Washington Supreme Court has held sobriety checkpoint
programs unconstitutional under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth
Amendment. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d at 458, 460, 755 P.2d 775. Relying on
article I, section 7’s explicit recognition of the privacy rights of the state’s
citizens and requirements that all searches be conducted under “authority
of law,” the Mesiani court rejected Seattle’s argument that the stops fell
within an exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 457–58, 755 P.2d
775. In one of the cases relied upon by the city, State v. Silvernail, 25 Wn.
App. 185, 605 P.2d 1279 (1980), the court permitted a warrantless search
when there was information that a serious felony had recently been
committed. Id. at 190, 605 P.2d 1279. The Mesiani court distinguished
Silvernail, stating notice that a felony had recently been committed “is far
different from an inference from statistics that there are inebriated drivers
in the area.” Id. at 458 n.1, 755 P.2d 775. This differs from the Fourth
Amendment, which permits sobriety checkpoints if all vehicles passing
through are detained. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481.
5.19 FORFEITURE OR LEVY
Courts in Washington, while recognizing that “[s]earches and
seizures of motor vehicles used in drug transactions are an everyday
occurrence,” have held that warrantless inventory searches of vehicles
forfeited under drug laws are permitted under article I, section 7. State v.
McFadden, 63 Wn. App. 441, 449, 820 P.2d 53 (1991), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Adel, 136 Wn.2d 629, 965 P.2d 1072 (1998). In Lowery
v. Nelson, 43 Wn. App. 747, 750, 719 P.2d 594 (1986), the court held that,
under the Fourth Amendment, police are not required to obtain a search
warrant before exercising the authority granted by the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act to seize a vehicle used to transport a controlled substance.
Id. at 750, 719 P.2d 594 (discussing RCW 69.50.505(1)(d)); see also
Rozner v. Bellevue, 116 Wn.2d 342, 350, 804 P.2d 24 (1991); State v.
Gwinner, 59 Wn. App. 119, 123, 796 P.2d 728 (1990) (upholding seizure
under Federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970, 21 U.S.C. § 881). Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I,
section 7, police may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle seized
pursuant to the forfeiture statute on the theory that the search is a valid
inventory or evidentiary search. McFadden, 63 Wn. App. at 449, 820 P.2d
53; see 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.5(c), at 892 98 (5th
ed. 2012).
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5.20 IMPOUNDMENT
“Impoundment is a seizure because it involves the governmental
taking of a vehicle into its exclusive custody.” State v. Coss, 87 Wn. App.
891, 898, 943 P.2d 1126 (1997). The facts of each case determine the
reasonableness of each particular impoundment. Id. A vehicle may be
impounded without a warrant in three circumstances: (1) when the vehicle
itself is evidence of a crime; (2) when the removal of the vehicle is
necessary as part of “community caretaking”; and (3) when the driver has
committed one of the traffic infractions that authorizes impoundment.
State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 189, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980); see also State
v. Lynch, 84 Wn. App. 467, 477 78, 929 P.2d 460 (1996). Officers do not
need the defendant’s consent to conduct an inventory search of an
impounded vehicle. State v. Tyler, 177 Wn.2d 690, 711, 302 P.3d 165
(2013).
A vehicle lawfully parked at one’s home or even on a public street
may not be impounded simply because its owner has been arrested.
Miranda v. Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 864 66 (9th Cir. 2005). Similarly,
impoundment is improper when the arrestee’s release is imminent, and the
vehicle does not pose a safety hazard. See State v. Bales, 15 Wn. App. 834,
836, 552 P.2d 688 (1976). Also, when police conduct warrantless
impoundments and subsequent inventory searches, the searches may not
form a pretext for a search that the police otherwise could not have made.
State v. White, 83 Wn. App. 770, 774 75, 924 P.2d 55 (1996), rev’d on
other grounds, 135 Wn.2d 761, 958 P.2d 982 (1998). See generally 3
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.5(e) (5th ed. 2012).
5.20(a) Evidence of Crime
“A car may be lawfully impounded as evidence of a crime if an
officer has probable cause to believe that it was stolen or used in the
commission of a felony.” State v. Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d 632, 647, 716
P.2d 295 (1986). In Terrovona, the Washington Supreme Court held that
police properly impounded a vehicle that they had probable cause to
believe was used in the commission of a felony, where the defendant had
lured the victim to the murder site by telephoning him and asking him to
bring gasoline to the defendant’s empty vehicle. Id. at 647 48, 716 P.2d
295. Furthermore, an officer who has probable cause to believe a vehicle
contains contraband or evidence of a crime may seize and hold the car for
the reasonable time needed to obtain a search warrant, and the car may be
towed to an impound yard during seizure. State v. Huff, 64 Wn. App. 641,
653, 826 P.2d 698 (1992).
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5.20(b) Community Caretaking Function
The “community caretaking function” permits impoundment when
an abandoned vehicle impedes traffic, poses a threat to public safety and
convenience, or is itself threatened by vandalism or theft of its contents.
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 69, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L.
Ed. 2d 1000 (1976); State v. Sweet, 44 Wn. App. 226, 236, 721 P.2d 560
(1986). For example, Sweet held that impoundment was proper under the
community caretaking exception when the arrestee was unconscious,
items of value were visible inside the vehicle, and the vehicle was in a
high-crime area. 44 Wn. App. at 236 37, 721 P.2d 560.
Under the community caretaking exception, police do not need to
have a reasonable belief that the vehicle is connected with criminal
activity. See State v. Chisholm, 39 Wn. App. 864, 866 67, 696 P.2d 41
(1985). However, police should first make an inquiry as to the availability
of the owner or the owner’s spouse or friends to move the vehicle. See
State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 743, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984); State v.
Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 153, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980). Police should also
consider the alternative of parking and locking the car. Williams, 102
Wn.2d at 743, 689 P.2d 1065.
5.20(c) Enforcement of Traffic Regulations
Officers may impound a vehicle as part of enforcing traffic
regulations only when constitutionally reasonable and necessary to
prevent a continuing violation of a traffic offense for which the legislature
has specifically authorized impoundment. See State v. Hill, 68 Wn. App.
300, 305, 842 P.2d 996 (1993). Impoundment is unreasonable and
improper if a reasonable alternative to impoundment exists, such as when
the owner of the vehicle, or a passenger in the vehicle, is available to
transport it. Id. at 306, 842 P.2d 996. Police officers are to use discretion
when deciding to impound a vehicle and, while an officer need not exhaust
all possibilities, the officer must at least consider alternatives to
impoundment. State v. Coss, 87 Wn. App. 891, 899, 943 P.2d 1126 (1997)
(impoundment improper where officer failed to consider alternatives to
impoundment; a validly licensed passenger could have driven vehicle
from scene of traffic stop); see also State v. Reynoso, 41 Wn. App. 113,
119, 702 P.2d 1222 (1985).
5.20(d) Warrantless Detention
Officers may make a warrantless detention of a vehicle by deflating
its tires during the time when officers are in pursuit of a suspect. State v.
Burgess, 43 Wn. App. 253, 259, 716 P.2d 948 (1986). In Burgess, the court
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held that, because the detention was unaccompanied by an exploratory
search, the detention was reasonably restricted in time and place and was
necessary to prevent the suspect’s flight from the scene. Id.
5.21 INVENTORY SEARCHES OF IMPOUNDED VEHICLES
When a vehicle is lawfully impounded, police are permitted to
conduct a warrantless inventory search. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367,
371, 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987) (inventory searches are a
well-defined exception to the warrant requirement); State v. Morales, 154
Wn. App. 26, 48, 225 P.3d 311 (2010), rev’d in part on other grounds,
173 Wn.2d 560, 269 P.3d 263 (2012); State v. White, 135 Wn.2d 761,
766 67, 958 P.2d 982 (1998) (scope of inventory search limited to those
areas necessary to fulfill its purpose). Routine inventory searches are
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when police follow standard
practices and the search is not a pretext for obtaining evidence the police
would not be able to obtain otherwise. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364, 375, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976); State v. White,
83 Wn. App. 770, 775, 958 P.2d 982 (1996), rev’d on other grounds, 135
Wn.2d 761, 958 P.2d 982 (1998). Police do not need to obtain a
defendant’s consent before performing an inventory search. State v. Tyler,
177 Wn.2d 690, 711, 302 P.3d 165, 176 (2013).
Washington courts have long held that a non-investigatory inventory
search of an automobile is proper when conducted in good faith for the
purposes of (1) finding, listing, and securing property belonging to the
detainee from loss during detention, and (2) protecting police and
temporary storage bailees from liability due to dishonest claims of theft.
State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 154, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980); White, 83 Wn.
App. at 777, 958 P.2d 982. An inventory search does not violate the
owner’s Fourth Amendment rights when the search follows written,
standardized inventory procedures. State v. Mireles, 73 Wn. App. 605,
612 13, 871 P.2d 162 (1994).
The scope of an inventory search is “limited to those areas necessary
to fulfill its purpose”—that is, “limited to protecting against substantial
risks to property.” Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 155, 622 P.2d 1218. For example,
police in Washington may not open and examine a locked trunk “absent a
manifest necessity for conducting such a search.” Id. at 156, 622 P.2d 1218
(no great danger of theft to property left in trunk); White, 135 Wn.2d at
765 67, 958 P.2d 982 (police may not search a locked trunk, despite the
fact that the trunk could be opened by a switch located inside the passenger
compartment). Police also may not open luggage located in an impounded
vehicle absent consent or exigent circumstances. Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 158,
622 P.2d 1218.
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In State v. Williams, the court suggested that police must obtain the
owner’s consent before conducting an inventory search of an impounded
vehicle pursuant to the community caretaking exception. 102 Wn.2d 733,
743, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984). However, an inventory search of a vehicle
impounded pursuant to the community caretaking exception without the
owner’s consent was held to be valid in State v. Sweet, 44 Wn. App. 226,
721 P.2d 560 (1986). In Sweet, the owner was unconscious and unable to
either give or withhold his consent; there was also no evidence suggesting
that the search was conducted in bad faith or that it was a mere pretext for
an investigatory search. Id. at 237, 721 P.2d 560; see also State v. Tyler,
177 Wn.2d 690, 711, 302 P.3d 165 (2013) (consent not required as a
condition precedent to an inventory search).
5.22 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES IN SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS
The court has permitted warrantless searches in special environments
when the danger to the public is severe and the degree of intrusion small.
For example, the court permitted warrantless magnetometer (metal
detector) searches at airports to prevent hijackings and bombings. United
States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 2007). Conversely, the
Washington Supreme Court has rejected as unconstitutional the
warrantless pat down of patrons at rock concerts. Jacobsen v. City of
Seattle, 98 Wn.2d 668, 673 74, 658 P.2d 653 (1983). The Jacobsen court
concluded there is a greater risk of danger at airports and courthouses than
at rock concerts, and pat-down searches constitute a higher degree of
intrusion than magnetometer and typical courthouse searches. Id., 658
P.2d 653. For a discussion of warrantless searches in other special
environments, see infra § 6.
5.23 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF OBJECTS IN THE
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MAILS
Law enforcement officers may seize first-class mail and packages
transported by private carriers when they have probable cause to believe
that the mail or packages contain contraband. See United States v. Van
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251 52, 90 S. Ct. 1029, 25 L. Ed. 2d 282 (1970);
see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 121 22, 104 S. Ct. 1652,
80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984). The contents of such mail or packages may not be
examined without a warrant, however, unless the reasonable expectation
of privacy in the contents no longer exists or the examination consists of a
test that will only disclose the presence of the contraband. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. at 121 22, 104 S. Ct. 1652; see also State v. Wolohan, 23 Wn. App.
813, 820, 598 P.2d 421 (1979). A canine sniff may be used to establish
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probable cause that a package lawfully held by police contains contraband.
State v. Jackson, 82 Wn. App. 594, 606, 918 P.2d 945 (1996).

CHAPTER 6
Special Environments
This chapter first discusses the differences in reasonable expectations
of privacy, burdens of proof, and warrant requirements in three special
environments: (1) public schools, (2) detention and correctional facilities,
and (3) international borders. Next, it discusses special considerations in
administrative searches.
6.1 SCHOOLS
A student’s legitimate expectation of privacy must be balanced
against the school’s legitimate need to provide an environment conducive
to learning. Consequently, schools are considered a special environment
in which the usual burdens of proof and warrant requirements are slightly
relaxed. Section 6.1(a) discusses how this balance permits a school official
to search a student without a warrant, or even probable cause, so long as a
reasonable suspicion exists. Section 6.1(b) discusses this standard in the
context of drug-testing programs for athletes.
6.1(a) Burden of Proof and Warrant Requirements
Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, school
authorities may conduct a warrantless search of a student without probable
cause if, under the totality of the circumstances, the school official has a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 341, 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985); State v. Meneese, 174
Wn.2d 937, 943, 282 P.3d 83 (2012). School officials may search a student
with less than probable cause because their “primary duty [is] to maintain
order and discipline at school, not discover and prevent crime like a police
officer.” Meneese, 174 Wn.2d at 943, 282 P.3d 83. However, if the search
is conducted by a police officer and not a school official, the school
exception does not apply and the officer must have a warrant. Id. (finding
search of student’s backpack by officer on school grounds unconstitutional
without warrant or other exception). Of course, the school official still

1443

1444

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:1277

must have particularized suspicion with respect to each individual
searched. Kuehn v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 103 Wn.2d 594, 599, 694
P.2d 1078 (1985) (individualized suspicion required for search of school
band members’ luggage). See generally 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 10.11(b), at 597 629 (5th ed. 2012).
A search is reasonable if (1) it is justified at its inception, and (2) it
is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the
interference in the first place. State v. B.A.S., 103 Wn. App. 549, 553, 13
P.3d 244 (2000) (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, 105 S. Ct. 733).
Additionally, there must be a nexus between the item sought and the
infraction being investigated. Id. at 554, 105 S. Ct. 733 (holding that no
connection existed between the school’s closed campus policy that
provided for searches of students found violating the policy and the
likelihood that a student was bringing contraband onto school property).
A search is unconstitutional if it exceeds the scope of initial reasonable
suspicion. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 375,
129 S. Ct. 2633, 174 L. Ed. 2d 354 (2009) (holding that a strip search of a
13-year-old student suspected of possessing illegal drugs was excessively
intrusive).
Although Washington allows for school searches on less than
probable cause, the Washington Supreme Court has not adopted a “special
needs” exception as appears under the Fourth Amendment. Compare York
v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 312, 178 P.3d 995
(2008) (no general special needs exception under article I, section 7), with
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709
(1987), and Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct.
1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989) (drug testing under special needs
exception). Thus, the court has “not created a general special needs
exception or adopted a strict scrutiny type analysis that would allow the
State to depart from the warrant requirement whenever it could articulate
a special need beyond the normal need for law enforcement.” York, 163
Wn.2d at 314, 178 P.3d 995. Thus, a school cannot conduct a general,
suspicionless search. Id.
6.1(b) Drug Testing of Student Athletes
The Washington Supreme Court has held that random and
suspicionless drug testing of student athletes is not permissible under
article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. York v. Wahkiakum
Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 310, 178 P.3d 995 (2008). Conversely,
the Fourth Amendment allows random drug testing without individualized
suspicion. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664 65, 115 S.
Ct. 2386, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1995); see also Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch.
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Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 153 L. Ed. 2d
735 (2002) (holding mandatory drug testing as a condition of participating
in extracurricular sports is constitutional).
Specifically, the Washington Supreme Court held that a student
athlete’s fundamental privacy interest in controlling his or her bodily
functions required school officials to meet a “reasonableness” or
“individualized” suspicion standard. York, 163 Wn.2d at 308, 178 P.3d
995 (citing State v. McKinnon, 88 Wn.2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977) (holding
school officials must have some “reasonable” or “individualized”
suspicion to protect students from unreasonable searches)). In McKinnon,
the court set forth several factors for determining the reasonableness of a
search: “the child’s age, history, and school record, the prevalence and
seriousness of the problem in the school to which the search was directed,
the exigency to make the search without delay, and the probative value
and reliability of the information used as a justification for the search.”
McKinnon, 88 Wn.2d at 81, 558 P.2d 781 (citations omitted). Because
Washington has not adopted any general special needs exception, a search
without reasonable and individualized suspicion is unconstitutional. York,
163 Wn.2d at 308, 178 P.3d 995.
6.2 PRISONS, CUSTODIAL DETENTION, AND POST-CONVICTION
ALTERNATIVES TO PRISON
Incarceration affects all aspects of an individual’s search and seizure
protections: the reasonable expectation of privacy, the levels of proof
required for intrusions, and warrant requirements. This section provides a
sampling of some of the ways incarceration, or even conviction alone,
alters search and seizure protections.
6.2(a) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Prisoners are not accorded the same expectations of privacy in their
cells and effects that citizens generally enjoy in their homes and effects.
Matter of Personal Restraint of Benn, 134 Wn.2d 868, 909, 952 P.2d 116
(1998) (holding convicted “prisoners have no legitimate expectation of
privacy and . . . the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable
searches does not apply [to] prison cells”) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 530, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984))). Pretrial
detainees, like prisoners, may be subjected to unannounced searches of
their living areas. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 589 91, 104 S. Ct.
3227, 82 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 555 57, 99
S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979). Additionally, jailed suspects have no
expectation of privacy in property located in the property room at the
prison. State v. Cheatam, 112 Wn. App. 778, 785 87, 51 P.3d 138 (2002),
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aff’d, 150 Wn.2d 626, 81 P.3d 830 (2003). This holds true when the
defendant is transferred to a hospital along with his or her personal effects.
State v. Puapuaga, 164 Wn.2d 515, 523 24, 192 P.3d 360 (2008) (no
privacy interest in personal effects when transferred to mental institution).
A convicted sex offender has a minimal expectation of privacy in
personal body fluids; thus, the State may remove blood for testing without
a defendant’s consent. In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121 Wn.2d 80, 92 93,
96, 847 P.2d 455 (1993) (upholding constitutionality of RCW 70.24.340,
which mandates HIV testing for adults and juveniles who have been
convicted of a sexual offense under RCW ch. 9A.44). Additionally, under
RCW 43.43.754, the state may obtain blood samples and perform DNA
tests without the defendant’s consent following conviction. State v. Olivas,
122 Wn.2d 73, 98, 856 P.2d 1076 (1993) (upholding the statute’s
constitutionality under Fourth Amendment).
After a defendant has been convicted of an offense and released, his
or her privacy interests remain diminished. For example, the warrantless
search of the home of a convict released pending appeal does not violate
constitutional protections. State v. Lucas, 56 Wn. App. 236, 240 41, 783
P.2d 121 (1989) (“one released pending appeal . . . should expect close
scrutiny.”). And, as discussed below, police may search a parolee’s vehicle
based on a “well-founded” suspicion of criminal activity. State v.
Coahran, 27 Wn. App. 664, 666, 620 P.2d 116 (1980).
6.2(b) Warrantless Searches and Seizures
Warrants are not required for searches of prisoners or pretrial
detainees. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 591, 104 S. Ct. 3227, 82
L. Ed. 2d 438 (1984); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526, 104 S. Ct.
3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984). Probable cause and individualized
suspicion are also not required for such searches. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 555 60, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979) (pretrial
detainees); State v. Baker, 28 Wn. App. 423, 424 25, 623 P.2d 1172
(1981) (prisoners). Permitting routine and warrantless searches of
inmates’ cells is reasonable because security interests of the correctional
institution outweigh the minimal intrusion into inmates’ privacy. State v.
Rainford, 86 Wn. App. 431, 438, 936 P.2d 1210 (1997) (“Washington
courts have held that an inmate’s expectation of privacy is necessarily
lowered while in custody and that warrantless searches may be conducted
if reasonable.”).
Warrants are also not required for searches of parolees, probationers,
work release inmates, and convicts released pending appeal, or for any of
these groups’ homes and effects. See generally United States v. Knights,
534 U.S. 112, 122 S. Ct. 587, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2001) (discussing
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whether a parole condition permitting the search of the “person, property,
place of residence, vehicle, [and] personal effects . . . with or without a
search warrant” satisfies the Fourth Amendment); see also Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843, 857, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250 (2006)
(neither probable cause nor warrant required for search of parolee stopped
by police officer in public); State v. Campbell, 103 Wn.2d 1, 22–23, 691
P.2d 929 (1984); State v. Lucas, 56 Wn. App. 236, 243 44, 783 P.2d 121
(1989). Furthermore, persons residing with prisoners who are released to
a home-detention program are required to sign consent forms that allow
for warrantless searches and seizures of the property where the person and
the prisoner reside. State v. Cole, 122 Wn. App. 319, 323, 93 P.3d 209
(2004).
6.2(c) Strip and Body Cavity Searches of Arrestees and Detainees
In Washington, routine strip searches are governed by statute and
administrative regulation. See RCW 10.79.060 170; WAC §§ 289-02020, 289-02-100, 289-02-200. A defendant’s state protections from a strip
search under article I, section 7 are coextensive with the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights. State v. Audley, 77 Wn. App. 897, 904, 908,
894 P.2d 1359 (1995) (holding that RCW 10.79.130(1)(a) is constitutional
under article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment and that such searches
are permissible where they are supported by reasonable suspicion that an
arrestee is concealing contraband that poses a threat to jail security). Only
a reasonable suspicion is required to conduct a “dry cell search” of a
prisoner. State v. Rainford, 86 Wn. App. 431, 433, 435 n.1, 936 P.2d 1210
(1997) (“dry cell search” typically involves placing prisoner in private
room under 24-hour observation until prisoner has undergone three bowel
movements and then examining the feces for signs of drug use).
For strip and body cavity searches conducted prior to a detainee’s
first court appearance, probable cause and a warrant are required unless
(1) the detainee is charged with a violent offense; (2) the detainee is
charged with an offense involving escape, burglary, use of a deadly
weapon, or contraband; or (3) police have a reasonable suspicion that the
detainee is concealing contraband, weapons, or fruits or instrumentalities
of crime on his or her person. WAC §§ 289-16-100 to -200; cf. State v.
Hartzog, 96 Wn.2d 383, 396 97, 635 P.2d 694 (1981) (visual and body
cavity searches of prisoners leaving penal institution for court appearance
are permissible); State v. Brown, 33 Wn. App. 843, 848, 658 P.2d 44
(1983) (reasonable suspicion for strip search of prisoner found after
prisoner had personal contact with visitor).
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6.3 INTERNATIONAL BORDERS
Searches and seizures of travelers at or near the international borders
fall within the scope of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, but
courts generally do not require such intrusions to meet the strict levels of
proof and warrant requirements of ordinary searches and seizures. This
section briefly describes some of the situations in which traditional proof
and warrant requirements have been relaxed.
6.3(a) Permanent Border Checkpoints
Customs officials may search persons and vehicles crossing the
border at permanent checkpoints into the United States under 19 U.S.C. §
1467. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154, 124 S. Ct.
1582, 158 L. Ed. 2d 311 (2004) (“[A]utomobiles seeking entry into this
country may be searched.”); see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 566, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (1976) (“[S]tops for
brief questioning routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are
consistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by
warrant.”); York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 345,
178 P.3d 995 (2008) (recognizing border exception). Although border
agents do not need a warrant to conduct a search at a border crossing, the
statute does not obviate the requirement that a particular search or seizure
be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See AlmeidaSanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272, 93 S. Ct. 2535, 37 L. Ed. 2d
596 (1973) (holding that although a statute authorizes customs searches
without probable cause or mere suspicion, no act of Congress can
authorize a violation of the Constitution). Race or color is not a sufficient
basis for making an investigatory stop by border patrol agents. See State
v. Almanza-Guzman, 94 Wn. App. 563, 567, 972 P.2d 468 (1999).
The scope of a Terry stop at the border may be relatively intrusive
when border patrol agents suspect individuals are smuggling narcotics. See
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544, 105 S. Ct.
3304, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1985) (individual fitting courier profile of
alimentary canal smuggler may be detained for 16 hours pending bowel
movement). But if the search is intrusive—as intrusive as a body cavity
search—the Ninth Circuit requires a showing of “a real suspicion, directed
specifically to that person,” supported by specific and articulable facts
before the officials may search the suspect. United States v. GuadalupeGarza, 421 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1970); Henderson v. United States, 390
F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967). If agents have only reasonable suspicion,
they may not hold the suspect for an unreasonable amount of time. Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 03, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983)
(officers who had only reasonable suspicion that airport traveler was
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smuggling narcotics could not detain traveler in a special room and seize
his tickets and luggage); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 10,
103 S. Ct. 2637, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1983) (90-minute detention of luggage
at international airport unreasonable when law enforcement officers had
only reasonable suspicion of smuggling).
6.3(b) Roving Patrols: Illegal Aliens and Searches Away from the Border
To stop a vehicle, officers conducting roving patrols near borders
must have a reasonable suspicion, based on “specific articulable facts,”
that the vehicle contains illegal aliens. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1975). Washington
has declined to follow the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on this
matter, allowing a search away from a border only with probable cause.
See York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 312 n.19, 178
P.3d 995 (2008) (discussing State v. Quick, 59 Wn. App. 228, 232, 796
P.2d 764 (1990), and its deviation from the Brignoni–Ponce federal
standard).
6.4 ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
The Fourth Amendment governs searches conducted for
administrative purposes, regardless of whether criminal prosecution is
anticipated. See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 291 93, 104 S.
Ct. 641, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984) (determining that the Fourth Amendment
applies to inspection of home that was partially damaged by fire, even
when purpose of inspection is to determine fire’s origin and not criminal
conduct); Bosteder v. Renton, 155 Wn.2d 18, 35, 117 P.3d 316 (2005)
(superseded by statute on other grounds); Dodge City Saloon, Inc. v.
Washington State Liquor Control Bd., 168 Wn. App. 388, 288 P.3d 343
(2012), review denied, 290 P.3d 994 (2012).
The following sections examine a subject’s reasonable expectations
of privacy during a warrantless search, the warrant requirements in
administrative searches, and the various level of proof requirements.
6.4(a) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
An individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not affected by
the fact that a search is part of an administrative or regulatory program or
has a purpose other than criminal prosecution. See Camara v. Mun. Court,
387 U.S. 523, 532 33, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967) (search of
home for housing code violations); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541,
545 46, 87 S. Ct. 1737, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1967) (search of commercial
premises for fire code violations). As with other searches, if there is no
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expectation of privacy in the area searched, the search does not fall under
Fourth Amendment protections. Centimark Corp. v. Dep’t of Labor &
Indus., 129 Wn. App. 368, 375, 119 P.3d 865 (2005) (no expectation of
privacy in roofing job site when inspector could readily see that the
workers were not wearing fall protection). An administrative search does
not fall under constitutional protections if those conducting the search are
not state actors. See Pasco v. Shaw, 161 Wn.2d 450, 166 P.3d 1157 (2007)
(finding that neither the Fourth Amendment nor article I, section 7 is
violated when a landlord and a privately engaged inspector inspect a rental
property for code violations that impact health and safety).
Although some pervasively regulated industries are denied
reasonable expectations of privacy, the Fourth Amendment protects
against civil and criminal searches of commercial as well as residential
premises. See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313, 98 S. Ct.
1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978) (except for particular industries, such as
those involving liquor and firearms where no reasonable expectation of
privacy exists, the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
administrative searches of commercial premises); see also Michigan v.
Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 291, 104 S. Ct. 641, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984). If
the industry is granted only a limited expectation of privacy, that interest
must be balanced against the need for a particular administrative search.
See Murphy v. State, 115 Wn. App. 297, 313, 62 P.3d 533 (2003) (holding
a patient has a limited expectation of privacy in prescription records that
is outweighed by the government’s statutorily mandated interest in
monitoring the flow of drugs from pharmacies to patients). However, there
is no general “heavily regulated industry” exception in Washington. See
State v. Miles, 160 Wn.2d 236, 248–51, 156 P.3d 864 (2007); see also
Bosteder v. Renton, 155 Wn.2d 18, 29, 117 P.3d 316 (2005).
Finally, certain government employees have a reduced expectation
of privacy given the special needs and legitimate workplace purpose. See
Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 177 L. Ed. 2d 216 (2010)
(holding that a police officer’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated
when a supervisor read his personal text messages on a department-issued
pager).
6.4(b) Warrant Requirements
Generally, warrants are required for administrative searches of
private and commercial premises. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S.
523, 532 33, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967). However, when the
traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement apply, a warrant is
unnecessary. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294 95, 104 S. Ct.
641, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984) (warrant not required for entry onto premises
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when consent given or exigent circumstances present because “evidence
of criminal activity . . . discovered during the course of a valid
administrative search . . . may be seized under the ‘plain view’ doctrine”)
(citation omitted).
Warrants are not required in certain limited situations when law
enforcement makes searches pursuant to comprehensive and predictable
legislative schemes. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598 99, 101
S. Ct. 2534, 69 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1981). Such situations are characterized by
a substantial governmental interest in inspection, as in the case of
hazardous industries, and by the necessity of a warrantless inspection to
enforce the legislative purpose. See id. at 598 99, 101 S. Ct. 2534
(congressional scheme authorizing warrantless inspections of mines found
constitutional); see also Murphy v. State, 115 Wn. App. 297, 307 08, 62
P.3d 533 (2003) (state statute requiring pharmacies to keep records of
dispensed prescriptions and to make them available for inspection by state
pharmacy board or other law enforcement officer does not violate search
and seizure provisions of state or federal constitutions). In addition, the
scheme must prove to be an adequate substitute for a warrant by imposing
certainty and regularity in the inspections and by accommodating special
privacy concerns. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S. Ct. 2534.
In Washington, there is no general administrative search warrant
exception for “heavily regulated industries.” Any administrative exception
must be expressly stated in an applicable law or regulation. See State v.
Miles, 160 Wn.2d 236, 248–51, 156 P.3d 864 (2007); see also Bosteder v.
Renton, 155 Wn.2d 18, 29, 117 P.3d 316 (2006) (holding that
administrative warrants are not constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment except when made pursuant to an authorizing statute or rule).
Warrants are also not always required for license, registration, and
equipment spot checks of vehicles. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496
U.S. 444, 455, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (holding that a
non-random highway sobriety checkpoint program did not violate the
Fourth Amendment). However, some random spot checks require warrants
if the officer has discretion over which vehicles to stop. Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979).
Importantly, Washington has held sobriety checkpoints to be
unconstitutional. City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 456, 755 P.2d
775 (1988). Additionally, Washington courts found a statute
unconstitutional because it allowed state patrol officers to stop any motor
vehicle and require the driver to display his or her driver’s license and
submit the vehicle to an inspection to ascertain whether the vehicle
complied with minimum requirements. State v. Marchand, 104 Wn.2d
434, 441, 706 P.2d 225 (1985).
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6.4(c) Level of Proof Requirements
To obtain an administrative warrant to search commercial or
residential premises, law enforcement officers must offer specific proof of
a violation, or show that “reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied with respect to a
particular [establishment].” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307,
320 21, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978) (brackets in original)
(citation omitted) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538, 87
S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967)). However, when fire officials seek
an administrative warrant to determine the recent cause of a fire, “fire
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has occurred
on the premises, that the scope of the proposed search is reasonable and
will not intrude unnecessarily on the fire victim’s privacy, and that the
search will be executed at a reasonable and convenient time.” Michigan v.
Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294, 104 S. Ct. 641, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984).
When officers seek a warrant based on a general administrative
program, they must set forth sufficient details of the program to enable the
magistrate to determine whether the program is reasonable. City of Seattle
v. Leach, 29 Wn. App. 81, 85, 627 P.2d 159 (1981). Conclusory statements
are inadequate. Id.

CHAPTER 7
The Exclusionary Rule
Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained in violation of a
person’s constitutional rights must be suppressed in a defendant’s criminal
trial. State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 176, 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v.
Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 393, 5 P.3d 668 (2000). The exclusionary rule
applies both to federal and state violations of the Fourth Amendment,
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961),
as well as violations of article I, section 7, State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d
620, 633, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009) (the general rule is that “violation of a
constitutional immunity automatically implies exclusion of the evidence
seized”) (quoting State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990)).
This chapter addresses five topics: first, general considerations of the
exclusionary rule; second, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule; third, the rule’s operation in non-trial settings; fourth, searches by
private individuals; and finally, exclusion of evidence as fruit of the
poisonous tree and various exceptions to the rule.
7.0 INTRODUCTION
As stated above, the exclusionary rule operates to suppress any
evidence found through unconstitutional government action. State v.
Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 176, 43 P.3d 513 (2002). The exclusionary rule
prohibits the use of “derivative evidence,” real or testimonial, that is the
“fruit,” or product, of the illegally obtained evidence. Murray v. United
States, 487 U.S. 533, 536, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 101 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1988); State
v. Smith, 165 Wn. App. 296, 309, 266 P.3d 250 (2011), aff’d on other
grounds, 177 Wn.2d 533, 303 P.3d 1047 (2013); see, e.g., State v. Samalia,
186 Wn.2d 262, 279, 375 P.3d 1082 (2016); State v. Hinton, 179 Wn.2d
862, 869 n.2, 319 P.3d 9 (2014); State v. Faford, 128 Wn.2d 476, 488, 910
P.2d 447 (1996); State v. Salinas, 121 Wn.2d 689, 697, 853 P.2d 439
(1993). However, if the evidence will be used only as impeachment
evidence and not in the government’s case-in-chief, the evidence may be
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admissible for the limited purpose of impeachment. Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62, 64–65, 74 S. Ct. 354, 98 L. Ed. 503 (1954); State v.
Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 179–80, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980); see also United
States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627–28, 100 S. Ct. 1912, 64 L. Ed. 2d 559
(1980) (defendant’s statements in cross-examination also subject to
impeachment by illegally obtained evidence that is inadmissible as
substantive evidence of guilt).
Although most of the discussion in this section centers upon the
exclusion of evidence when compelled by the federal or state constitutions,
statutory law can also provide the basis for exclusion of evidence. See,
e.g., State v. Williams, 94 Wn.2d 531, 541, 617 P.2d 1012 (1980)
(recordings made in violation of Washington privacy statute, although
permitted under federal wiretap statute, are inadmissible in state court
proceedings); see 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.5(b) (5th
ed. 2012) (state may compel exclusion of illegally seized evidence even
when the federal constitution does not require such exclusion).
7.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
This section first explores the standing requirements under article I,
section 7. Next, it examines the broad differences between the application
of the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment and the rule under
article I, section 7. Lastly, the section discusses the criticisms of a broadreaching exclusionary rule.
7.1(a) Standing
A defendant must have standing to object to a search or seizure, but,
while the U.S. Supreme Court has abandoned the automatic standing
doctrine, United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 65 L. Ed.
2d 619 (1980), a Washington defendant may rely on automatic standing if
the challenged police action produced the adverse evidence. See State v.
Jones, 146 Wn.2d 328, 331–35, 45 P.3d 1062 (2002); State v. Williams,
142 Wn.2d 17, 21–23, 11 P.3d 714 (2000). Still, a defendant asserting
automatic standing must assert his or her own rights, not those of a thirdparty. State v. Libero, 168 Wn. App. 612, 619, 277 P.3d 708 (2012)
(holding that while a defendant could challenge the legality of a search
through asserting automatic standing, he still must show a violation of his
own rights to suppress the challenged evidence); see State v. Hinton, 179
Wn.2d 862, 869 n.2, 319 P.3d 9 (2014) (a defendant has standing to
challenge a search upon showing it infringed upon his privacy rights). For
a general discussion of standing, see 1 LaFave, supra § 1.6.
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To invoke the exclusionary rule, a defendant must make a timely
objection. State v. Valladares, 31 Wn. App. 63, 76, 639 P.2d 813 (1982),
rev’d in part on other grounds, 99 Wn.2d 663, 664 P.2d 508 (1983).
7.1(b) Difference in Purpose Between the Fourth Amendment and
Article I, Section 7
The differences between the federal and state exclusionary rules are
largely based on the difference in wording and intent between the Fourth
Amendment and article I, section 7. Historically, the exclusionary rule
served (1) to deter unreasonable searches and seizures, Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 656, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961); (2) to preserve
judicial integrity by preventing courts from becoming accomplices to the
willful disobedience of the Constitution, id. at 659, 81 S. Ct. 1684; and (3)
to sustain the public’s belief that the government will not profit from
lawless behavior, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357, 94 S. Ct.
613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The U.S. Supreme
Court considers deterrence of police misconduct to be the most important
justification to the rule. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 18, 104
S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984).
Conversely, the primary purpose of article I, section 7 underlying the
exclusionary rule is the protection of individual privacy interests against
unreasonable governmental intrusions. See State v. Winterstein, 167
Wn.2d 620, 631−32, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009); see also State v. Afana, 169
Wn.2d 169, 180, 233 P.3d 879 (2010); State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166,
176–77, 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Rife, 133 Wn.2d 140, 148, 943 P.2d
266 (1997). As a secondary concern, the rule also deters unlawful police
activity and preserves the integrity of the judiciary by excluding evidence
obtained through illegal means. See Afana, 169 Wn.2d at 180, 233 P.3d
879; Rife, 133 Wn.2d at 148, 943 P.2d 266. Thus, while the Fourth
Amendment is primarily concerned with deterrence of police conduct,
article I, section 7 is more concerned with individual privacy. Compare
State v. Crawley, 61 Wn. App. 29, 35, 808 P.2d 773 (1991), and State v.
White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 109–12, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982), with Leon, 468 U.S.
at 916 18, 104 S. Ct. 3405.
7.1(c) Criticism of the Exclusionary Rule
A number of judges and legal scholars have opposed a broadreaching exclusionary rule. See generally 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 1.2(a) (5th ed. 2004). First, commentators argue that the rule
impedes the police by handicapping the detection and prosecution of
crime. Id. § 1.2(a), at 32–33. On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment
itself, not the rule, has that effect. Id. This very argument was rejected
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when the Amendment was adopted. See id. at 33. In fact, commentators
suggest that illegally issued warrants cause the loss of only a negligible
portion of felony arrests. See id. § 1.3(c), at 75.
Second, commentators argue that the rule only aids the guilty and
does not deter illegal police action. Id. § 1.2(b), at 36 39. After the rule’s
creation, however, there was a dramatic increase in the number of warrant
applications and the number of police academy classes offering instruction
on obtaining evidence in a manner that does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed.
2d 1067 (1976). As a result of the rule’s deterrent effect, innocent persons
are spared intrusive, illegal police procedures. 1 LaFave, supra § 1.2(a), at
32–33. Suggested alternatives to the exclusionary rule include providing
civil damages as the sole remedy, limiting the rule to knowing violations,
or limiting the rule to minor crimes. See generally id. § 1.2(a) (f), at 31–
67; see also Samuel Estreicher & Daniel P. Weick, Opting for a
Legislative Alternative to the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 78
UMKC L. REV. 949 (2010) (proposing legislation providing for
comprehensive overview by the Department of Justice of agency-byagency constitutional compliance programs); L. Timothy Perrin, If It’s
Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV.
669 (1998) (providing an empirical study of the exclusionary rule and
suggesting a civil administrative remedy to partially replace the rule);
Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363 (1999) (suggesting an administrative damages
regime wherein Fourth Amendment violations could be brought directly
against police).
7.2 UNLAWFUL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES CONDUCTED IN GOOD FAITH
While federal courts have adopted a good-faith-reliance exception to
the exclusionary rule, Washington courts have rejected such an exception.
See State v. Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169, 184, 233 P.3d 879 (2010); State v.
Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 212, 720 P.2d 838 (1986) (declining to apply “good
faith” exception under the Washington constitution). This distinction
stems from the fact that, unlike the Fourth Amendment, article I, section 7
of the Washington State Constitution “clearly recognizes an individual’s
right to privacy with no express limitations.” Afana, 169 Wn.2d at 180,
233 P.3d 879 (quoting State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 110, 640 P.2d 1061
(1982)). Thus, even if an officer acts in good faith reliance on an invalid
warrant, the evidence must be suppressed. State v. Crawley, 61 Wn. App.
29, 35, 808 P.2d 773 (1991).
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Under the federal good-faith exception, the exclusionary rule does
not apply when evidence is seized in reasonable, good faith reliance on a
search warrant that the court later finds to be unsupported by probable
cause. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919–21, 104 S. Ct. 3405,
82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). This good-faith exception applies because “the
marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence
obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated
search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” Id. at 922,
104 S. Ct. 3405. Likewise, if the warrant is technically invalid, the
evidence may be admitted when the police reasonably believed that the
search was valid. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987–88, 104
S. Ct. 3424, 82 L. Ed. 2d 737 (1984). Moreover, when police mistakes are
the result of negligence rather than systemic error or reckless disregard,
the exclusionary rule does not dictate suppression. Herring v. United
States, 555 U.S. 135, 129 S. Ct. 695, 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009).
7.3 APPLICATIONS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS OTHER THAN TRIALS
During a trial, the exclusionary rule applies in full force. State v.
Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 176, 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Kinzy, 141
Wn.2d 373, 393, 5 P.3d 668 (2000). The rule, however, is not likely to
apply in other portions of the trial process. The following sections discuss
applications of the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings other than
trials.
7.3(a) Application of the Exclusionary Rule to Pre-Trial Matters
A person testifying before a grand jury may not refuse to answer
questions on the ground that the questions are based on evidence derived
from an illegal search. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349–50,
94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974). The exclusionary rule is not applied
to grand jury proceedings because its application would have only a
marginal deterrent effect. Id. at 351–52, 94 S. Ct. 613. In determining
whether to employ the rule, courts weigh the deterrent value of applying
the rule against the costs of excluding the type of evidence in question. Id.
at 349, 94 S. Ct. 613.
The exclusionary rule does not apply to indictments based on
illegally obtained evidence. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 350, 78
S. Ct. 311, 2 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1958). Again, excluding the evidence, even if
it means dismissing an indictment, would have only marginal deterrent
value. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 351–52, 94 S. Ct. 613.
Illegally seized evidence may be considered in determining whether
there is probable cause to believe that the accused committed the crime
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charged. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 488, 78 S. Ct. 1245,
2 L. Ed. 2d 1503 (1958) (holding that it would not be sound judicial
administration to remand to district court for a special hearing regarding
probable cause because illegally seized evidence was introduced at trial).
For example, recordings made by federal agents in a matter inconsistent
with state law (therefore, inadmissible at trial), nevertheless, may be used
to furnish probable cause for a court-sanctioned search. State v. O’Neill,
103 Wn.2d 853, 867–72, 700 P.2d 711 (1985).
The Washington Supreme Court has not yet decided whether
illegally obtained evidence must be suppressed at a bail hearing. Other
jurisdictions that have considered the issue suggest that the evidence may
not be suppressed. See State v. Tucker, 101 N.J. Super. 380, 383, 244 A.2d
353 (1968) (no need to go into detail concerning admissibility of the
evidence for purposes of bail application when state makes prima facie
showing of admissibility); Steigler v. Super. Ct., 252 A.2d 300, 305 (Del.
1969).
7.3(b) Application of the Exclusionary Rule to Post-Trial Matters
Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, effective July 1,
1984, structured, but did not eliminate, discretionary decisions affecting
sentencing. RCW 9.94A.010. Under this provision, the sentencing process
is limited to the present conviction and the defendant’s prior convictions.
As a result, illegally obtained evidence may not be admitted. This contrasts
somewhat with sentencing under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The
majority of circuits have maintained that the exclusionary rule does not
apply in sentencing hearings. See United States v. Kim, 25 F.3d 1426,
1432–36 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Montoya-Ortiz, 7 F.3d 1171,
1181–82 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jenkins, 4 F.3d 1338, 1344–45
(6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1260–61 (2d Cir.
1992); United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1234 (11th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Torres, 926 F.2d 321, 324–25 (3d Cir. 1991).
Washington courts are divided on whether article I, section 7 requires
the application of the exclusionary rule to probation revocation hearings.
State v. Murray, 110 Wn.2d 706, 708 09, 757 P.2d 487 (1988)
(recognizing the division and uncertainty that exists around the article I,
section 7 exclusionary rule in revocation hearings, but not resolving the
uncertainty). Compare, e.g., State v. Kuhn, 7 Wn. App. 190, 194, 499 P.2d
49 (1972) (excluding evidence obtained as result of an illegal search is not
applicable to probation revocation hearings), with State v. Lampman, 45
Wn. App. 228, 232, 724 P.2d 1092 (1986) (requiring application without
exception to probation revocation proceedings). Notably, there must be a
“nexus between the property search and the alleged probation violation.”
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State v. Cornwell, 190 Wn.2d 296, 304, 412 P.3d 1265 (2018). However,
because parolees experience a lower expectation of privacy, it is less likely
that evidence will be illegally obtained while the parolee is on release.
State v. Parris, 163 Wn. App. 110, 117, 259 P.3d 331 (2011).
Under the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule does not apply
to parole revocation hearings. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S.
357, 365–66, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 141 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1998). The Court has
reasoned that applying the exclusionary rule would hinder the functions of
the state parole systems and alter the traditionally flexible administrative
nature of parole revocation proceedings, while providing only minimal
deterrence benefits. Id. at 364, 118 S. Ct. 2014.
7.4 APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN QUASI-CRIMINAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
While Washington courts have rarely addressed the matter, the
exclusionary rule has been applied in quasi-criminal and administrative
proceedings as well. First, the exclusionary rule has generally been applied
in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In Washington, criminal court rules
are automatically applied to juvenile proceedings. JuCR 1.4(b). Other
jurisdictions have also taken this approach. See In re Robert T., 8 Cal. App.
3d 990, 993, 88 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1970); In re Marsh, 40 Ill. 2d 53, 55, 237
N.E.2d 529 (1968). However, some jurisdictions have found that it might
be unwise to apply the rule in dependency hearings based on the possible
damage to the child. See, e.g., In re Christopher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608,
615, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1978). Along the same reasoning, the rule has not
been applied to other conservatorship proceedings because of concern for
the individual’s well-being and society’s safety. See Conservatorship of
Susan T., 8 Cal. 4th 1005, 1019–20, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 40, 884 P.2d 988
(1994).
Second, whether the exclusionary rule is applied in an administrative
proceeding depends on the nature of the proceeding. If the proceeding is
closer to criminal in nature, then the rule will be applied. For example, the
exclusionary rule is applied in forfeiture proceedings, requiring the
suppression of any illegally seized evidence used to prove the criminal
violation justifying the forfeiture. See, e.g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.
Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 702, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1965);
Deeter v. Smith, 106 Wn.2d 376, 378 79, 721 P.2d 519 (1986).
Courts have also applied the exclusionary rule when the disposition
is relatively significant and when application of the rule is likely to deter
unlawful searches and seizures. See New Brunswick v. Speights, 157 N.J.
Super. 9, 20 21, 384 A.2d 225 (1978) (policy of deterring unlawful
governmental conduct may be significant when subsequent disciplinary
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hearing directed at police officer charged with criminal violations was
foreseeable at time of search or seizure). In contrast, the exclusionary rule
is generally not applied to administrative proceedings. I.N.S. v. LopezMendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 82 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1984)
(exclusionary rule not applied in civil deportation hearings held by INS);
see also Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365, 118 S. Ct.
2014, 141 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1998) (exclusionary rule incompatible with
traditionally flexible administrative procedure). However, in the Ninth
Circuit, “administrative tribunals are still required to exclude evidence that
was ‘obtained by deliberate violations of the Fourth Amendment or by
conduct a reasonable officer should know is in violation of the
Constitution.’” Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th
Cir. 2008).
7.5 SEARCHES BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS
Article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment only apply to
government actor’s searches. As such, evidence found during a private
actor’s search need not be excluded if the search fails to conform to
constitutional requirements. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475, 41
S. Ct. 574, 65 L. Ed. 1048 (1921) (papers obtained through theft by a
private individual and delivered to federal prosecutors admissible against
defendant); State v. Clark, 48 Wn. App. 850, 855, 743 P.2d 822 (1987).
But the evidence must have come from an actively conducted search; if
the private individual merely observes incriminating evidence, article I,
section 7 protection will apply. See State v. Eisfeldt, 163 Wn.2d 628, 635–
39, 185 P.3d 580 (2008) (rejecting the private search doctrine under article
I, section 7); State v. Faford, 128 Wn.2d 476, 488–89, 910 P.2d 447 (1996)
(independent basis was required for police search made pursuant to
information obtained from a nosey neighbor who was eavesdropping on
the defendant’s cordless telephone conversations).
Importantly, once the private party gives the evidence to the
government, the government search may not exceed the scope of the
private party’s previous search. In re Teddington, 116 Wn.2d 761, 766,
808 P.2d 156 (1991) (police properly read letter when sergeant had
inventoried defendant’s locker and turned over incriminating letter to
police); State v. Walter, 66 Wn. App. 862, 866, 833 P.2d 440 (1992) (no
violation when photo lab turns pictures over to police). The intrusion is
considered of the same scope even if officers test a substance that was
merely looked at by the private party. State v. Bishop, 43 Wn. App. 17, 20,
714 P.2d 1199 (1986) (no violation when police reopened packets and
tested substance that was found by private security guard in the telephone
mouthpiece of defendant’s hospital room).
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7.5(a) Government Involvement
For a search to be truly “private”—therefore, not subject to
constitutional limitations—the actor must not be a government actor nor
acting under the state’s authority. Kuehn v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 103
Wn.2d 594, 600, 694 P.2d 1078 (1985) (when private person acts under
authority of state, Fourth Amendment applies; thus, school search of
students’ luggage must conform to constitutional requirements). If the
actor is a private individual, the defendant has the burden of proving that
he or she conducted the search as an agent or instrumentality of the state.
State v. Swenson, 104 Wn. App. 744, 754, 9 P.3d 933, 938 (2000); State
v. Clark, 48 Wn. App. 850, 856, 743 P.2d 822 (1987).
Under an agency theory, a search is not private if a government
officer ordered or requested it. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465,
474 75, 41 S. Ct. 574, 65 L. Ed. 1048 (1921). For example, an airline
employee’s search was not private when conducted under the supervision
of government agents’ request. Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th
Cir. 1966); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336, 105 S. Ct.
733, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985) (holding that school officials act as
representatives of the state and as such are government actors). No agency
relationship exists unless the state actively encourages or instigates the
citizen’s actions. See Clark, 48 Wn. App. at 855 56, 743 P.2d 822. Courts
consider as factors the State’s knowledge of and acquiescence in the search
and whether the citizen’s intent was to assist law enforcement efforts or to
further his or her own end. Swenson, 104 Wn. App. at 753, 9 P.3d 933
(father intended to assist police by obtaining defendant’s phone records
and, although police knew of the father’s efforts, there was no evidence
that they instigated, encouraged, counseled, or directed the father to obtain
the phone records).
Under a joint endeavor theory, when the police accompany a citizen
on a search, the search becomes a government search. Corngold, 367 F.2d
at 5 6 (contraband discovered by airline agents inadmissible when
government agents actively joined in search). “It is immaterial whether the
official originated the idea or simply joined in it while the search was in
progress.” Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79, 69 S. Ct. 1372, 93 L.
Ed. 1819 (1949). But even if the police are summoned before the search
begins and are present as it occurs, the search may still be considered
private if a private purpose is served. United States v. Lamar, 545 F.2d
488, 490 (5th Cir. 1977) (heroin admissible when discovered by airline
agent who opened unclaimed bag to determine its owner, because it was a
private search even though a police officer was present during search).
If a public employee conducts a search in his or her private capacity,
the search is not a state action merely because the individual is a public
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employee. State v. Ludvik, 40 Wn. App. 257, 263, 698 P.2d 1064 (1985)
(state game warden, residing across the street from defendant, observed
suspected drug transactions and informed police). Searches by off-duty
police officers are considered private if the officers acted as private
citizens and if the search or seizure was unconnected with their duties as
police officers. People v. Wachter, 58 Cal. App. 3d 911, 920–21, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 279 (1976) (deputy sheriff acted as private citizen when he notified
law enforcement officials of defendant’s marijuana plants). When a
private party, however, acts as a police officer, has a strong interest in
obtaining convictions, and is familiar with search and seizure law, the
purposes of the exclusionary rule are served by suppression and the rule
will apply. See Commonwealth v. Eshelman, 477 Pa. 93, 100, 383 A.2d
838 (1978).
Lastly, a majority of jurisdictions have decided that when evidence
is seized to aid the government and the government had prior knowledge
that the seizure would occur, the taint of the illegal action is transferred to
the government. See United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1327–28
(5th Cir. 1975) (copies of fraudulent claims allowed into evidence because
defendant failed to prove that federal investigators knew nurse had
illegally copied records for government use).
7.6 VIOLATION OF WARRANT PROCEDURE
“[A]bsent a showing of prejudice to the defendant, procedural
noncompliance does not compel invalidation of an otherwise sufficient
warrant or suppression of its fruits.” State v. Aase, 121 Wn. App. 558, 567,
89 P.3d 721 (2004) (emphasis omitted). For example, when the police
failed to give a defendant a copy of the warrant before commencing an
otherwise lawful search, the evidence was still admissible because the
defendant was not prejudiced by receiving the warrant several minutes
after the search began, and the search would not have been less intrusive
had the defendant been able to immediately see the warrant. State v. Kern,
81 Wn. App. 308, 311, 914 P.2d 114 (1996).
7.7 DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE AS “FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE”:
GENERAL RULE
Whether evidence obtained illegally will be suppressed depends on
the extent to which the evidence derives from exploitation of the illegality.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d
441 (1963) (The question is “whether, granting establishment of the
primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has
been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”) (internal
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quotations omitted); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385, 392, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319 (1920); State v. Byers, 88 Wn.2d 1,
10, 559 P.2d 1334 (1977) (defendants’ confessions inadmissible when
obtained as a result of defendants being in custody after an unlawful arrest
and being confronted with illegally obtained evidence); State v.
Magneson, 107 Wn. App. 221, 226–27, 26 P.3d 986 (2001) (evidence was
not admissible under the plain view doctrine when officers entered home
with what was later determined to be an invalid search warrant and seized
drugs from a third person in the home at the time of the search); State v.
McReynolds, 104 Wn. App. 560, 571, 17 P.3d 608 (2000) (court remanded
for lack of findings regarding whether subsequently obtained evidence
from valid warrants was tainted by an illegal search). The following
sections discuss three exceptions that have been used to determine whether
a given piece of evidence constitutes derivative “fruit of the poisonous
tree” and should therefore be suppressed. See generally 6 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4 (5th ed. 2004).
7.7(a) Attenuation Test
The attenuation test suggests that where there are intervening,
independent factors along the chain of causation, the taint of illegally
obtained evidence becomes so dissipated as to preclude suppression of
derivative evidence as “fruit” of the illegal police action. State v. Warner,
125 Wn.2d 876, 888, 889 P.2d 479 (1995) (remanded for determination of
whether both sources of information were compelled; if only one was
compelled, the other would constitute independent source and any “fruits”
need not be excluded); see 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4
(5th ed. 2012). Put another way, the detrimental consequences of
excluding the evidence become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of
the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590, 608 09, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring); State v. Spotted Elk, 109 Wn. App. 253, 262, 34 P.3d 906
(2001) (finding that the defendant’s and parole officer’s testimony was
insufficiently attenuated from a law enforcement officer’s Miranda
violation because the defendant’s improperly admitted incriminatory
statements regarding heroin compelled her to explain and later testify
about why she was carrying the substance); State v. Reid, 38 Wn. App.
203, 213, 687 P.2d 861 (1984).
For example, in Reid, the police arrested the defendant shortly after
he emerged from his apartment building and got into a car. Reid, 38 Wn.
App. at 205, 687 P.2d 861. When the defendant refused to identify which
apartment unit he had exited, police seized the defendant’s keys from the
car, entered the building, and used the keys to unlock the door to one of
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the apartments. Id. at 205 06, 687 P.2d 861. The police then entered the
apartment, observed evidence in plain view, and later returned and seized
the evidence pursuant to a warrant. Id. at 206, 687 P.2d 861. The court
reasoned that even if the initial seizure of the keys was unlawful, the
evidence taken from the apartment would be admissible because the
seizure of the evidence “was so attenuated that the taint of the seizure of
the keys had dissipated.” Id. at 208–09, 687 P.2d 861. “[B]ystanders had
identified the door through which the defendant had often entered and
exited. [Thus,] [t]he keys were not utilized in the manner of a divining rod
to locate [the defendant’s] apartment but rather to facilitate access to [the]
residence and to confirm from which door the defendant had exited.” Id.
at 209, 687 P.2d 861.
As of the end of 2018, Washington courts have not explicitly adopted
the attenuation doctrine, but they have applied it. See State v. Eserjose,
171 Wn.2d 907, 919, 259 P.3d 172 (2011) (evaluating the challenged
evidence to see if it was “fruit of the poisonous tree” or so “attenuated as
to dissipate the taint”); cf State v. Samalia, 186 Wn.2d 262, 279, 375 P.3d
1082 (2016) (limiting the application of attenuation when not asserted or
supported in response to suppressing evidence at the trial level). But see
State v. Mayfield, 192 Wn.2d 871, 434 P.3d 58 (2019) (explicitly adopting
a narrow application of the attenuation doctrine compatible with article I,
section 7). The court in Eserjose held that the defendant’s confession
obtained at the sheriff’s office following an illegal arrest at the defendant’s
home was an act of free will sufficient to purge the primary taint of the
illegal arrest. Id. at 929, 259 P.3d 172.
7.7(b) Independent Source Test
Under the independent source exception, illegally obtained evidence
is not suppressed under the exclusionary rule when the evidence was
ultimately obtained pursuant to a valid warrant or other lawful means,
independent of the unlawful government action. State v. Gaines, 154
Wn.2d 711, 718, 116 P.3d 993 (2005). Thus, “where an unlawful [action]
has given investigators knowledge of facts x and y, but fact z has been
learned by other means, fact z can be said to be admissible because [it is]
derived from an ‘independent source.’” Murray v. United States, 487 U.S.
533, 538, 108 S. Ct. 2533, 101 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1988). When police lawfully
obtain evidence, the fact that police also came by the evidence unlawfully
does not make the evidence suppressible. State v. O’Bremski, 70 Wn.2d
425, 429 30, 423 P.2d 530 (1967) (a missing child’s testimony was
admissible because she was not discovered solely as a result of unlawful
search). The underlying policy is that, although the government should not
benefit from illegal activity, it should not end up in a worse position than
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it otherwise would have been if it had not performed the illegal activity.
Murray, 487 U.S. at 542, 108 S. Ct. 2533.
The independent source exception has been held to comply with
article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. Gaines, 154
Wn.2d at 722, 116 P.3d 993 (probable cause existed to search trunk
independent of initial, illegal search and police would have sought a
warrant for the trunk even absent the initial, illegal search). Under the
exception, unlawful police activity does not invalidate a later search if (1)
the search warrant was based on independently obtained information, and
(2) the police were not motivated by the prior unlawful activity in seeking
the search warrant. State v. Miles, 159 Wn. App. 282, 284, 244 P.3d 1030
(2011); see also State v. Smith, 165 Wn. App. 296, 266 P.3d 250 (2011),
aff’d on other grounds, 177 Wn.2d 533, 303 P.3d 1047 (2012) (police
entry into motel room was based on independent information because
victim sought police assistance as community caretakers and the
emergency need was an intervening factor that allowed emergency aid
exception to the warrant requirement).
7.7(c) Inevitable Discovery Doctrine
The last exception to the exclusionary rule is the inevitable discovery
doctrine. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 81 L. Ed.
2d 377 (1984). Unlike federal courts, Washington courts do not recognize
the inevitable discovery doctrine. State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 220
P.3d 1226 (2009). This is attributed to the express protection of individual
privacy in article I, section 7 and the Washington State Supreme Court’s
dislike of the doctrine’s speculative analysis. See id. at 635, 220 P.3d
1226; State v. Hilton, 164 Wn. App. 81, 91−92, 261 P.3d 683 (2011)
(“Washington courts will not entertain the speculative question about
whether the police ultimately would have obtained the same information
by other, lawful means.”).
Under the federal exception, the inevitable discovery doctrine is an
extrapolation of the independent source doctrine: if evidence is admissible
because it was discovered through an independent source, then it should
be admissible if it would have inevitably been discovered through an
independent source. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539, 108 S.
Ct. 2535, 101 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1988); see also Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, 104 S.
Ct. 2501 (location of murdered child’s body derived from coerced
statement was not suppressed when searchers would have located child
anyway). Under the doctrine, originally tainted evidence is admissible if
the police, while following routine procedure, would inevitably have
uncovered the evidence. United States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711, 721 (9th
Cir. 2009). This reasoning requires a “speculative analysis” of police
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behavior. State v. Smith, 165 Wn. App. 296, 310, 266 P.3d 250 (2011).
Specifically, the doctrine examines the police’s actions and their
motivations to take such actions. Hilton, 164 Wn. App. at 92, 261 P.3d
683. However, the doctrine does not excuse police failure to obtain a
search warrant where the police had probable cause, but simply did not
seek to obtain a warrant. Young, 573 F.3d at 723 (inevitable discovery
doctrine did not apply when police failed to secure a warrant to search
defendant’s hotel room after defendant was arrested, but before defendant
had checked out).
7.8 EVIDENCE DISCOVERED AS A RESULT OF ILLEGAL ARREST
OR DETENTION
7.8(a) Confession as Fruit of Illegal Arrest
Generally, when a defendant voluntarily confesses, a court may
admit the defendant’s confession into evidence consistent with the Fifth
Amendment. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 379, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L.
Ed. 2d 908 (1964). However, when a confession is the fruit of an illegal
seizure, the court must ensure that the confession is admissible despite the
constitutional violation. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600 03, 95 S. Ct.
2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975); see State v. Dane, 89 Wn. App. 226,
233 34, 948 P.2d 1326 (1997). In many cases, the temporal location of
the illegal arrest in relation to the confession will be a deciding factor. For
example, a confession made immediately upon an illegal entry and arrest
is excludable, but when a suspect is released after an illegal arrest and later
returns to the police station to make a confession, the confession is
admissible because its taint has dissipated. Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 491, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963).
There are three other factors to determine whether the taint of a
confession has dissipated. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603 05, 95 S. Ct. 2254.
First, the giving of Miranda warnings may indicate sufficient attenuation.
Id. However, the fact that a defendant received and understood Miranda
warnings is not sufficient by itself to purge the taint of an illegal seizure.
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 17, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 60 L. Ed.
2d 824 (1979). When a person is unlawfully detained because probable
cause is lacking, but is not formally arrested, the confession is inadmissible
even if the person was first given Miranda warnings so long as his or her
confession is causally connected to the detention. Id. at 117–18, 99 S. Ct.
2248.
Second, the presence of any intervening circumstances may provide
sufficient attenuation. The court in State v. Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d 907,
919 29, 259 P.3d 172 (2011), held that the defendant’s confession
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obtained at the sheriff’s office following an illegal arrest at the defendant’s
home was an act of free will sufficient to purge the primary taint of the
illegal arrest. Id. The arrest was illegal because of lack of consent, and the
defendant only confessed later at the police station upon hearing that his
co-conspirator had implicated him. Id. Because the co-conspirator’s
confession elicited the defendant’s confession, and not the illegal arrest,
the intervening circumstance was sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal
arrest. Id.
Lastly, the officer’s purpose and the level of the constitutional
violation are also instructive in determining whether the confession should
be suppressed. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603 05, 95 S. Ct. 2254; see also State
v. Johnston, 38 Wn. App. 793, 800 01, 690 P.2d 591 (1984).
7.8(b) Search as Fruit of Illegal Arrest or Detention
When a search is incidental to an illegal arrest, courts may suppress
the fruits of the search unless intervening factors, such as a valid arrest,
occur between the illegal arrest and the search. United States v. Walker,
535 F.2d 896, 898 99 (5th Cir. 1976). The search may also be purged of
the taint by voluntary consent to the search; the voluntariness of the
consent may be determined by reference to the Brown factors, as outlined
in section 7.8(a) above. See generally 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 11.4(b) (5th ed. 2012); see also State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wn.2d
207, 212, 533 P.2d 123 (1975).
The defendant’s voluntarily statement does not prove the
voluntariness of consent. State v. Avila-Avina, 99 Wn. App. 9, 15–16, 991
P.2d 720 (2000), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Winterstein, 167
Wn.2d 620, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009); 4 LaFave, supra § 8.1(a) (c).
Washington courts have considered the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether consent to a search incident to arrest was voluntary.
State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 588 89, 62 P.3d 489 (2003) (stating that
repeated requests for consent is one factor to consider); State v. Tagas, 121
Wn. App. 872, 876, 90 P.3d 1088 (2004) (agreeing that totality of
circumstances is normally the appropriate test); cf. supra §§ 5.9−5.10
(Ferrier warnings).
7.8(c) Identification of the Suspect as Fruit of Illegal Arrest
Whether illegally obtained evidence may be used to identify the
defendant varies based on the means of identification. Washington courts
have rarely considered the issue, but courts in other jurisdictions have
excluded evidence of post-arrest identifications, at-trial identification,
photo identification, and fingerprinting. First, in Washington, a court has
found that a post-arrest identification by one officer immediately after a
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warrantless arrest was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest
and therefore had to be suppressed. State v. Le, 103 Wn. App. 354, 362 65,
12 P.3d 653 (2000) (admitting the identification would “conveniently
assum[e] that the police would eventually effect a lawful arrest of the
defendant . . . . [S]uch a result would eviscerate the exclusionary rule by
readily excusing police failure to obtain a warrant.”). Under the Fourth
Amendment, the evidence may be admitted if, under the Brown factors,
the link between the illegal action and the identification is broken. See
supra § 7.8(a); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365, 92 S. Ct. 1620,
32 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1972) (defendant may consent to lineup and hence purge
taint of illegal action). See generally 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 11.4(a) (j) (5th ed. 2012). Of course, if police make flagrantly
illegal arrests for the purpose of securing identifications that otherwise
could not have been obtained, the identifications are inadmissible. United
States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 584 (2d Cir. 1970).
The second issue arises when a witness identified the defendant in
court but had also previously identified the defendant at a line-up
following the illegal arrest. Because the arrest was illegal, the initial lineup identification was illegal. If both the police officer’s knowledge of the
accused’s identity and the victim’s independent recollection of the accused
predate the unlawful arrest, the victim’s in-court identification of the
accused is untainted by either the arrest or the pretrial identification arising
therefrom. State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 546 47, 688 P.2d 859 (1984).
A basic attenuation test is applied, but with additional factors specific to
in-court identification. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 100 S.
Ct. 1244, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537 (1980). The court should also consider (1) the
witness’s prior opportunity to observe the criminal act; (2) any
discrepancy between the defendant’s pre-lineup description and the
defendant’s actual description; (3) the identification of someone else prior
to the lineup; (4) identification of the defendant’s picture before the lineup;
(5) failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion; and (6) the time
between the criminal act and the lineup identification. United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967).
Courts have excluded other types of evidence identifying the
defendant if the evidence was associated with an unlawful arrest. A photo
identification produced by an unlawful arrest is not admissible. Crews, 445
U.S. at 474, 100 S. Ct. 1244. And fingerprints must be suppressed when
police unlawfully arrest a suspect for the purpose of obtaining the
suspect’s fingerprints so as to prosecute the suspect for the crime of arrest.
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727, 89 S. Ct. 1394, 22 L. Ed. 2d 676
(1969).
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7.9 TYPES OF EVIDENCE DISCOVERED AS A RESULT OF
AN ILLEGAL SEARCH
7.9(a) Confession as Fruit of Illegal Search
Attenuation, including the Brown factors, is not applicable to a
confession following an unlawful search. See supra § 7.8(a). Unlike an
unlawful arrest, a suspect is more likely to confess as a result of an
unlawful search. People v. Robbins, 54 Ill. App. 3d 298, 304 05, 369
N.E.2d 577, 12 Ill. Dec. 80 (1977); see also State v. Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d
907, 917, 259 P.3d 172 (2011) (defendant’s confession following illegal
arrest not suppressed “since ‘[a]n illegal arrest, without more, has never
been viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution, nor as a defense to a valid
conviction.’”) (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 100 S.
Ct. 1244, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537 (1980)). Thus, a confession is suppressible if it
would not have been made but for the illegal search. See State v. White, 97
Wn.2d 92, 102 04, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982).
7.9(b) Search or Arrest as Fruit of Illegal Search
An illegal search that took place prior to securing a valid warrant will
not invalidate the execution of that warrant, assuming it is based on
untainted evidence; evidence seized during the execution of the valid
warrant will be admissible. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 814,
104 S. Ct. 3380, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1984) (second search of home is not
tainted by prior illegal entry). But if the search warrant for the second
search is supported by both tainted and untainted evidence, and the
untainted evidence alone does not establish probable cause, evidence
seized pursuant to the warrant must be excluded. State v. Ross, 141 Wn.2d
304, 314 15, 4 P.3d 130 (2000); see also United States v. Marchand, 564
F.2d 983, 1001 02 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. DiMuro, 540 F.2d 503,
515 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Nelson, 459 F.2d 884, 889 (6th Cir.
1972).
7.9(c) Testimony of Witness as Fruit of Illegal Search
Testimony and physical evidence are treated differently under the
exclusionary rule. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 277 79, 98 S.
Ct. 1054, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1978). Verbal testimony carries with it an
exercise of free will, and the cost of excluding the evidence is great.
Consequently, suppression of derivative witness testimony depends on
several factors. First, suppression depends on whether the search and
testimony were close in time. See id. at 277 78, 98 S. Ct. 1054 (witness
testimony not excluded where “substantial periods of time” had elapsed
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between the illegal search and the government’s first contact with the
witness).
Second, suppression depends on whether the witness testified freely.
See United States v. Karathanos, 531 F.2d 26, 35 (2d Cir. 1976) (testimony
by illegal aliens obtained as result of illegal search inadmissible because
testimony was prompted by government statements concerning future
prosecution). Suppression may also depend on whether the fruits of the
illegal search were used in questioning the witness. See State v. Rogers,
27 Ohio Op. 2d 105, 198 N.E.2d 796, 806 (1963) (testimony about gun
suppressed because witness would not have been questioned about gun but
for unlawful search). Testimony concerning an object seized during an
illegal search is inadmissible when the identification of the object is
established by use of the illegally seized object. State v. Swaite, 33 Wn.
App. 477, 484 n.4, 656 P.2d 520 (1982).
Third, suppression may depend on the officer’s intent and prior
knowledge of the existence of the witnesses. If the intent of an illegal
search was to find witnesses, the evidence should be excluded. See People
v. Martin, 382 Ill. 192, 201, 46 N.E.2d 997 (1942) (testimony of witnesses
suppressed when witnesses’ names were obtained from papers found
during illegal search). See generally Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S. Ct.
1054. Admission of the testimony is also more likely if the officers knew
of the witness’s existence before the search. See State v. O’Bremski, 70
Wn.2d 425, 429 30, 423 P.2d 530 (1967) (although girl was found during
illegal search, her testimony was admissible because her whereabouts
were discovered through independent information).
7.10 CRIME COMMITTED DURING ILLEGAL ARREST OR SEARCH
Generally, evidence that the defendant attempted to bribe or attack
an officer is admissible even if the arrest was illegal. State v. Mierz, 127
Wn.2d 460, 473 475, 901 P.2d 286 (1995). In addition, evidence of a
suspect speeding away from an unlawful traffic stop has been found
admissible at trial because it is considered sufficiently distinguishable
from the unlawful intrusion. State v. Owens, 39 Wn. App. 130, 135, 692
P.2d 850 (1984).
The rationale for admission of this evidence is that acts of free will
purge the taint of the illegal police activity; thus, the application of the
exclusionary rule would only marginally deter illegal police behavior. In
addition, exclusion would allow persons unlawfully arrested to assault
officers with minimal risk of criminal liability. Mierz, 127 Wn.2d at 474,
901 P.2d 286. The evidence would be inadmissible, however, if it were the
product of questionable police action. See id. at 475, 901 P.2d 286.
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7.11 WAIVER OR FORFEITURE OF OBJECTION
A defendant may waive or forfeit his or her constitutional objection
and render the objectionable evidence admissible in three ways: (1) by
failing to make a timely objection, (2) by testifying at trial about the
evidence, and (3) by entering a guilty plea. See 6 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 11.1(a), (c) (d) (5th ed. 2012).
7.11(a) Failure to Make a Timely Objection
Jurisdictions have different rules for what constitutes a timely
objection. Washington court rules provide that a defendant’s failure to
object at the omnibus hearing may constitute a waiver of the objection if
the party had knowledge of the illegality of the search or seizure prior to
the hearing. See Wash. CrR 4.5(d); see also State v. Lee, 162 Wn. App.
852, 857, 259 P.3d 294 (2011), review denied, 173 Wn.2d 1017, 272 P.3d
247 (2012) (“Under RAP 2.5(a), a party may raise manifest error affecting
a constitutional right for the first time on appeal. ‘A failure to move to
suppress evidence, however, constitutes a waiver of the right to have it
excluded.’” (footnote omitted)) (quoting State v. Mierz, 72 Wn. App. 783,
789, 866 P.2d 65 (1994)). Thus, a defendant’s failure to move to suppress
evidence at trial that he or she later contends was illegally gathered
constitutes a waiver of any error associated with the admission of the
evidence. Mierz, 127 Wn.2d at 468, 901 P.2d 286.
Importantly, a defendant may only appeal suppression issues on the
bases raised during the trial. State v. Garbaccio, 151 Wn. App. 716, 731,
214 P.3d 168 (2009), review denied, 168 Wn.2d 1027, 230 P.3d 1060
(2010) (reasoning that because the defendant’s “present contention was
not raised in his suppression motion, and because he did not seek a ruling
on this issue from the trial court, [the court] will not consider it for the first
time on appeal.”).
7.11(b) Testimony by Defendant Concerning Suppressed Evidence
Unless a timely objection was made, on appeal a defendant may not
raise a Fourth Amendment claim challenging the admission of evidence if
the defendant gave testimony at trial admitting to the possession of that
evidence. See State v. Peele, 10 Wn. App. 58, 67, 516 P.2d 788 (1973).
However, a Fourth Amendment claim may be raised on appeal if the
defendant’s testimony was induced by the erroneous admission of the
evidence. Id. at 67–68, 516 P.2d 788; see also Harrison v. United States,
392 U.S. 219, 224 25, 88 S. Ct. 2008, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1047 (1968). The
rationale for the general rule is that the testimony may make the admission
of the illegal evidence harmless error. See Peele, 10 Wn. App. at 66, 516
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P.2d 788. See generally 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.1(c)
(5th ed. 2004).
7.11(c) Guilty Plea
A defendant who has knowingly and voluntarily entered a guilty plea
may not thereafter obtain post-conviction relief on Fourth Amendment
grounds even though he or she made a timely motion to suppress the
evidence in advance of the plea. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258,
267, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1973). Courts recognize this
limitation because “[w]hen a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in
open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged,
he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation
of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.”
State v. Butler, 17 Wn. App. 666, 676, 564 P.2d 828 (1977) (citing Tollett,
411 U.S. at 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602). But if the plea itself can be characterized
as the fruit of illegally obtained evidence and should have been suppressed
upon the defendant’s timely motion, then the plea was not entered
voluntarily or knowingly. See Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602
(defendant may attack the voluntariness of the plea under the factors set
forth in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed.
2d 763 (1970)); see also State v. Wilson, 162 Wn. App. 409, 414–15, 417,
253 P.3d 1143 (2011) (“[A] ‘guilty plea waives or renders irrelevant all
constitutional violations that occurred before the guilty plea, except those
related to the circumstances of the plea or to the government’s legal power
to prosecute regardless of factual guilt.’”) (quoting State v. Brandenburg,
153 Wn. App. 944, 948, 223 P.3d 1259 (2009)).
7.12 HARMLESS ERROR
Even when illegally seized evidence has been improperly admitted
at trial, a conviction will not be reversed if the defendant would have been
convicted without its admission. See State v. Smith, 93 Wn.2d 329,
352 53, 610 P.2d 869 (1980); State v. Flicks, 91 Wn.2d 391, 396, 588
P.2d 1328 (1979). Where an error infringes on a constitutional right, the
error is presumed prejudicial, and the State bears the burden of proving the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Thompson, 151
Wn.2d 793, 808, 92 P.3d 228 (2004); State v. McReynolds, 117 Wn. App.
309, 326, 71 P.3d 663 (2003); State v. Spotted Elk, 109 Wn. App. 253,
261, 34 P.3d 906 (2001). A constitutional error is harmless if the appellate
court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that, in light of the
overwhelming untainted evidence, a jury would have reached the same
result in the absence of the error. State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412, 425, 705
P.2d 1182 (1985).
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CONCLUSION
Particulars of search and seizure law may change based upon the
circumstances of each case, but the types of issues raised and considered
are likely to remain similar. This survey attempts to expand upon basic
search and seizure issues by referencing recent Washington search and
seizure cases. While this survey is not comprehensive and will require
continual updating, we hope it will continue to be a useful tool for
practitioners and judges who must assess the scope of protection that the
Washington State Constitution and the U.S. Constitution afford persons
against unlawful searches and seizures.
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